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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1875, Representative James G. Blaine introduced into the United
States House of Representatives a proposed constitutional amendment that
would have barred states from spending public funds on "sectarian" institu-
tions-which were commonly understood as Catholic parochial schools-
while preserving Protestant instruction in the public schools.' The amend-
1. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion). "[I]t was an
open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic."' Id. (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine
Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 41-43 (1992)); Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 721 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the purpose of federal and
state Blaine amendment movements was "to make certain that government would not help pay
for 'sectarian' (i.e., Catholic) schooling for children"); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying
Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 50 (1997) ("Although there were le-
gitimate arguments to be made on both sides, the nineteenth century opposition to funding
religious schools drew heavily on anti-Catholicism."); Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anach-
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ment passed though the House, 180 to 7,2 but fell 4 votes shy in the Senate.'
All the same, the amendment enjoyed enough popular nativist support that
Congress required new states to adopt this language in their constitutions as a
condition of joining the union.4 In addition, many existing states, including
Florida, voluntarily adopted the language.
Florida first adopted its Blaine Amendment-the last phrase of the dec-
laration of rights, section 6-later than most other states in 1885,6 and then
readopted it with changes in the last sentence in article I, section 3 in 1968.7
ronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 375, 386
(1999) ("From the advent of publicly supported, compulsory education until very recently, aid
to sectarian schools primarily meant aid to Catholic schools as an enterprise to rival publicly
supported, essentially Protestant schools."); The Alarm About the Schools, THE NATION, Dec.
16, 1875, at 383 ("[The Blaine Amendment] would no doubt put a stop to ... the process of
making covert appropriations of public money, or granting privileges which are the equivalent
of money, under one disguise or another, to Catholic societies, schools, and charities.");
WARD M. MCAFEE, RELIGION, RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION: THE PUBLIC SCHOOL IN THE
POLrriCs OF THE 1870s 194 (1998); Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of
State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 551, 556-57 (2003); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of
the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 301-02 (2001); Toby J. Heytens, Note,
School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 131-32 (2000); see generally
CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 253 (1988) (mentioning
Blaine's proposed amendment would require the States to establish public schools irrespective
of religion); JOSEPH P. VrTERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND CIVIL SOCIETY 151-53 (1999) (explaining the history of the Blaine Amendment).
2. 4CONG.REC.5172,5191 (1876).
3. 4 CONG. REC. 5558, 5595 (1876).
4. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889) (enabling act for
North Dakota, Montana, South Dakota, and Washington); Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 8, 26
Stat. 215, 216 (1890) (enabling act for Idaho); Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557,
559 (1910) (enabling act for Arizona and New Mexico); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 16; N.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 5. See also 20 CONG. REC. 2080, 2100
(1889) (statement of Sen. Blair) (arguing in favor of enabling act requirement that state consti-
tutions guarantee "public schools ... free from sectarian control," in part because this re-
quirement would accomplish purposes of the failed federal Blaine Amendment).
5. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 335 (2002) ("Nativist Prot-
estants also failed to obtain a federal constitutional amendment but, because of the strength of
anti-Catholic feeling, managed to secure local versions of the Blaine [A]mendment in a vast
majority of the states.") See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; KY.
CONST. § 189; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8; FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 6.
6. FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 6 ("No preference shall be given by
law to any church, sect or mode of worship and no money shall ever be taken from the public
treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect or religious denomination or in aid of
any sectarian institution." (emphasis added)).
7. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. Article I, section 3 provides:
2005]
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No convention records illuminate the intent of the framers who adopted the
1885 amendment.8 Convention records from 1968 are not any more helpful. 9
The amendment shares with other states similar text and a common relation-
ship with bigotry.' ° In fact, the same Florida convention that in 1885 enacted
the declaration of rights, section 6, precluding aid to sectarian institutions,
adopted the separate but equal racial doctrine."
Nevertheless, this article reveals that even in the area most closely
linked to the declaration of rights, section 6--education-it has nearly al-
ways coexisted with the equal participation of religious persons in neutral,
generally applicable public programs with a secular purpose. The exception
pertains to a brief interlude from the 1910s to the world wars when anti-
Catholic religious bigotry dominated Florida's headlines. This article exam-
ines the key factors influencing the Supreme Court of Florida's unique his-
torical interpretation of the state Blaine Amendment, as well as the non-
exclusionary implementation of it by the Florida Legislature and lesser legis-
lative bodies. This history is especially important now that article I, section
3 has become the primary tool in lieu of the federal Establishment Clause for
challenging Florida school choice.
When called upon to construe the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court of
Florida has instructed state courts to examine "the express language of the
constitutional provision, its formative history, both preexisting and develop-
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing
the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with
public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or
agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of
any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.
Id. (emphasis added).
8. The rough chronology of the amendment's adoption is available. See FLA. CONST.
CONVENTION, J. OF THE PROCEEDINGS, at 118-91, 575-90 (1885). The committee presented a
report on then-section 22. Id. at 118. The committee read and passed the provision without
amendment. Id. at 183-91. The section was renumbered as section 6 without amendment. Id.
at 575-77, 590; see also Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, WKLY. FLORIDIAN,
June 25, 1885 (Supp.) (committee reported Bill of Rights with section 22); WKLY. FLORIDIAN,
July 2, 1885 (indicating "[t]he Preamble and Declaration of Rights was ... spread upon the
Journal"); WKLY. FLORIDIAN, July 9, 1885 (indicating committee read and passed Preamble
and Declaration of Rights, modifying only section 8 (concerning infamous crime)); Constitu-
tion Adopted by the Convention of 1885, WKLY. FLORIDIAN, Aug. 6, 1885 (renumbering oc-
curred by August 6, 1885).
9. See FLA. CONST. CONVENTION, MINuTES, Aug. 7, 1967 (adopted and passed by voice
vote); Committee of Whole House: Minutes with Explanatory Documents, H.R. Constitutional
Revisions Sessions (July 31 and Aug. 21, i967) [hereinafter 1967 Minutes].
10. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3; see, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10; NEV. CONST. art. X1,
§ 2.
11. See generally FLA. CONST. CONVENTION, J. OF THE PROCEEDINGS (1885) (document-
ing each of the forty-six days of the convention).
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ing state law, evolving customs, traditions and attitudes within the state, the
state's own general history, and finally any external influences that may have
shaped state law.' 2 Weighing these factors in the field of education, the
conclusion of this article is that it is more consistent with the state Blaine
amendment's pedigree and precedent and with other constitutional prohibi-
tions to perpetuate existing precedent by limiting Blaine's reach to other than
religiously-neutral public programs of general eligibility with a secular pur-
pose. The alternative urged by no-aid-separationists would prohibit an entire
class of persons from assisting with Florida's most pressing educational and
other social needs and communicate a message that religious persons are
unequal participants in the public square.
II. PEDIGREE OF THE FLORIDA BLAINE AMENDMENT
When interpreting the state's Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida directs courts to "focus primarily on factors that inhere in their own
unique state experience."'' 3 It is precisely these differences that have led the
Court to give an unusual interpretation to Florida's Blaine Amendment and
the legislature to implement it in a less exclusionary fashion. The key vari-
ables influencing this history are not exceptional. As elsewhere in the United
States, the history of Florida's Blaine Amendment is irrevocably linked to
the progress of the common school movement and immigration, urbaniza-
tion, and industrialization. What is distinctive is the speed and extent of the
developments.
The common school movement, in Florida and elsewhere, taught a
"common religion" that was essentially Protestant in character, requiring
until the 1960s, daily reading from the King James Bible, prayer, and other
Protestant religious observances in the public schools. 14 Nationally, Blaine
amendments diffused as a reaction to Roman Catholic opposition to the com-
mon religion and the request for equal public funding for parochial schools.' 5
In Florida, the Protestant reaction was muted and postponed by the slow pace
of the Florida common school movement, 16 Florida's tradition of religious
12. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 1992).
13. Id.
14. See Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21, 23 (Fla.
1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 402 (1964) (referencing FLA. STAT. § 231.09 (1961)).
15. See VrIERITrl, supra note 1, at 151-52.
16. 1 HARRY GARDNER CUTLER, HISTORY OF FLORIDA: PAST AND PRESENT 221 (1923).
20051
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pluralism, 17 and delayed and less substantial foreign Catholic immigration,
urbanization, and industrialization.
A. Florida Public Education Before the Civil War
Florida had a nascent de jure, but not a de facto common school system
prior to the Civil War.18 Consequently, private schools were crucial in Flor-
ida's pioneer days.' 9 Frequently, religious schools were the only available
schools.° What little public funding existed for education was shared with
religious schools. 2' Religious pluralism and tolerance was a tradition in Flor-
ida.22 In the 1850s, not even the Know-Nothing Party propagated an anti-
Catholic message in Florida.23
1. Religious Tolerance
Unlike a number of northeastern states, Florida never had an established
church.24 Roman Catholics were obviously St. Augustine's first European
settlers, but their numbers in mid-nineteenth century Florida were small.25
Alongside Catholics in St. Augustine, Jews arrived in the 1780s; Presbyteri-
ans arrived in 1824; Episcopalians appeared in St. Augustine in 1821; and
Methodists came to Pensacola in 1821.26 "Baptists [arrived] in Nassau
County in 1821 and in Bethlehem in 1825. " 27 Florida enjoyed religious di-
versity in the early 1800s, but Protestants were by far the largest religious
group.
28
17. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE ELEVENTH CENSUS OF THE
UNrrED STATES: 1890, STATISTICS OF CHURCHES 260 (1894) [hereinafter ELEVENTH CENSUS
CHURCHES].
18. See CUTLER, supra note 16, at 223.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 222-23.
22. MICHAEL J. McNALLY, CATHOLIC PARISH LIFE ON FLORIDA'S WEST COAST, 1860-
1968, at 21 (1996) [hereinafter MCNALLY I].
23. See W. DARRELL OVERDYKE, THE KNow-NOTHING PARTY IN THE SOUTH 227 (1968).
24. See Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21, 31 (Fla.
1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 402 (1964). "[A] state church ... existed in Massachusetts for more
than forty years after the adoption of the Constitution." Id. (citation omitted).
25. MICHAEL GANNON, FLORIDA: A SHORT HISTORY 39 (1993).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See OFFICE OF THE SECURITY OF THE INTERIOR, THE SEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
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In 1850, the largest Protestant denomination in Florida was the Method-
ists, who had eighty-seven churches with property valued at $55,260, ac-
commodating 20,015 members. 29 The Baptists were the next largest de-
nomination with fifty-six churches and property valued at $25,640, accom-
modating 11,985 members.30 Presbyterians had sixteen churches with prop-
erty valued at $31,500 and accommodating 5900 members.3 Episcopalians
had ten churches with property valued at $37,800 and accommodating 3810
members.32 Roman Catholics had but five churches with property valued at
$13,600 and accommodating 1850 members.33
"Scholars report that by the mid-[nineteenth] century religious conflict
over matters such as Bible reading 'grew intense,' as Catholics resisted and
Protestants fought back to preserve their domination. '' 34 But in frontier Flor-
ida, Protestant-Catholic relations were generally cordial. 35 Before the Civil
War, the only recorded anti-Catholic riot occurred in St. Augustine in 1848,
in response to an anti-Catholic book published by a non-Floridian about the
city's Catholic population.36 "On the frontier everybody chipped in to help
one another. '37 For example, in 1858, one observer recounted: "Catholics
and Protestants alike generously contributed to . .. the construction of a
Catholic church in Tampa.
38
2. The Age of Private Religious Education
a. The Territorial Years
Florida's tradition of religious tolerance positively influenced educa-
tion, which was essentially private and sectarian until the 1840s;39 then sec-




32. Id. at 410.
33. SEVENTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 28, at 411; accord Arthur W. Thompson,
Political Nativism in Florida, 1848-1860: A Phase of Anti-Secessionism, 15 J. S. HIST. 39,
50-51 (1949).
34. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 720 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted).
35. Thompson, supra note 33, at 50.
36. Id. at 51.
37. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 21.
38. Id.
39. J. Scott Slater, Comment, Florida's "Blaine Amendment" and Its Effect on Educa-
tional Opportunities, 33 STETSON L. REV. 581, 586-88 (2004).
2005]
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War.' The very first common school law in Florida was federal. In 1822,
when Florida became a territory, Congress reserved every sixteenth section
of land throughout the territory for the purpose of supporting primary
schools.42 The federal limitation on the land grant was in the nature of a trust
condition for the purpose of establishing a public school system. 3
On January 29, 1827, Congress authorized the Governor and Territorial
Legislature to preserve and lease the lands and appropriate the funds for
schools.' The legislature implemented this in 1828 and appointed trustees
of the school lands to preserve the lands, collect rent, and select up to twenty
acres in every sixteenth-section for the erection of a school. 5 When this led
to the rental of but five sections of land for an annual rent of $101.50, the
legislative council conferred power in 1832 on the people of the townships to
elect commissioners of the sixteenth-sections, and then in 1834, removed the
authority to county judges.46
Fueled by these developments, on January 22, 1831, the short-lived
Florida Education Society in Tallahassee was founded and thereafter, spun-
off auxiliary societies. 47 The Educational Society at St. Augustine recorded
the first effort to establish a common school in 1831, albeit with the general
apathy of the people with respect to education, racial prejudices, and the ob-
stacles caused by a scattered small population, as discussed in the Society's
annals. 48 Efforts in Tallahassee to found a common school also failed in the
early 1830s, when promoters found they could not sell, instead of lease, the
sixteenth-section lands.49 The education societies were abandoned altogether
around the same time. 50
This left education in Florida entirely to private schools. As elsewhere
in the United States, the first schools in frontier Florida were Protestant.5'
The typical pattern was for a church or a family of means to commence an
40. CUTLER, supra note 16, at 223.
41. See id. at 221.
42. THOMAS EVERETTE COCHRAN, HISTORY OF PUBLIC-SCHOOL EDUCATION IN FLORIDA 1
(1921).
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id. (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 6 (citing Act of Nov. 21, 1828, 1828 Fla. Territory Laws 247, 247-248 (to
provide for laying out the school lands in this Territory)).
46. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
47. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 1-2.
48. Id. at 2-3.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 4-5,
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"academy" or "institute. 52 In 1827, Reverend Henry White founded Leon
County's and potentially Florida's first school, Leon Academy.53 In 1834-
1835, Episcopalian Reverend Alva Bennett opened Key West's first school
after a resolution of the town council.54 Likewise, in frontier Tampa in
1848-1854, Methodist minister Jasper K. Glover and Presbyterian minister
Edmund Lee and his wife founded private schools utilizing books furnished
by the churches. Classes produced numerous teachers "who instructed
generations of Manatee and Hillsborough County young people," attending
both private and public schools. 56 Through the 1830s, it is fair to say that
private religious education was essentially the only choice in Florida.
Nevertheless, the Territorial Legislature continued its efforts to create
an authentic common school system. The Act of 1835 directed the register
of the land office to select portions of sixteenth-sections "for schools, semi-
naries, and other purposes;, 58 the Acts of 1836 and 1837 directed the territo-
rial treasurer to demand money due from the rent of sixteenth-sections and to
prosecute trespassers;5 9 the Act of 1839, termed the first general school law,
directed three elected trustees in each town to establish common schools
where they did not exist from land revenue and to set aside two percent of
the territorial tax and auction duties for the education of poor orphan chil-
dren;6° the Acts of 1843 and 1844 removed authority from the trustees to
sheriffs to look after the education of poor children;61 and the Acts of 1845
provided that judges should officiate as superintendents of common schools,
elected trustees should report to them, and the Governor could select private
lands in place of sixteenth-sections for schools.62
52. Id. at 15, 33-34.
53. Francis A. Rhodes, A History of Education in Leon County Florida 12-13 (1946)
(unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Florida) (on file with Nova Law Review).
54. JEFFERSON B. BROWNE, KEY WEST: THE OLD AND THE NEW 21 (Univ. of Fla. Press
1973) (1912).
55. 1 JAMES W. COVINGTON, THE STORY OF SOUTHWESTERN FLORIDA 308 (1957);
BROWN, supra note 51, at 11.
56. BROWN, supra note 51, at 11.
57. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 1, 5-10.
58. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
59. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 13, 1836, 1836 Fla. Territory Laws 42-43 (amendatory of the
several Acts relating to the School Lands in the Territory of Florida)).
60. Id. at 8 (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1839, 1839 Fla. Territory Laws 15-16 (to raise a fund
by taxation for the education of Poor Children)); see also CUTLER, supra note 16, at 220.
61. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 8 (citing Act of Mar. 15, 1843, 1843 Fla. Territory Laws
34-36 (concerning School Lands); Act of Mar. 15, 1844, 1844 Fla. Territory Laws 61-65 (to
Incorporate the Inhabitants of the different Townships of this Territory, for the institution and
establishment of common schools)).
62. Id. at 9 (citing Ch. 21-(No. 21), § 1, 1845 Fla. Laws, 40,40).
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By all reports, many of these laws were ignored and public school funds
criminally squandered or not collected, so that by 1842, the public school
fund had a deficit.63 Governor R.K. Call reported to the Territorial Legisla-
ture in 1843 that "in many of the counties, at least, no attention whatever has
been paid" to the Act of 1834, and that the territorial treasurer's duties in
Tallahassee prevented him from effectively enforcing the Acts of 1836 and
1837.64 Governor W.D. Moseley announced in 1846 that the laws were so
poorly enforced that trespassers on school lands were common and that rents
received were "humiliating, shamefully neglected or criminally squan-
dered. '65 Moreover, the Territorial Legislature made no provision for taxa-
tion in support of common schools, erecting or maintaining common schools,
school or teacher standards, or school terms.66 Public education was left to a
few willing counties which offered a free education only to a handful of poor
children.67 Monroe and Franklin Counties led the way with Monroe County
providing for the education of thirty children in Key West from county taxes
in 1843, 68 notwithstanding the absence of any state authority for the tax.69
b. Florida Becomes a State
Florida became a state in 1845.70 In An Act Supplemental to the Act for
the Admission of Florida and Iowa into the Union,7' Congress restated its
condition on the grant of sixteen-section lands. 72 Article X, section 1 of Flor-
ida's first constitution incorporated the condition:
The proceeds of all lands that have been, or may hereafter be, granted by the
United States for the use of schools and a seminary or seminaries of learning,
shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the interest of which, together with all
moneys derived from any other source . . . shall be inviolably appropriated to
63. CUTLER, supra note 16, at 220.
64. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 7-8 (citing FLA. H.R. JOUR. 19-20 (Terr. Sess. 1843);
FLA. S. JOUR. 23 (Terr. Sess. 1843)).
65. Id. at 11-12 (quoting FLA. H.R. JOUR. 7 (Reg. Sess. 1846); Fla. S. Jour. 6 (Reg. Sess.
1846)).
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. at 12.
68. BROWNE, supra note 54, at 21; accord COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 12.
69. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 11.
70. An Act for the Admission of the States of Iowa and Florida into the Union, ch. 48, 5
Stat. 742, 742 (1845).
71. Ch. 75, 5 Stat. 788 (1845).
72. Ch. 75, 5 Stat. at 788.
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the use of schools and seminaries of learning, respectively, and to no other pur-
pose.73
In 1846, the Florida Legislature authorized the rental of the sixteenth-
section lands,74 and their sale in 1848, as the system of renting was unprofit-
able. 5 The Florida Legislature directed preservation of the proceeds in a
permanent common school fund.76 The State School Trust Fund (School
Fund) remains part of Florida law, 77 although its importance for funding edu-
cation has vastly diminished. Nevertheless, in the 1840s, gains in public
education made possible by sixteenth-section, lands were impressive enough
that according to federal census records, common schools began to educate
more students than private schools. 78  In 1840, eighteen private schools
served 732 pupils, compared to fifty-one common schools serving 925 pu-
pils.'79 In 1850, thirty-four private schools served 1251 pupils, compared to
sixty-nine common schools serving roughly 1878 pupils. 80 Of course, the
public schools of the 1850s-l 860s were nothing like today's schools; the line
between common schools and volunteer civic and religious groups was
blurry.
In the early years of the common school movement, the schools looked
more like "private-public institution[s] .' 8 Florida counties commonly des-
ignated private religious schools as public schools," as Pasco County did for
a number of Catholic schools.83 "Tax money was used for [their] upkeep,
with no qualms about the First Amendment."'84 Alternatively, the first public
schools commonly met in church buildings.85 For example, Hillsborough
County did not erect its first school building in Tampa until 1878, but relied
instead upon the facilities of religious and civic organizations.86
73. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. X, § 1. A condition of statehood was that the Territory of
Florida adopt a state constitution, which became effective in 1845. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §
4.
74. Ch. 93-(No. 23), § 3, 1846 Fla. Laws 47, 48.
75. COCHRAN, supra note 42 at 16 (citation omitted).
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. See FLA. STAT. § 1010.71(1)(a) (2004).
78. See COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 27 tbl.I.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. COVINGTON, supra note 55, at 308.
82. See MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 148-49.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 149.
85. See BROWN, supra note 51, at 19, 34, 54, 57-58.
86. Id. at 57.
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More private schools than public schools existed in 1860.7 There were
ninety-seven public schools with ninety-eight public school teachers with an
annual income of approximately $20,000, compared to 138 private schools
with 185 teachers and an annual income of approximately $75,000.88 By
comparison, Massachusetts, where the common school movement began,89
boasted 4134 public schools with 5308 public school teachers with an annual
income of $1,545,454.90
3. Florida Know-Nothingism
Commencing in the 1850s, the Know-Nothing, or American Party,
came into national prominence as the successor to the failing Whig Party and
reached its peak strength in Florida in 1856, 9' then rapidly dissolved here due
to its moderate orientation on state's rights and slavery.92 Nationally, the
Know-Nothing platform required reading of the King James Bible in com-
mon schools; favored constitutional amendments limiting or depriving suf-
frage and public office-holding by Catholics; banned foreign language in-
struction; limited immigration; and prevented immigrants from holding state
jobs.93 The first Blaine-like constitutional amendment was passed by the
Know-Nothing Party in the cradle of the common school movement in Mas-
sachusetts.94
Know-Nothingism is linked to the wave of Catholic and Jewish immi-
gration to the United States in the mid-nineteenth century. 95 This influx gave
voice to opponents of the common religion.96 In 1840, the Very Reverend
87. Herbert J. Doherty, Jr., Florida in 1856, 35 FLA. HIST. Q. 60, 63 (1956).
88. Id.; accord OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE NINTH CENSUS OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1870, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 453, 456 (1872) [hereinafter NINTH
CENSUS POPULATION].
89. Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: The Revival of a
Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L.
413, 416-17 (2003).
90. NINTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 88, at 453.
91. Thompson, supra note 33, at 42.
92. Id. at 59.
93. JOHN R. MULKERN, THE KNow-NOTHING PARTY IN MASSACHUSETrS 102 (1990).
94. Prior to its amendment, the original Eighteenth Article of Amendment provided that
"[alll moneys... which may be appropriated by the state for the support of common schools.
. shall never be appropriated to any religious sect for the maintenance exclusively of its own
schools." Mass. CONST. amend. art. XVIII, historical notes.
95. Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (No. 02-1315), 2003 WL 22118852, at 5-
96. Id. at 6.
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John Power, Vicar-General of the Roman Catholic Diocese of New York,
explained Catholic resistance as follows: "The Catholic Church tells her
children that they must be taught religion by AUTHORITY -- The Sects say,
read the bible [sic], judge for yourselves. 97  Beginning that year where
Catholic immigrants concentrated, the Catholic Church launched an offen-
sive to forbid devotional Bible reading in the common schools and obtain tax
exemptions and public funding for parochial schools "to preserve youth from
the deleterious effects of Protestantism or secularism." 98
The wave of Catholic immigrants dissenting from the common religion
in the northeast came later, in less substantial numbers, and predominately
from different countries to Florida.99 Foreign-born Floridians accounted for
just 3% of the state's population in 1850, and even by 1890, just 6% of the
population. 1°' By comparison, foreigners in Massachusetts accounted for
16% of the population in 1850, and by 1890 equaled 30% of the popula-
tion.10 In 1850, Florida's urban centers included Key West with a popula-
tion of 1825 persons; Pensacola with 1073 persons; St. Augustine with 1213
persons; Tampa with 631 persons; and Jacksonville with 532 persons.
10 2
Catholic immigrants settled in Duval, Escambia, Monroe, and St. Johns
County.0 3 In 1860, the Irish (25%), Germans (15%), and West Indians
(28%) comprised Florida's largest immigrant groups;' °4 however, the Irish
and Germans, who American Party activists most vilified, constituted less
than 1% of Florida's total population.
0 5
With so few Catholic immigrants in Florida, and a still nascent common
school movement, Florida Know-Nothingism proved nationally distinct.'
0 6
Although Democrats branded them as religiously intolerant and abolition-
97. Sallie R. Taylor, The Public and the Parochial School: A Personal and Social Ad-
justment Study 2 (1954) (unpublished M.S. Thesis, University of Florida) (on file with Nova
Law Review) (citation omitted).
98. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 151; accord Taylor, supra note 97, at 2.
99. See MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 27.
100. Compare NINTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 88, at 299, with OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1900, ABSTRACT
42 (1902) [hereinafter TWELFTH CENSUS ABSTRACT].
101. Compare NINTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 88, at 299, with TWELFTH CENSUS
ABSTRACT, supra note 100, at 42.
102. SEVENTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 28, at 401.
103. Id. at 411; see generally MICHAEL J. MCNALLY, CATHOLICISM IN SOUTH FLORIDA:
1868-1968, at 20-34 (1982) [hereinafter McNALLY II] (discussing the development of Ca-
tholicism in South Florida),
104. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE EIGHTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1860, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 56 (1864).
105. Id.
106. Thompson, supra note 33, at 43.
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ists,' °7 the Florida American Party platform disapproved the national plat-
form with respect to religious intolerance, states' rights, and slavery. °8 The
Party did not emphasize anti-Catholicism," although there were certainly
party leaders who were unabashedly anti-Catholic and opposed to "foreign-
ism,"" and others including Governor R.K. Call, critical of any "'higher
allegiance' to the Pope."' Yet the state's demurer from the national plat-
form favoring anti-Catholicism is significant. Although other states dis-
criminated against Catholics in public law prior to the Civil War, Florida did
not.''
2
4. The Common School System Matures
In 1849, the legislature approved the first general law for the State of
Florida, authorizing the establishment of common schools for white children
with the register of the land office as the state superintendent, probate judges
as county superintendents, and local elected boards of trustees who were to
be elected by the taxpayers of the various school districts each year.' The
legislature augmented the school fund by adding to the sale of sixteenth-
sections the "net proceeds of five percent of other public lands, and of all
escheated property, and of all wreckage, and flotsam found on the coast."' 14
In January 1851, the legislature approved the first "tax on both real and
personal property for the support of the common schools" not to exceed four
107. Id. at 45.
108. Id. at 46. The Florida platform stated with respect to religious intolerance as follows:
That the American Party of Florida unqualifiedly condemns and will endeavor to counteract all
efforts by any sect or party to bring about a union of Church and State, and utterly disclaim
any intention to prescribe a religious test as a qualification for office, and that in advocating
the principles of the American Party, we wish it distinctly understood that we maintain the
right of every citizen to the full, free and unrestricted exercise of his own religious opinions
and worship.
Id. (citation omitted); accord OVERDYKE, supra note 23, at 227.
109. Doherty, supra note 87, at 67; OVERDYKE, supra note 23, at 227-28; Thompson,
supra note 33, at 49.
110. Spessard Stone, The Know-Nothings of Hillsborough County, 19 SUNLAND TRIB. 3, 3
(1993); Thompson, supra note 33, at 43.
111. OVERDYKE, supra note 23, at 227. Governor R.K. Call said "that while some of his
best friends were Catholics, he was willing to declare 'resistance to the aggressive policy and
corrupting tendencies of the Roman Catholic Church.' He was alarmed over 'higher alle-
giance' to the Pope." Id. At the Florida American State Convention, "R.K. Call presided and
delivered a typical nativistic speech." Id. at 76.
112. See id. at 227; accord Thompson, supra note 33, at 46.
113. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 16-17 (citing Ch. 229-(No. 21), 1849 Fla. Laws 25).
114. CUTLER, supra note 16, at 221; accord COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 18;
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dollars annually for each school-aged child;" 5 added to the school fund pro-
ceeds from the sale of slaves;" 6 and required the state superintendent to no-
tify the comptroller of counties where the money arising from the interest of
the school fund was insufficient to allow two dollars to be given annually for
the education of school-aged children, so the comptroller could make up the
difference.'
Also, in 1851, the Florida Legislature authorized two seminaries of
learning, 1 '8 both committed to the common religion and led by Protestant
clergy." 9 East Florida Seminary (1853-1905) and West Florida Seminary
(1857-1901), the forebears of, respectively, the University of Florida and
Florida State University, initially concerned themselves primarily with basic
elementary education. m° Constructed with public funds,' 2 ' they subsisted in
the 1850s primarily upon income from the school fund,' 22 and an annuity
from their city of origin (respectively, Ocala and Tallahassee), together with
tuition and donations. 23 The annuity has been hailed by common school
115. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 19 (citing Ch. 343-(No. 32), 1850 Fla. Laws 104); see
CUTLER, supra note 16, at 221; BROWN, supra note 51, at 18-19.
116. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 19 (citing Ch. 341-(No. 30), 1850 Fla. Laws 103).
117. Id. (citing Ch. 340-(No. 29), 1850 Fla. Laws 102).
118. BROWN, supra note 51, at 10.
119. West Florida Seminary initially had a strong Presbyterian influence as two of its
original presidents were former Presbyterian ministers: Rev. Duncan McNeill Turner (1857-
1860) (former Pastor of the Presbyterian Church of Tallahassee) and Rev. Levi H. Parsons
(1864). WILLIAM G. DODD, HISTORY OF WEST FLORIDA SEMINARY 9, 24 (1952). East Florida
Seminary was at first the idea of the Florida Conference of the Methodist Church. See Charles
L. Crow, East Florida Seminary-Ocala (1852) (citation omitted). Later, East Florida Seminary
had as principal Edward W. Meany, an Episcopal priest, and rector of Holy Trinity Episcopal
Church in Gainesville. SAMUEL PROCTOR & WRIGHT LANGLEY, GATOR HISTORY: A
PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 19 (1986).
120. BROWN, supra note 51, at 10; COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 154-55. Harry Gardner
Cutler refers to West Florida Seminary as the first bona fide common school in the state, but
other evidence set forth above belies this. CUTLER, supra note 16, at 221.
121. See PROCTOR & LANGLEY, supra note 119, at 21. East Florida Seminary "received
$28,300 in state appropriations for buildings and another $20,000 'for general purposes."' Id.;
STATE SEMINARY WEST OF THE SUWANNEE, CATALOGUE 7 (1897-98) [hereinafter STATE
SEMINARY WEST, CATALOGUE] ("The City of Tallahassee gave to the State, as an inducement,
the property known as the Florida Institute, embracing about ten acres of land and a new two-
story brick building, with the furniture and other appliances, valued at $10,000.").
122. See generally PROCTOR & LANGLEY, supra note 119, at 21 ("Annual income from the
Agricultural Land Fund [for East Florida Seminary] was $9,000 in 1890, but only $7,700 in
1903.").
123. DODD, supra note 119, at 3; accord CUTLER, supra note 16, at 221.
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advocates as "'among the earliest attempts in the South to support schools by
taxation.'"1
24
In its last education enactment before the Civil War, the legislature in
1853, named the register of public lands to be the state superintendent of
schools and gave additional responsibilities to county commissioners and
probate judges, including fixing the length of the school year and requiring
probate judges to employ and discharge teachers. 125 Reviewing Florida's
public educational accomplishments in 1854, State Superintendent David S.
Walker said, "[w]ith the exception of the counties of Monroe and Frankling
. . . I have heard of none that have contributed anything from the county
treasury for the augmentation of the school money received from the
State.",
126
Apathy was widespread. 127 Reports suggest that parents who could af-
ford tuition resented the idea that they should pay taxes to send other peo-
ples' children to school. 128 Some counties like Hillsborough County reacted
to the general laws by differentiating school districts, but without creating "a
true or free public school system."' 129 Tuition was subsidized, but not usually
free; the school year was but six weeks to three months long; ' and school
buildings were the exception, so classes continued to meet in church and
civic buildings or other borrowed properties.' 3
Up to the Civil War, private schools and public-private partnerships
were obviously far more critical to education in Florida up to the Civil War
than in the northeast. Due partly to these reasons and because the executive,
legislature, and probate court were in agreement that funding students attend-
ing private religious schools and common schools teaching a common relig-
ion was constitutional, records indicate that public subsidization of parochial
education was commonplace. 132 According to census records (which were
likely understated because of the blurring of public and private schools) pri-
124. Rhodes, supra note 53, at 22 (quoting GEORGE GARY BUSH, HISTORY OF EDUCATION
IN FLORIDA 16 (Bureau of Education Circular of Information No. 7, 1888) (1889)). Apart
from the "one which ran for a short while in St. Augustine in 1832," the school was the "first
real public school in the state operated on a substantial basis." Id.
125. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 19-21.
126. Id. at 23; accord CUTLER, supra note 16, at 221.
127. COCmAN, supra note 42, at 26.
128. BROWN, supra note 51, at 33; see also WILLIAM F. BLACKMAN, HISTORY OF ORANGE
COUNTY FLORIDA 48 (1973) (deeming public schools to be pauper schools).
129. BROWN, supra note 51, at 18.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 19; see W.L. STRAUB, HISTORY OF PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA 64 (1929).
132. See BROWN, supra note 51, at 18; COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 25 ("[D]uring the early
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vate schools received five percent of their budgets from public sources in
1860, and more than double this amount in 1870.33
B. Florida's Reconstruction
During the Civil War, a majority of Florida schools closed and the state
spent most of the principal of the common school fund on munitions.134 Yet
the state emerged with a constitution and laws the most committed yet to
public education.135  By the 1870s, the state began more carefully distin-
guishing public from private schools while still funding private religious
education, alongside the separate but equal racial doctrine even after enact-
ment of the declaration of rights, section 6.136 The delayed start of public
education, along with delayed and less substantial immigration from differ-
ent countries, postponed any nativist reaction until the Twentieth Century. 37
1. Florida Enacts a Constitutional Common School System
Some deem the Constitution of 1868 the real beginning of common
education in Florida, some forty years after the national commencement of
the movement. 38 The Constitution of 1868 made provision for certain tax
revenue and impliedly prohibited use for other schools by stating that the
interest of the School Fund "shall be exclusively applied to the support and
maintenance of common schools.' 139 No such constitutional limitation ap-
plied to school funds generated by counties or municipalities. 40 The Consti-
tution of 1868 also set penalties in terms of lost educational dollars for coun-
ties failing to raise tax revenue for education and enacted an appointed State
133. NINTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 88, at 455-56; accord COCHRAN, supra note
42, at 27 tbl.I.
134. BROWN, supra note 51, at 40; COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 28.
135. See COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 34.
136. See BROWN, supra note 51, at 66; COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 52.
137. See infra Part II.E.
138. BROWN, supra note 51, at 66; COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 36-37 (the Constitution of
1868 incorporated "the first common-school law which succeeded in creating a real system of
public education"); CUTLER, supra note 16, at 221; DODD, supra note 119, at 31 (citing Ch.
1686-(No.2), 1869 Fla. Laws 7);
The period [prior to 1868] is one in which can be seen only the beginnings of the
ideas of public school education for all the people. It remained for the constitution
of 1868, and the school law of 1869 to create a public school system even in the
mere legal sense of the term.
Rhodes, supra note 53, at 29.
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Board of Education comprised of the Superintendent of Public Instruction
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate, Secretary of State,
and Attorney General. 4 '
The School Law of 1869 implemented the Constitution of 1868 by
mandating a "uniform system of public instruction," open without charge "to
all the youth residing in the State between the ages of six and twenty-one"
without respect to race; establishing a board of education in each county ap-
pointed by the State Board of Education; creating a county school superin-
tendent appointed by the Governor and local school trustees appointed by the
county boards of education; requiring the state superintendent to establish
teacher licensing requirements; setting a minimum three-month school year;
imposing a state tax on property; and authorizing a county tax on property.'42
The law authorized county boards to establish not only elementary, but also
heretofore unknown secondary schools. 143 It reserved authority over post-
secondary education for the State Board of Education, but entitled county
boards of education to send pupils in the ratio that they sent representatives
to the legislature. 44
Florida did not fully implement'the School Law of 1869 for over a dec-
ade because of the State's poor fiscal situation, resentment toward carpet-
baggers and Reconstruction, racial prejudice, the still scattered and sparse
population, and the opposition affluent residents voiced about paying taxes to
send other peoples' children to school. 145 Some school board members re-
fused appointments and the school boards dragged their feet.'46 Neverthe-
less, by 1870, Florida's public schools once again had the edge in numbers
over Florida's private schools, were near parity in spending, and would never
again look back; 226 public schools with 265 public school teachers and an
annual income of $76,389, compared to 151 private schools with 217 private
school teachers and an annual income of $78,180.'4 Inflaming racial preju-
dice, many of the new schools begun by Republicans were for blacks.
48
141. See COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 34-36 (citing FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, §§ 8-
9); ERNEST L. ROBINSON, HISTORY OFHILLSBOROUGH COUNTY FLORIDA 128 (1928).
142. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 36-45 (citations omitted); see also BROWN, supra note
51, at 50-51 (the 1869 school law did not require racial segregation).
143. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 44.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 49, 54, 72; BROWN, supra note 51, at 51; Rhodes, supra note 53, at 45.
146. BROWN, supra note 51, at 51.
147. NINTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 88, at 452, 454-55 (private school figures
combined).
148. See BROWN, supra note 51, at 50-51.
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Roughly seventy-seven percent of the state educational budget for the year
1868 was spent on educating African-Americans.'49
The number of children attending Florida common schools skyrocketed
between 1870 and 1880 and the number of public schools increased five-fold
to 1135 with 1151 public teachers and an annual income of $12 9 ,90 7 .5 ° In
1860, Florida private schools taught more children than Florida public
schools; there were 2032 public school children and 4486 private school chil-
dren.15' By 1870, schools designated "public" taught considerably more
children; there were 10,132 public school children and 4538 private school
children. 52 The number of public school children increased more than four-
fold between 1870 and 1880 to 43,304 public school children. 153 As in ear-
lier periods, however, the line between public and private schools remained
blurred in the 1870s. 154
2. Public and Private Schools Still Blurred
Some so-called common schools were really private religious
schools.'55 For example, in October 1878, St. Johns County agreed to treat a
Catholic parochial school as part of the public school system.5 6 The county
entered the following notation: "PUBLIC SCHOOL NO. 12-Sisters of St.
Joseph, St. George Street; 180 pupils, Teachers-Sister Gertrude Capo, Sis-
ter Agnes Hernandez, Sister Mary Fitz-Simmons."' 57 The school building
was owned by the Sisters of St. Joseph and was the only grade school in St.
149. See id. at 50; see also id. at 28-31. To make up for the exhaustion of the seminary
fund for munitions, another twenty-four percent of the state educational budget was spent on
direct legislative appropriations to the seminaries equal to what they might otherwise have
received from the fund. Id. at 50.
150. Compare OFFICE THE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE TENTH CENSUS OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1880, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 916-17 (1882), [hereinafter TENTH
CENSUS POPULATION] with NINTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 88, at 452. Some of these
public schools may not have been in operation. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 50. "As of
1880 Hillsborough County had forty-nine schools, but not all were in operation .... Id.
151. NINTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 88, at 453,456.
152. Id. at 452, 454-55.
153. Compare TENTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 150, at 918, with NINTH CENSUS
POPULATION, supra note 88, at 452.
154. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 52.
155. Id.
156. Sister Mary Alberta, A Study of the Schools Conducted by the Sisters of St. Joseph of
the Diocese of St. Augustine, Florida, 1866-1940, at 40 (Aug. 1940) (unpublished M.A. the-
sis, University of Florida) (on file with Nova Law Review).
157. Id. (citation omitted).
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Augustine.'5 8 The same thing happened in 1883 in St. Ambrose, and after
the adoption of the state Blaine Amendment in 1892 in Mandarin (which
became Loretto) in Duval County. 59  Duval County actually erected the
school building for the Sisters in Mandarin on property donated by a Catho-
lic family."6 The Sisters of Saint Joseph were required to receive training
and take an exam, utilize approved texts, restrict religious instruction to af-
ter-school hours, and submit to monthly inspections.'
61
Altogether, in the 1870s at least fifteen percent of the budget of private
schools came from public funding. 62 With respect to bona fide common
schools, public school buildings were scarce through the 1870s, and dis-
agreement persisted over which three months were best for common educa-
tion in frontier Florida. 63 Taxpayers opposed the erection of school build-
ings as exceeding school board authority.' 64 Public schools continued to
meet in church and civic buildings, usually rent-free. 65 Manatee County
erected its first school house in 18 7 3 ,'66 Key West constructed its first public
school building in 1874,167 and Tampa erected its first public school in
1876.168 The State lacked a common course of study, common textbooks, or
textbooks at all until 1883, and had a "small and poorly trained teaching
force."' 169 In frontier towns especially, parochial education was key. 70 Ac-
cordingly, the Sisters of Saint Joseph opened some of the first grade schools:
in Orlando in October 1889; in Ybor City for latins in 1891 and for blacks in
1903; and in Miami in March 1905.'7'
158. Id.
159. Id. at 40-42.
160. Id. at 42.
161. Alberta, supra note 156, at 41, 56.
162. See NINTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 88, at 454.
163. BROWN, supra note 51, at 59-60; see also COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 49, 66. Ac-
cording to Democrat Samuel Pasco, the president of the Constitutional Convention of 1885,
"[n]o public buildings, institutions for the unfortunate, colleges, normal schools or seminaries
were built or aided by the State Treasury during the period of Republican rule in Florida
(1867-1876)." Alberta, supra note 156, at 12 (citation omitted).
164. BROWN, supra note 51, at 57.
165. ROBINSON, supra note 141, at 132; COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 66.
166. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 67.
167. BROWNE, supra note 54, at 22.
168. ROBINSON, supra note 141, at 129.
169. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 49. In 1883, the legislature provided that county boards
"that had not provided for uniform textbooks in their schools were required to ... [in] May of
that year." Id. at 72 (citing Ch. 3446---(No. 34), § 1, 1883 Fla. Laws 65, 65).
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In the 1880s, Florida's fiscal situation improved, permitting faster
growth in public education in the next decade so that the number of pupils
more than doubled between 1880 and 1890 to 91,188 public school children
and 6304 private school children. 172 The assessed value of state educational
property also more than doubled between 1870 and 1884.173 State educa-
tional expenditures invested in the School Fund doubled, 174 but Democrats
who regained control of Florida in 1877, redirected public funds from black
schools, 175 while increasing appropriations to the seminaries in the 1880s,
which began adding secondary-level courses. 176 Public sentiment began to
favor common schools as reflected most notably by the increasing number of
counties approving and increasing local levies for their support: from
"eleven counties with an average school tax of but one and one-half mills ...
in 1870 [to] thirty-nine counties with an average school tax of a little over
three mills" in 1884.177 Yet grade schools and high schools were still largely
unknown except at the seminaries and a few select cities. '78 Tampa's first
high school was founded in the late 1870s' 79 and its first grade school in
1878.180
3. First Immigrant Influx
In the 1870s, Florida also experienced its first immigrant influx.' 8' Cu-
bans immigrated to Key West due to "[t]he Ten Years War (1868-1878)
against Spanish colonialism' ' 82 and the United States imposed tariffs and
expanded the modest Key West cigar industry that began in the 1830s.' 83
"By the early 1890s, an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 persons traveled annu-
ally between Cuba and the United States."'" Immigrants imported the first
172. Compare TENTH CENSUS POPULATION, supra note 150, at 918, with OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE ELEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1890,
EDUCATION 59 (1893).
173. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 58.
174. Id. at 56 tbl.3.
175. BROWN, supra note 51, at 55-56.
176. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 50, 154-55; DODD, supra note 119, at 36-37, 67, 68-69,
76-77, 89, 98.
177. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 57.
178. BROWN, supra note 51, at 61.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 60.
181. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 63.
182. Id.
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labor militancy into the State, a source of nativist discontent elsewhere in the
United States. 85 By the mid-1880s, in or about the time the declaration of
rights, section 6 was enacted, strikes were commonplace in Key West with
the largest of such strikes occurring in 1885, 1889, and 1894.186 Cigar manu-
facturers, primarily Spanish, began looking for a new site for their facto-
ries. 187 "In 1885, Vicente Martfnez Ybor settled on a forty-acre tract of land
east of Tampa" which became known as Ybor City, and other manufacturers
soon followed.
88
Florida's immigrant population increased to around six percent by the
1890s, with particular concentrations in Florida's few relatively urban and
industrialized areas and a few almost strictly Catholic immigrant settlements
in San Antonio, Dade City, and St. Joseph.'89 The overall effect on the reli-
gious diversity of the State was modest.' 90 The largest denominations in
Florida held constant through at least 1890, with Methodists reporting 70,458
members,' 9 ' and Baptists reporting 39,575 members. 92 Significantly, Catho-
lics, against whom nativists were most prejudiced, took over as the third
largest denomination in 1890 with 16,867 communicants. 93 Presbyterians
reported 4574 members' 94 and Episcopalians reported 4225 members.' 9
5
New denominations included Disciples of Christ with 1306 members,
96
Congregationalists with 1184 members,' 97 and Lutherans with 369 mem-
bers.' 98 The stage was set for a Blaine-like backlash.
Just as immigration to Florida gained momentum and Florida's com-
mon school system was congealing, Representative James G. Blaine, a for-
mer Speaker of the House and a favored successor to President Grant, seized
upon Grant's recommendation and introduced the federal Blaine Amendment
185. See id. at 2-3.
186. Id. at 3; McNALLY II, supra note 103, at 31; MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 72;
BROWNE, supra note 54, at 126.
187. INGALLS & PtREZ, supra note 183, at 3.
188. Id.
189. See McNALLY I, supra note 22, at 33. San Antonio was designed to be exclusively a
German Catholic colony and from 1882 to 1888 only Catholics only could buy property. Id.
190. See ELEVENTH CENSUS CHURCHES, supra note 17.
191. Id. at 502.
192. Id. at 159, 172.
193. Id. at 231.
194. Id. at 632.
195. ELEVENTH CENSUS CHURCHES, supra note 17, at 707.
196. Id. at 344.
197. Id. at 332.
198. Id. at 437.
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on December 14, 1875.199 Discussions of federalism and Congress' proper
legislative power controlled the legislative debate. 2' The House overwhelm-
ingly approved it with an amendment stating it should not be "construed to
prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution., 2°1 The Senate
barely disapproved it.20 2  Nevertheless, support for the Amendment was
strong enough that it began diffusing rapidly among the states with the num-
ber enacting them increasing from fourteen in 1876 to twenty-nine in
1890.203 Florida was on the trailing-end of the movement.
C. Home Rule and the 1885 State Blaine Amendment
The Florida Constitutional Convention of 1885 replaced the Republican
Reconstruction-era constitution with an indigenous one that became law on
January 1, 1887.204  The article on education in the Constitution of 1885
elaborated upon its predecessor by, among other things: 1) providing for a
definite state tax for education and for the distribution of this tax, together
with the interest of the School Fund in proportion to the number of school-
aged youth in each county;2 5 2) requiring counties to support the common
schools and setting a minimum and maximum rate for an annual county
school tax;206 3) adding the Governor and Treasurer to the State Board of
Education; 207 and 4) requiring the quadrennial election of the Superintendent
of Public Instruction.2 8
199. Heytens, supra note 1, at 131-32. In December 1875, President Grant recommended
a constitutional amendment to deny all direct or indirect public support to sectarian institu-
tions. Id. The Blaine Amendment read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto,
shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands
so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.
Id. at 132 (quoting 4 CONG. REc. 204, 205 (1876)). See also LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE
AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925, at 138-39 (1987).
200. See Green, supra note 1, at 57-68.
201. Id. at 60 (citation omitted).
202. Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 672 (1998). The Senate fell four votes
short of the supermajority necessary to pass the Blaine Amendment. Id.
203. Green, supra note 1, at 43.
204. COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 79.
205. Id. at 80 (citing FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, §§ 6, 7).
206. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 8).
207. Id. at 79 (citing FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 3).
208. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 2).
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The Constitution was also more religiously and racially discriminatory
than its predecessor.20 9 The article on education implemented the separate
but equal doctrine by requiring separate schools for blacks and whites and, in
the very next subsection, included a provision distinct from the state Blain
Amendment, providing "that no public-school money should go for sectarian
schools. '2'0 This was in addition to the provision in the 1868 Constitution,
preserved in the 1885 Constitution, providing that the School Fund could "be
exclusively applied to the support and maintenance of public free schools."
2 I
The 1885 Constitution also included for the first time the declaration of
rights, section 6: "No preference shall be given by law to any church, sect or
mode of worship and no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury
directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect or religious denomination or
in aid of any sectarian institution."
2 1 2
On the face of these provisions, if not for the requirement in both the
1885 Constitution and 1868 Constitution that the School Fund be expended
exclusively on common schools, we might expect that public funding of pri-
vate religious schools ceased altogether in Florida; but it did not.213 Unde-
niably, petitioners in other states were largely successful in litigation at strik-
ing so-called "aid" reaching Catholic institutions. For example, in one of the
earliest cases, the Supreme Court of Mississippi refused a pro rata share of
the school fund to parents of students attending a Catholic parochial school
and struck an act entitling them to a proportionate share of the funds.214
Perhaps most egregiously, state courts did not require public payment
for services rendered.1 5 For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld
under the state Blaine Amendment the refusal of Cook County to make pay-
ment for the tuition, maintenance, and care of infants committed until age
eighteen by Cook County courts to the Industrial School for Girls at Chicago,
209. See COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 83.
210. Id.; FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 12 ("White and colored children shall not be
taught in the same school, but impartial provision shall be made for both."); FLA. CONST. of
1885, art. XII, § 13. This section provides:
No law shall be enacted authorizing the diversion or the lending of any County or Dis-
trict School Funds, or the appropriation of any part of the permanent or available school
Fund to any other than school purposes; Nor shall the same, or any part thereof, be ap-
propriated to or used for the support of any sectarian school.
Id.
211. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 4.
212. FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 6.
213. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 13; FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 4.
214. Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758, 764-65 (1879).
215. See Cook County v. Chi. Indus. Sch. for Girls, 18 N.E. 183, 184 (111. 1888).
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which the court held was a front for the Catholic Archdiocese. 2 6 Likewise,
the Supreme Court of Nevada excused the state from paying to feed orphans
assigned to the Nevada Orphan Asylum, also run by the Sisters of Charity.1 7
In the most straightforward equation of "sectarianism" with Catholicism, the
courts disagreed that the schools were teaching merely the common religion
because, according to them, Catholicism was "sectarianism.
' 21 8
Until the present, Florida case law reveals no litigation along similar
lines, notwithstanding that public funding for parochial education persisted
through at least the mid-1910s. 2'9 Duval County erected the school building
and authorized the Sisters of Saint Joseph to commence a supposed common
school in Mandarin in 1892, seven years after enactment of the 1885 consti-
tution.22 ° Similarly, records indicate that in 1892, Pasco County erected a
larger building for Saint Anthony's, known to teach, among other things,
catechism and Bible history.22 1 The Sisters of Saint Joseph "surrendered"
their common schools around 1914,222 but Pasco County built a second
school for another Catholic parish, Sacred Heart, as late as 1916.223
216. Id. at 184, 198. The court referenced then-article 8, section 3 of the Illinois Constitu-
tion as follows:
Neither the [Gleneral [A]ssembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school-district,
or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public
fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or
sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific
institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any
grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property, ever be made by the state,
or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose.
Id. at 184 (quoting ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3).
217. Nevada ex rel. Nev. Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373, 381, 388 (1882). The
court referenced then-article XI, section 2 of the Nevada Constitution which states that the
legislature must "provide for a uniform system of common schools, by which a school should
be established and maintained in each school district ... and that any school district which
should allow instruction of a sectarian character therein might be deprived of its portion of the
interest of the public school fund during the time of such instruction." Id. at 379. (citing NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 2). The court also referenced then article II, section 9 of the Nevada Consti-
tution, providing that "[n]o sectarian instruction shall be imparted or tolerated in any school or
University that may be established under this [c]onstitution." Id. (quoting NEV. CONST. art.
XI, § 9).
218. Chi. Indus. Sch. for Girls, 18 N.E. at 187; Nev. Orphan Asylum, 16 Nev. at 386-87.
219. See Alberta, supra note 156, at 42.
220. See id.
221. Cf id. (noting Catholic educational efforts).
222. See id. at 41-42. Records indicate that the land the Catholic family donated for the
common school in Mandarin was surrendered to the state. Id. at 42.
223. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 149.
2005]
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Florida did not join the national Blaine prohibition against funding
Catholic schools, but did require instruction in the common religion.224 The
same convention that adopted the declaration of rights, section 6 also ap-
proved payment to the City of Ocala "for the reimbursement of certain mon-
eys expended to secure the location there of the East Florida Seminary in
1852, which seminary was summarily removed in 1865 and neither land
[n]or money returned to the town., 225 Both schools adhered to the common
religion, 6 as evidenced by daily devotional exercises including: Bible read-
ing; singing hymns, choruses, and anthems; praying; short lectures; and re-
quired church attendance as late as 1904.227 The schools authorized opt-outs
for Catholics and Jews, something courts in other states occasionally re-
fused.228
The trend was obvious. Although themselves religious, Florida com-
mon schools were becoming more jealous about sharing resources with paro-
chial schools and less reliant upon private religious charity. 2 9 As an exam-
ple, the total value of public school property, which was first recorded in
1877-78 as $116,934 for 992 schools, reached $250,000 for 1724 schools in
1884-85, then more than doubled by 1889-90 to $573,862 for 2333 schools,
and continued to climb.23° Common graded schools, of which there were
almost none prior to 1889, also began to appear.231 As required by the school
law of that year, ten high schools were founded by 1892-93, public teachers
vastly improved, and the school term lengthened from ninety-two days in
1884-85 to 100 days by 1889-90.232 State appropriations for the seminaries
224. See Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21, 35 (Fla.
1962), rev'd 377 U.S. 402 (1964); VIrERrrr, supra note 1, at 151-52.
225. THE WKLY. FLORIDIAN, July 30, 1885.
226. According to the West Seminary Course Catalogue of 1897-98, "[w]hile the school is
strictly nonsectarian in every feature, no institution is more careful in the moral and religious
training of her students than the Seminary." STATE SEMINARY WEST, CATALOGUE, supra note
121, at 45.
227. Id.; EAST FLORIDA SEMINARY, STATE NORMAL SCHOOL AND MILITARY INSTITUTE,
CATALOGUE 24 (1885-86); EAST FLORIDA SEMINARY, STATE NORMAL SCHOOL AND MILITARY
INSTITUTE, CATALOGUE 42 (1882-83); EAST FLORIDA SEMINARY AND MILITARY INSTITUTION,
CATALOGUE 24 (1903-04).
228. See McCormick v. Burt, 95 111. 263, 264-66 (1880) (affirming judgment against
Catholic plaintiff who was suspended for not observing Bible reading rule); Spiller v. Inhabi-
tants of Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 127, 130 (1866) (upholding student's exclusion from
school for refusing to bow her head during public school prayer); North v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ.
of Ill., 27 N.E. 54, 56 (I11. 891) (holding that expulsion of plaintiff for failure to attend man-
datory chapel exercises did not violate the Illinois Constitution).
229. Compare COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 68 tbl.6, with id. at 93 tbl.10.
230. Id. at 68 tbl.6, 93 tbl.10.
231. Id. at 94-98, 108 tbl.12.
232. Id. at 94-98, 108 tbl.12, 124 tbl.15.
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also increased dramatically in the 1890s, 233 and both adopted collegiate pro-
grams.234
D. Public Education Consolidates in the Early 1900s
In the early 1900s, the last components of a modem common school
system emerged with the adoption of a standard curriculum in 1911;235 the
extension of the common education backward to kindergarten beginning in
1905236 and forward to a formal university system pursuant to the Buckman
Act in the same year;237 the passage of compulsory education legislation in
1919 that, although initially struck, eventually took permanent hold;238 the
consolidation of school districts enabling bus transportation in the 1920s;239
and the growth of the Florida Education Association. 2 0  The continued
teaching of the common religion into the early 1960s was all that remained
anachronistic in the public school system by today's standards.24'
233. "State appropriations during the 1890s [to East Florida Seminary] averaged $2,500 a
year." PROCTOR & LANGLEY, supra note 119, at 21. In 1887, the same year that the 1885
Constitution became effective, the legislature made the first appropriation to the East Florida
Seminary library in the amount of $500. Id.
234. Id. at 19; STATE SEMINARY WEST, CATALOGUE, supra note 121, at 9 ("[In the past
few years . . . [the Legislature] propose to limit the scope of instruction in the Seminary
mainly to high school and collegiate courses .... ").
235. Ch. 6178-(No. 59), § 1, 1911 Fla. Laws 109, 109.
236. The first public kindergarten was established in Tallahassee in 1905, paid for by the
county. Rhodes, supra note 53, at 61.
237. See Ch. 5384-(No. 13), § 1, 1905 Fla. Laws 37, 41-42. "By the Buckman Act [in
1905], the legislature abolished The Florida Agricultural College at Lake City... The White
Normal School at DeFuniak Springs, The East Florida Seminary at Gainesville, The South
Florida College at Bartow, and The Florida Agricultural Institute in Osceola County." City of
Gainesville v. Bd. of Control, 81 So. 2d 514, 516 (Fla. 1955). West Florida Seminary, re-
named Florida State College in 1901, became Florida Female College in 1905; and East Flor-
ida Seminary became the University of the State of Florida in 1905 and University of Florida
in 1909. See Id. at 517; COCHRAN, supra note 42, at 162-63; CUTLER, supra note 16, at 231;
DODD, supra note 119, at 107.
238. Ch. 7808-(No. 26), § 1, 1919 Fla. Laws 59, 59. After increasing school attendance
by, for example, twenty-five percent in Leon County, the compulsory school attendance law
was declared unconstitutional in 1920. Rhodes, supra note 53, at 56-57.
239. Rhodes, supra note 53, at 55-56, 73-74. Although Leon County considered consoli-
dation and bus transportation as early as 1902, it did not become a reality until 1921-22. Id.
240. HISTORY OF THE FLORIDA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION: 1886-87 TO 1956-57, at 75
(1958).
241. See generally Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21, 35
(Fla. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 402 (1964) ("The principles governing the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer, the singing of religious hymns and the holding of baccalaureate programs... are so
conducted as not to infringe the constitutional safeguards enjoyed by appellants.").
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E. Nativism Flourishes as Florida Enters the Twentieth Century
Just as the common school movement was consolidating and becoming
basically self-reliant, an upturn in urbanization, industrialization, immigra-
tion, and unemployment occurred, exposing the precursors elsewhere in
America to virulent nativism. 24 2 The result was predictable: religious and
racial prejudice flourished as never before in Florida.24 3 Neutral public fund-
ing for sectarian schools lapsed precisely as racial and religious bigotry
flared.24
1. Delayed Urbanization Advances
Florida urbanized and industrialized late by comparison to other states.
Florida's population was 20% urban in 1890 and 1900; 29% urban in 1910;
37% urban in 1920; and 52% urban in 1930.245 The state's largest urban cen-
ters in 1910 included Jacksonville, with a population of 28,249; Pensacola
with 17,747; Key West with 17,144; and Tampa with 15,839.246 "By 1914
Tampa was the seventh most popular destination for immigrants coming to
the United States, ' 247 which caused Tampa rapidly to take over as the second
largest city by 1920248 and caused Miami to emerge as a new urban center.
249
The Tampa area quickly became the focus of nativist sentiment, yet by com-
parison to large cities elsewhere in America, Tampa was small.25 ° In 1920, at
a time when the population of New York was 5.6 million, the population of
Florida's four largest cities was 91,558 in Jacksonville; 51,608 in Tampa;
31,035 in Pensacola; and 29,571 in Miami. 1
242. GLENN, supra note 1, at 259-60.
243. Thompson, supra note 33, at 50-52; GANNON, supra note 25, at 86-87.
244. ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE 34-36 (Robert P. Lockwood ed., 2000).
245. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1920, VOLUME I, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 47 (1921) [hereinafter
FOURTEENTH CENSUS POPULATION VOL. I; OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE
FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1920, VOLUME III, POPULATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 184 (1922) [hereinafter FOURTEENTH CENSUS POPULATION VOL. III]; FLORIDA
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (Anne H. Shermyen & Susan S. Floyd eds., 23d ed. 1989).
246. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 56.
247. Id. at 168.
248. FOURTEENTH CENSUS POPULATION VOL. I, supra note 245, at 82.
249. GANNON, supra note 25, at 85.
250. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 68.
251. FOURTEENTH CENSUS POPULATION VOL. I, supra note 245, at 82.
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2. Delayed Industrialization Makes Gains
Anti-Catholic nativism had its roots in industrial and urban centers in
America. 5 z Industrialization in Florida, as measured by power used in
manufacturing, experienced dramatic gains at the turn of the century from
7147 horsepower in 1880 to 16,058 in 1890;253 40,745 in 1900;254 and
139,456 in 1919.255 Wage earners increased too. For example, in Jackson-
ville they increased from 1988 in 1909 to 7168 in 1919; in Tampa from 6786
in 1909 to 13,079 in 1919; and in Pensacola from 940 in 1909 to 4586 in
1919.256 Florida's principal industries in 1919 were lumber and timber prod-
ucts ($42,598,000 with 21,058 employees); tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes
($37,926,000 with 12,393 employees); shipbuilding and steel ($24,234,000
with 7838 employees); turpentine and rosin ($21,509,000 with 11,748 em-
ployees); and fertilizers ($10,686,000 with 1390 employees).257
3. Immigration Redoubles
Industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and nativism were linked
in Florida nowhere more closely than to the cigar industry in Tampa.258 In
1890, fifty percent of Tampa's population was comprised of immigrants,
including Cubans, Spaniards who primarily managed the cigar industry, and
Italians.259 Ybor City, then West Tampa, mushroomed into almost exclu-
sively Latino enclaves. 260 Due to cigar-related immigration by 1919, Tampa
had by far the largest number of immigrants (10,666), followed by Jackson-
ville (3894), Key West (3235), Miami (2563) and Pensacola (1445).261 Three
thousand four hundred and fifty-nine Cubans, 2817 Italians (Sicilians), and
2726 Spaniards settled in Tampa; 1704 Cubans, and 1040 West Indians set-
252. See MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 73.
253. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE ELEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1890, PART I, MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 754 (1895).
254. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, THE TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1900, VOLUME VII, PART I, MANUFACTURES 341 (1902).
255. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES:
1920, VOLUME IX, PART 1, MANUFACTURES 242 (1923).
256. Id. at 244.
257. Id. at 243. "Florida ranked second in turpentine and rosin [production] and fourth in
tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes" production in 1900. TWELFTH CENSUS ABSTRACT, supra note
100, at clxxxix.
258. See MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 68-69.
259. Id.
260. INGALLS & PtREz, supra note 183, at 3-4, 31.
261. FOURTEENTH CENSUS POPULATION VOL. III, supra note 245, at 197.
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tled in Key West. 262 Jacksonville, Miami, Pensacola, and St. Petersburg had
no particular ethnic concentrations.263
By 1920, the largest foreign-born ethnic groups in Florida included rela-
tively few at the heart of the nativist controversy in the north.2 4 There were
6613 Cubans, 4745 Italians, 4451 English, 4121 Canadians, 4091 Spaniards,
3534 Germans, and 2087 West Indians.2 65 By 1920, the Irish and Germans
comprised less than one-half percent of the total population and resided pre-
dominately in Jacksonville and Miami.266 About 100 German families also
resided in San Antonio, St. Joseph, and Dade City.267 Nativists later picked
on these settlements, as well as the Latino cigar workers located in the Tam-
pa area.268
"[C]igar workers comprised the highest paid and most concentrated
work force in Florida., 269 Accordingly, whites "looked upon the Latins with
both envy and prejudice, with attraction and repugnance; they saw West
Tampa as a wild [w]est town and Ybor City as a notorious place of crime,
vice, and Dionysian frenzy. 27° Worst, they considered "the denizens of the
Latin enclave as un-American, conspiratorial, and nefarious., 27' Jim Crow
signs arose forbidding not just blacks, but also Latinos from entering. 72
Ironically, Ybor's inhabitants, although viewed as pervasively Catholic,
demonstrated little interest in the Catholic Church.273
4. Structural Unemployment Develops
The problem of structural unemployment and adjustment eventually ac-
companied industrialization and urbanization in Florida, increasing the fric-
tion between native Floridians and the supposedly Catholic immigrants they
believed were taking their jobs, corrupting their culture, and burdening gov-
262. Id.
263. Id. These cities included a relatively large number of Canadians, and Jacksonville
included a relatively large number of English and Russians (600 and 469 respectively). Id.
264. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 73-75.
265. FOURTEENTH CENSUS POPULATION VOL. III, supra note 245, at 197.
266. Id.
267. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 166; accord FOURTEENTH CENSUS POPULATION VOL.
III, supra note 245, at 197 (indicating that 363 Germans resided in Hillsborough County and
205 in Pinellas County, compared to 608 in Duval County and 334 in Dade County).





273. INGALLS & PIREZ, supra note 183, at 157.
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emment and charity.274 Labor militancy erupted in Tampa's cigar industry in
the late 1800s, as it had in Key West.275 Cigar manufacturers, which came
under the control of American conglomerates, began mechanizing traditional
hand-rolling methods, leading to the so-called weight strike of 1899, in
which workers protested the supply of only a fixed quantity of tobacco to
produce a specified number of cigars.276
La Resistencia, with links to cigar workers' organizations in Cuba, was
formed in 1899 and called the first general strike in 1901.277 Vigilantds as-
saulted strike leaders,278 but general strikes in Tampa were not deterred in
1910, 1920 and 1931 under the leadership of the Cigar Maker's International
Union, which had decided anarchist and socialist tendencies of concern to
Floridians. 79 When cigar demand plummeted during the Great Depres-
sion,"' in order to cut costs, manufacturers automated and, during World
War II, turned predominately to women to produce cigars.28' Structural un
employment became severe, deepening prejudices toward immigrants.282
5. Nativism Flourishes in Florida
Nativism came into its own in Florida in the early 1900s, once the na-
tional precursors consolidated.283 In 1901, an arsonist burned St. Mary, Star
of the Sea Church to the ground in Key West; and in 1915, an arsonist
274. Id. at 3.
275. Id. at 8.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 9. The first general strike failed after four months following various vigilant6
actions. INGALLS & PtREZ, supra note 183, at 10.
278. Id. at 9-10. During the first general strike lasting four months, vigilantes with impu-
nity, kidnapped and exported thirteen of the union's most prominent leaders. Id. Local au-
thorities arrested union supporters unless they returned to work, evicted them, and froze union
funds in local banks. Id.; accord MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 71-73.
279. INGALLS & PtREZ, supra note 183, at 10-11; MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 72-73.
The Cigar Makers' International Union took over from La Resistencia. INGALLS & PIREZ,
supra note 183, at 10, 99. Both unions had decidedly anarchist, socialist, and communist
tendencies, in part due to the role of readers or lectura in the cigar plants who stimulated
radical thought. Id. at 11-12, 82-85, 92-93, 178-83, 212-13. The plants banned lectura in
1931, after thousands of cigar workers joined a union affiliated with the communist party. Id.
at 11, 178-83.
280. INGALLS & PtREZ, supra note 183, at 12.
281. Id. at 12, 191, 206, 210.
282. Id. at 191-93. The final blow to the industry came in the 1960s, when the United
States imposed an embargo against the importation of Cuban products including tobacco. Id.
at 12, 214-15.
283. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 73.
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burned a classroom in the parish school.284 Anti-Catholic literature circulated
widely in Florida after 1910, causing the Bishop of St. Augustine, Michael J.
Curley, to write, "[w]e Catholics... are victims of organized vilification and
the government itself through the mails takes a hand by the distribution of
lewd and lascivious anti-Catholic filth.2 85  Nativism impacted local and
statewide elections.286 In St. Augustine in 1910, a secret society, the Patriotic
Sons of America, helped defeat Catholic Congressional candidate Lewis W.
Zim.2 87 Protestants also opposed Catholic candidates in Jacksonville and St.
Augustine due to their faith.288
In 1913, nativism even influenced the Florida Legislature to pass "legis-
lation titled 'An Act Prohibiting White Persons from Teaching Negroes in
Negro Schools,' ' ' 289 targeting the Sisters of St. Joseph, the only whites known
to teach black children at the time (in schools at St. Augustine, Fernandina,
Jacksonville, and Ybor City).290 For three years the law was not enforced;
then at Easter, on April 24, 1916, the state prosecutor charged Sister Mary
Thomasine with a violation.29' In May, the county court discharged her from
custody by holding that "the petitioner was upon the date named in the affi-
davit a teacher of a private school in no manner supported or maintained by
the public funds," and that the Act did not apply to private schools. 92
In 1914, the Florida Legislature nearly passed the so-called Garb Bill,293
which would have precluded public school teachers, widely understood as
the same Sisters of St. Joseph, from wearing religious garb. 294 This bill also
revealed a link between religious prejudice and Blaine-styled limitations on
public funding. 295 Garb Bill supporters decried "'public funds used for sec-
284. Id.
285. Id. at 74.
286. See id.
287. Id.
288. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 74.
289. Id. at 75; Chapter 6490-(No. 70) of the Florida Laws states:
Section 1. From and after the passage of this Act it shall be unlawful in this State, for white
teachers to teach negroes in negro schools, and for negro teachers to teach in white schools
Section 2. Any person, or persons, violating the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a
fine not to exceed five hundred ($500.00) dollars or by imprisonment in the County jail not
exceeding six (6) months.
Ch. 6490-(No. 70), §§ 1-2, 1913 Fla. Laws 311, 311.
290. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 75; Alberta, supra note 156, at 44.
291. Alberta, supra note 156, at 45.
292. Id. at 47.
293. Robert B. Rackleff, Anti-Catholicism and the Florida Legislature, 1911-1919, 50
FLA. HIST. Q. 352, 353 (1972).
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tarian purposes.' 29 6 The Bill proved the immediate precursor to the Sisters'
of St. Joseph's surrender of their so-called common schools 297 and the dis-
charge of Sister Thomasine in 1916.298
In the same year, Governor Catts, formerly a Baptist pastor, fomented
nativist prejudice to win statewide office.299 Secret societies, including the
Patriotic Sons of America, Guardians of Liberty, the True Americans, the
Masons, and the Knights of Pythias supported Catts' self-proclaimed "cru-
sade against 'the continuance of the Roman domination' of America." 3°° He
coupled religious and class prejudice by adding to his anti-Catholic mes-
sage, 30' an anti-German war and anti-Black message. Typical stump rhetoric
included the claim that German Catholics in San Antonio were planning an
armed-Negro insurrection for Kaiser Wilhelm II, after which the Pope would
move the Vatican there.3 °2 There could hardly have been a more thoroughly
prejudicial speech.
In Fort Lauderdale and Fort Myers, at the height of Catts' hysteria, pub-
lic teachers lost their jobs in 1915-16 due to their Catholic faith. 30 3 Parochial
schools, previously attended in roughly equal numbers by Catholics and
Protestants, became religiously segregated. 304  Additionally, in 1917, the
Florida Legislature finally passed in the Convent Inspection Bill, which was
killed in committee two years earlier.30 5 Although Governor Catts appointed
a team to perform the task annually, there is no evidence that the Act was
enforced; however, the legislature did not repeal it until 1935."
Elsewhere in the United States, nativism was also influential and led to
no-aid separationist court victories. 3 7 For example, in 1918, the Supreme
Court of Iowa struck down public payments for maintenance of a public
296. Alberta, supra note 156, at 43 (no citation provided in original).
297. Id. at 41-42. Perhaps influenced by the Latino population, the Tampa Tribune op-
posed the Garb Bill as discriminatory and a violation of the First Amendment. MCNALLY I,
supra note 22, at 75.
298. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 75.
299. Id. at 75-76.
300. Id. at 76.
301. GANNON, supra note 25, at 74.
302. See MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 78-79.
303. Id. at 74. Also, neutral state and local funding benefiting sectarian schools was
threatened. See id. at 75.
304. See id. at 153-54. Protestant children who made up roughly fifty percent of Catholic
classes in 1905-06 in Tampa and about forty percent in 1910 in Tampa and St. Augustine,
made up just twenty-five percent in Tampa and twenty percent in St. Augustine in 1919. Id. at
154.
305. MCNALLY I, supra note 22, at 75.
306. Id. at 75.
307. See Knowlton v. Baumhover, 166 N.W. 202, 214 (Iowa 1918).
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school operating on the second floor of a parochial school on the grounds
that it, too, was essentially parochial." 8 In 1922, a New York court struck
down indirect aid to pupils in the form of the provision of textbooks and
other supplies to parochial students.0 9
F. The Post-World War H Years
After World War II, public funding of Florida educational programs
neutrally benefiting religious and non-religious educational institutions re-
sumed.310 The reason was first as of necessity, in the form of loans and
scholarships for teachers and nurses."' Subsequently, the funding expanded
to other fields and K-12 education.31 2 The first three Florida cases ever to
interpret the declaration of rights, section 6 also followed in rapid succession
after the wars.3t 3 Accordingly, until the 1967 Constitutional Revision Com-
mission, both the Florida Legislature and the judiciary behaved as if the dec-
308. Id. The Supreme Court of Iowa also struck it down under the state Establishment
Clause, a clause precluding "taxation for ecclesiastical support," as well as a statute forbidding
"the use or appropriation or gift or loan of public funds to any institution or school under
ecclesiastical or sectarian management or control." Id. at 207. Accord Jenkins v. Inhabitants
of Andover, 103 Mass. 94, 100, 103 (1869) (holding educational enactment unconstitutional
to the extent it permits the town of Andover to support a supposed public school that was run
by a private board affiliated with Christ Church).
309. Smith v. Donahue, 195 N.Y.S. 715, 718 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922). The court referenced
then-article IX, section 4 of the New York Constitution as follows:
No Aid to Denominational Schools. Neither the state, nor any subdivision thereof, shall
use its property or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used,
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of
any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of
any religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught.
Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. of 1894 art. IX, §4).
310. See generally ch. 29726, §§ 1-3, 1955 Fla. Laws 231, 231-34. Chapter 29726 was
enacted to provide for scholarships and loans to prospective teachers. Id. Chapter 28919 was
enacted to provide for scholarships and loans to prospective nurses. Ch. 28919, §§ 1-2, 1955
Fla. Laws 572, 572-73.
311. Ch. 29726, § 1, 1955 Fla. Laws 231, 231-32; Ch. 29819, § 1, 1955 Fla. Laws 572,
573.
312. See Act effective June 22, 1961, ch. 61-496, pmbl., 1961 Fla. Laws 1091, 1091-92.
The purpose of this act was to provide financial assistance to Florida high school graduates
seeking to attend college. Id. This program served as a predecessor to the Corporate Income
Tax Credit Scholarship Program, which permits students in grades K-12 to attend private
religious or non-religious schools of their parents' choice. See FLA. STAT. § 220.187 (2004);
FLA. STAT. § 1002.20(6) (2004).
313. See Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 1959);
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laration of rights, section 6 was consistent with religiously neutral programs
of general eligibility with a secular purpose.314
1. Neutral Public Funding of Religious Schools Reemerges
Teaching and nursing shortages in the aftermath of the world wars were
the first to prompt a neutral public education scholarship program.1 5 The
legislature responded in 1955 by enacting scholarship loans for residents to
attend any institution of higher learning in Florida approved for teacher edu-
cation, religious or non-religious.316 Awardees pledged to teach in a Florida
public school or junior college for at least as long as the resident received the
scholarship.1 7 The teacher scholarship loan recipient could "register in any
college, school, department, or division of the institution he may desire, and
may pursue a course of studies leading toward any type of degree he may
desire," as long as, upon graduation, the recipient would be fully eligible for
teacher certification.318  At the time, Florida residents could attend, for
teacher education, a variety of religious institutions including, for example,
Stetson University, St. Leo College, Bethune-Cookman College, Edward
Waters College, Florida Presbyterian College, and Barry College. 319 Similar
loan and scholarship programs survive today.32°
314. 1967 Minutes, supra note 9.
315. Rhodes, supra note 53, at 67-68; Alfred H. Adams, A History of Public Higher Edu-
cation in Florida: 1821-1961 184 (1962) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State Uni-
versity) (on file with Nova Law Review).
316. Ch. 29726, § 2, 1955 Fla. Laws 231, 232-33 (codified at Ft.A. STAT. § 239.41
(1961)). The law required scholarship loans to be awarded on the basis of competitive exami-
nations and allocated funds to the counties proportionate to their K-12 enrollment. Id. See
also FLA. STAT. § 239.42 (1961) (explicitly referencing disbursement of scholarship funds at
private institutions).
317. Ch. 29726, § 2, 1955 Fla. Laws 231, 232-33.
318. FLA. STAT. § 239.41 (1961); accord FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 130.5-10, 130.7-20
(1962). Florida's State Board of Education approved programs for teacher education. Id. at r.
130.5-10.
319. See STETSON UNIV., REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF
TEACHER EDU. 12 (1957); Telephone Interview with Betty D. Johnson, Library Director and
Professor, duPont-Ball Library, Stetson Univ., in St. Petersburg, Fla. (Aug. 19, 2004); Letter
from Gene W. Medlin, Chairman, Dep't. of Mathematics, Stetson Univ., to W.W. Wharton,
Dir., Scholarships and Loans, Fla. Dep't. of Educ. (Apr. 20, 1967) (on file with Nova Law
Review); Memorandum from W.W. Wharton to Floyd T. Christian, Comm'r of Educ., State of
Fla. (Mar. 16, 1971) (on file with Nova Law Review); Proposal from Dep't of Educ., State of
Fla., to U.S. Office of Educ., Buereau of Educ. Pers. Dev. Under EPDA (May 26, 1971) (on
file with Nova Law Review).
320. See FLA. STAT. §§ 1009.54, 1009.57-.59 (2004) (addressing scholarship, loan for-
giveness, and tuition reimbursement programs for teachers); Minority Teacher Education
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Also in 1955, due to a nursing shortage, the State of Florida established
a professional scholarship for Florida residents pledging to practice nursing
in Florida.32' Eventually, one-half of the residents had to pledge their intent
to practice nursing in a public hospital in Florida.322 Scholarships were
available to attend several types of educational institutions: 1) "professional
diploma schools of nursing or approved junior college schools of nursing in
Florida; '323 2) "basic collegiate schools of nursing in Florida;, 324 3) "practi-
cal schools of nursing in Florida; 32 5 and 4) baccalaureate-granting institu-
tions in Florida and other states.326 Eligible institutions had to meet "the en-
trance requirements of a school of nursing approved by the Florida state
board of nurse registration and nursing education.,, 327 A similar program has
existed ever since, now benefiting sectarian schools and has expanded to
include occupational therapists. 328 Religious hospitals have always benefited
from the program.
The 1960s marked a significant expansion in public funding for private
religious and non-religious schools.3 29 In 1961, the Florida Legislature ap-
proved the first school choice program, neutrally benefiting religious and
non-religious higher educational institutions in the form of a corporate in-
come tax educational scholarship program to assist Florida high school
graduates "unable to attend college because of financial inability." 330 The
legislation rendered educational benefits payable from approved plans not to
Scholars Program, § 1009.60; Florida Fund for Minority Teachers, Inc., § 1009.605;
Teacher/Quest Scholarship Program, § 1009.61; Grants for Teachers for Special Training in
Exceptional Student Education, § 1009.62.
321. Ch. 29819, § 2, 1955 Fla. Laws 572, 573-74.





327. § 239.49. Rollins College may have participated in the program. E-mail from
Wenxian Zhang, Dep't of Archives & Special Collections, Rollins College (Aug. 20, 2004).
Rollins College offered a combined nursing and liberal arts program with Orange General
Hospital School of Nursing in Orlando from 1941-59. Id.
328. See Nursing Student Loan Forgiveness Program, FLA. STAT. § 1009.66 (2004); Nurs-
ing Scholarship Program, § 1009.67. Bethune-Cookman College and Pensacola Christian
College have nursing baccalaureate programs. Florida Center for Nursing, Nursing Education
Programs in Florida, http://www.flcenterfomursing.org/links/individual-cat.cfm?catid=14
(last visited Oct. 30, 2005). See also Critical Occupational Therapist or Physical Therapist
Shortage Student Loan Forgiveness Program, § 1009.632; Critical Occupational Therapist or
Physical Therapist Shortage Scholarship Loan Program, § 1009.633; Critical Occupational
Therapist or Physical Therapist Shortage Tuition Reimbursement Program, § 1009.634.
329. See FLA. STAT. § 220.187 (2004).
330. Act effective June 22, 1961, ch. 61-496, pmbl., 1961 Fla. Laws 1091, 1092.
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be deemed as a distribution of income to a member of a corporation.33 ' This
was a forebear of the modem Corporate Income Tax Credit (CITC) Scholar-
ship Program, enabling students to attend a private religious or non-religious
kindergarten through twelfth grade school of the parents' choice.3 32
In 1963, the legislature expanded scholarship and loan assistance to
higher education. 333 The state appropriated a half-million dollars for a spe-
cial trust fund to award scholarship loans for tuition, registration fees, books,
and housing to eligible residents attending any "institution of higher learning
in Florida, either private or public, which is a member of the Southern Asso-
ciation of Colleges and Secondary Schools, or whose credits are acceptable
for transfer to state universities in Florida." '334 Eligibility depended upon
need and ability as demonstrated by "standardized examinations and a certi-
fication of acceptability by the university or college of the applicant's
choice. '335 The state also established Seminole Indian Scholarships for Indi-
ans to attend any accredited community college, college, or university in
Florida.336 These and similar aid programs still exist, with two incorporating
an explicit requirement that the post-secondary educational institution have a
secular purpose, namely, education itself.
337
In 1965, the legislature approved the precursor to today's Florida Bright
Futures Scholarship Program, the Florida Regents Scholarship. 338 The legis-
lature directed the Florida Board of Regents to award a scholarship to eligi-
ble residents to attend any "accredited public or private college, university or
331. Act effective June 22, 1961, ch. 61-496, § 1(4), 1961 Fla. Laws 1091, 1092 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 617.50 (1967)).
332. See FLA. STAT. § 220.187 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 1002.20(6) (2004).
333. Act effective June 17, 1963, ch. 63-452, § 4, 1963 Fla. Laws 1176, 1178 (codified at




337. Neutral post-secondary educational loan assistance programs include: the Florida
Public Student Assistance Grant Program, FLA. STAT. § 1009.50 (2004), Florida Private Stu-
dent Assistance Grant Program, § 1009.51, Florida Postsecondary Student Assistance Grant
Program, § 1009.52. Florida post-secondary educational loan assistance programs requiring
the institution to have a secular purpose include: the William L. Boyd, IV Florida Resident
Access Grants, § 1009.89(3) (discussing private schools), and Access to Better Learning and
Education Grant Program, § 1009.891(3) (discussing private schools). See also Mary McLeod
Bethune Scholarship Program, § 1009.73, Jose Marti Scholarship Challenge Grant Program, §
1009.72 (discussing scholarship for Hispanic students attending, inter alia, private religious
post-secondary institutions).
338. Act effective June 24, 1965, ch. 65-495, § 1(2), 1965 Fla. Laws 1683, 1684 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 239.451 (1967)).
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junior college in Florida.-3 39 Eligibility among seniors depended upon a
"rank in the top five percent in the state as judged by the state-wide twelfth
grade examination and high school academic record and recommendation of
their high school principals., 34" Renewal depended upon maintaining at least
"a 'B' average on at least thirty credit hours of work per academic year. 34'
The program has expanded since and assumed new names including the Flor-
ida Academic Scholars' Fund,342 Florida Graduate Scholars' Fund,343 Florida
Undergraduate Scholars' Fund,' 4 and Florida Bright Futures Scholarship
Program.
345
2. Equal Treatment and Neutrality Principles Reemerge
Following World War II, the Supreme Court of Florida, in addition to
the Florida Legislature, interpreted the declaration of rights, section 6 in a
manner consistent with neutral and equal treatment of religious persons. 346
The first three Florida cases ever to interpret the declaration of rights, section
6 followed in rapid succession after the World Wars and held constitutional
devises of land and access to public buildings neutrally benefiting religious
and non-religious persons.3 47 Two federal cases decided before the incorpo-
ration of the Establishment Clause against the states in 1947 also favored
neutrality and equal treatment of persons on the basis of race and faith.
3 48
The United States Supreme Court upheld, against the Establishment
Clause, the use of federal funds for construction of buildings on the grounds
of two hospitals in the District of Columbia; allegedly directed by members
of a Catholic monastic order or sisterhood with title to the property vested in
339. Id. Sectarian institutions participated. See, e.g., Letter from Floyd T. Christian,
Comm'r of Educ., State of Fla., to Ren Morris (July 30, 1970) (on file with Nova Law Re-
view) (regarding attendance of student at Barry College on a Florida Regents Scholarship).
340. § 239.451(1).
341. § 239.451(2).
342. FLA. STAT. § 240.402 (1980).
343. FLA. STAT. § 240.4025 (1985).
344. FLA. STAT. § 240.402 (1986).
345. FLA. STAT. § 240.40202 (1997).
346. See, e.g., Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 700-01
(Fla. 1959) (condemning a preference of one sect or denomination over any other); Koerner v.
Borck, 100 So. 2d 398, 401-02 (Fla. 1958) (upholding church's right or ingress and egress
over county-owned land for baptismal purposes); Fenske v. Coddington, 57 So. 2d 452, 456
(Fla. 1952) (upholding the existence of "a Chapel for religious worship which is located in a
portion... of a public school.").
347. See supra note 346.
348. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Cochran v. La. State Bd. of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 375 (1930).
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the Sisters of Charity.349 Additionally, the Court upheld, against the Four-
teenth Amendment, inter alia, a state law authorizing purchase of secular
school books for the use of school children attending public and private reli-
gious and non-religious schools.350 The Court found no intent to benefit reli-
gious schools and that the actual beneficiaries were not the schools, but the
children."'
In 1947, Everson v. Board of Education upheld a law providing reim-
bursement to parents for the cost of transporting children on public busses to
religious and non-religious schools.35 2 The Court incorporated the Estab-
lishment Clause against the states, yet found the Clause not violated by a
program "neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers." '353 According to the Court, "[s]tate power is no more to be used
so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." '354 Consequently, the
Court stated in dicta that on the one hand, New Jersey could not directly con-
tribute tax-raised funds to a sectarian school, but on the other hand, the state
could not exclude persons because of their faith, or lack there of, from re-
ceiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.355
Shortly after Everson, in 1952, the Supreme Court of Florida decided
the first case interpreting the declaration of rights, section 6, Fenske v. Cod-
dington.356 In Fenske, the court reviewed the desire of trustees of a sectarian
"negro school" to transfer its related real estate and tangible personal prop-
erty to the Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, allegedly to better
serve the trust's purpose of providing a quality, albeit segregated, education
to blacks.357 The court held the conveyance reserving Stewart Memorial
Chapel to the grantors, who were at the heart of the real property, a right of
ingress and egress to the premises did not violate the First Amendment or the
declaration of rights, section 6.358 According to the Fenske court,
[t]he very fact that sufficient money from the original trust is retained by
the trustees under the supervision of the Chancellor to maintain this chapel
until the further orders of the Chancellor, and that no public (state) monies
349. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 292, 300 (1899).
350. Cochran, 281 U.S. at 375.
351. Id. at 374-75.
352. 330 U.S. at 17-18.
353. Id. at 18.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 16-17.
356. 57 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 1952).
357. Id. at 453.
358. Id. at 454, 456.
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are to be spent in aid of any sectarian institution is sufficient evidence that
neither the federal or the state Constitutions are being violated.359
In 1958, the Supreme Court of Florida likewise approved a devise of a
parcel of land with a lake for use as a county park, reserving to a nearby
church a perpetual right of ingress and egress over county-owned land to
reach the lake for purposes of conducting baptisms and other religious and
recreational events.36 Although the easement resulted in an important bene-
fit to the church, and the court conceded that a public disbursement to im-
prove the park was possible, in Koerner v. Borck,6 the court held that, "any
improvement to the county-owned land will be made for the benefit of the
people of the county and not for the church., 362 Referencing Everson, "[t]he
Florida Supreme Court recognized that prohibiting baptisms in public waters
would violate the United States Constitution because state power cannot be
used to handicap religions any more than it can to favor them.,
363
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Florida elaborated its nascent declaration
of rights, section 6 equal treatment and neutrality framework when it held
constitutional the temporary use by "several churches" of various public
school buildings on Sunday,3 " pursuant to state law and county board regula-
365"36tions, "pending.. . construction of church buildings. 366 Appellants com-
plained that the use was "an indirect contribution of financial assistance to a
church in violation of Section 6 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida
Constitution, F.S.A. '3 6 7 They further argued "that regardless of how small
the amount of money might be, nevertheless, if anything of value can be
traced from the public agency to the religious group, the Constitution has
been thereby violated. 368 The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed without
remanding the case to clarify whether public funds had been contributed and
359. Id. at 456.
360. Koerner v. Borck, 100 So. 2d 398, 401-02 (Fla. 1958).
361. Id. at 398.
362. Id. at 402.
363. Bush v. Holmes (Bush 1), 886 So. 2d 340, 379-80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (Pol-
ston, J., dissenting) (citing Koerner, 100 So. 2d at 401 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947))).
364. Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. Of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 1959).
365. See FLA. STAT. § 235.02 (1959) ("Subject to law, the trustees of any district may
provide for or permit the use of school buildings and grounds within the district, out of school
hours during the school term, or during vacation, for any legal assembly ... .
366. Southside Estates Baptist Church, 115 So. 2d at 698.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 699.
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considered de minimis any indirect benefit to the churches and cost to the
public fisc.369
In Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, the court ap-
proved the consistency of the declaration of rights, section 6 with the neutral-
ity principle when it noted the lack of any evidence "that one sect or de-
nomination is being given a preference over any other. As a matter of fact,
the amended complaint reveals that some four or five religious groups had
been accorded the same treatment. None has been denied .... Citing
Fenske and Koerner, the Supreme Court of Florida said: "We ourselves have
heretofore taken the position that an incidental benefit to a religious group
resulting from an appropriate use of public property is not violative of Sec-
tion 6, of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution. '37' Subject to
judicial review for abuse of discretion, the court applied a rule of reason for a
"basically religious" people,372 rather than appellant's position preventing use
or occupancy of public property for Easter Sunrise Service and other "absurd
application[s].,,7
It would be decades before the United States Supreme Court would
reach a holding similar to Southside Estates Baptist Church.374 On the other
hand, with respect to striking the common religion, the United States Su-
preme Court acted first.375 In 1964, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed in part the Supreme Court of Florida's holding in Chamberlin that a
statute requiring daily readings from the Bible, the recitation of the Lord's
Prayer, singing of religious hymns, and holding of baccalaureate programs
did not violate the Establishment Clause or the declaration of rights, section
6.376 On remand, the Supreme Court of Florida preserved the constitutional-
ity of "religious and sectarian baccalaureate programs ... the conducting of a
religious census among the [school] children to ascertain their own religious
369. Id. at 699-701.
370. Id. at 700.
371. Southside Estates Baptist Church, 115 So. 2d at 700 (citations omitted).
372. Id. at 701.
373. Id. at 700.
374. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).
375. See Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction (Chamberlin I1), 377 U.S.
402, 402 (1964).
376. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction (Chamberlin 1), 143 So. 2d 21,
23, 35 (Fla. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 402 (1964) (referencing FLA. STAT. § 231.09 (1961)). See
also Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181, 183, 185 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960) (reinstating a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against a school
district policy permitting the Gideons to annually distribute the King James Bible at public
schools on the grounds that it violated the Florida Blaine Amendment, the First Amendment,
and parents' right to inculcate their children in religion).
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affiliations . . .[and] the conducting of religious tests as a qualification for
the employment of teachers. 377
G. The 1967 Constitutional Revision Session
On the eve of the 1967 Constitutional Revision Session, the Florida
Legislature had approved numerous public funding programs neutrally bene-
fiting religious and non-religious schools.378 The Supreme Court of Florida
and the United States Supreme Court also had generally endorsed the princi-
ples of neutrality and equal treatment of persons on the basis of faith.37 9 The
Committee of the Whole House approved a single amendment by a vote of
seventy-one to twenty-four38 ° to replace the declaration of right, section 6's
"no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly
in aid of any church, sect or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian
institution,"38 with article I, section 3's "[n]o revenue of the state or any
political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public
treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomi-
nation or in aid of any sectarian institution., 382 The minutes do not reflect
the reason, but the change ensured, to the extent there was any question, that
local governmental bodies are subject to it.383
The Commission rejected numerous other amendments to the declara-
tion of rights, section 6, but few conclusions can be drawn from this. 3 4 For
example, the Commission rejected an amendment permitting "the provision
of health and welfare or other non-curricula services ... for the benefit of all
school children" and "the distribution of Federal funds in accordance with
the terms of the Federal law. 385 The former proposed nothing new or con-
troversial as private school students have long benefited from basic health
and welfare services (for example, immunization) and there is no evidence
the Commission sought to end this.386 The Commission may very well have
rejected the second amendment because it was unnecessary; federal law pri-
377. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction (Chamberline II1), 171 So. 2d
535, 537 (Fla. 1965).
378. See 1967 Minutes, supra note 9, at 17.
379. See Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 701 (Fla. 1959);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).
380. 1967 Minutes, supra note 9, at 17.
381. FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 6.
382. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; see 1967 Minutes, supra note 9, at 17.
383. 1967 Minutes, supra note 9, at 17.
384. Id. at 15.
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marily governs federal expenditures.387 The Commission also rejected the
following amendment, but presumably without meaning to endorse its ob-
ject: "The liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as
to justify licentiousness or practices subversive of, or inconsistent with, pub-
lic morals, peace or safety." '388
Other rejected amendments include the addition to the 1885 language of
the words "for religious, denominational or sectarian purposes, 389 which
would have precluded aid for a religious purpose. 39" The declaration of
rights, section 6 already prohibited this.39' The Commission also rejected a
substitute amendment condensing article 1, sections 3 through 5 and replac-
ing the state Blaine amendment with language similar to the federal Estab-
lishment Clause: "There shall be no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ,,39' At this early date,
there was no obvious difference between state and federal jurisprudence and
no reason to believe either would eventually prove more separationist than
the other, although in fact, federal jurisprudence would shortly emerge as the
more exclusionary. 9 Last, the Commission rejected a proposal that recurred
in subsequent constitutional conventions to strike the phrases "or indirectly"
and "directly or indirectly. 394 It also refused an amendment advancing equal
treatment of churches, sects, religious denominations, and sectarian institu-
tions,3 95 as prevailing jurisprudence already required this.396
H. The 1968 Florida Blaine Amendment Interpreted
The declaration of rights, section 6 became article I, section 3 with mi-
nor modification in the 1968 Florida Constitution.397 The same year, the
legislature did not view it as unconstitutional to enact a K-12 voucher pro-
gram for disabled students unable to obtain exceptional student services from
public schools whose parents petitioned to permit them to attend private
387. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Funds § 54 (1997).
388. 1967 Minutes, supra note 9, at 13.
389. Id.
390. See id.
391. FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 6.
392. 1967 Minutes, supra note 9, at 14.
393. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07, 625 (1971) (holding un-
constitutional laws authorizing reimbursement for parochial teacher salaries, teachers, and
instructional materials in the teaching of secular subjects).
394. 1967 Minutes, supra note 9, at 15, 17.
395. Id. at 13.
396. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 6.
397. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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schools, including religious ones.398 The Supreme Court of Florida eventu-
ally reviewed whether the state could cap the amount it would pay for the
sectarian education under this program consistent with article IX, section 1,
without otherwise commenting on the constitutionality of the program.399
This was the precursor to the McKay Scholarship Program,400 which is func-
tionally equivalent to the Opportunity Scholarship Program.40'
Also in 1968, the United States Supreme Court decided that the loan of
textbooks to students attending parochial schools did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause, as "[tihe law merely makes available to all children the
benefits of a general program .... ,4.2 The Court held that the "financial
benefit [was primarily] to parents and students, not schools. ' ' 403 The Court
was not concerned that this would create incentives for some students to at-
tend religious schools. 404 According to the Court, "[perhaps free books
make it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian school,
but that was true of the state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not alone
demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious institu-
tion.,,
4°5
The Supreme Court of Florida also continued expanding its neutrality
jurisprudence.4 6 In 1970, the Supreme Court of Florida held a statute ex-
empting properties used as licensed homes for the elderly, including religious
homes, was consistent with the First Amendment and the Blaine Amend-
ment.40 7 "The atmosphere of the home [wa]s religious," as demonstrated by,
among other things, daily chapel services, except Sunday, "under the super-
vision of an ordained minister," Bible instruction and study, and transport to
the churches of the residents' choice on Sunday.4°8 Out of 158 residents,
seventy-six were members of the Presbyterian Church.40 9 "Unquestionably, a
Christian atmosphere [wa]s maintained."41  The Synod of Florida of the
Presbyterian Church elected the officers and directors of the home.4"
398. See Act effective July 1, 1968, ch. 68-24, § 5, 1968 Fla. Laws 240, 243.
399. See Scavella v. Sch. Bd. of Dade County, 363 So. 2d 1095, 1098 (Fla. 1978).
400. FLA. STAT. § 1002.39 (2004).
401. § 1002.38.
402. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
403. Id. at 244.
404. See id. at 244-45.
405. Id. at 244.
406. See Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256, 261-
62 (Fla. 1970).
407. Id. at 261-63.
408. Id. at 258.
409. Id. at 263.
410. Id. at 258.
411. Johnson, 239 So. 2d at 258.
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In upholding the constitutionality of a tax exemption benefiting the
home, the court in Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Florida,
Inc. disregarded its sectarian character or, indeed, the fact that it was con-
trolled by a church, and instead focused on the statute's secular purpose of
encouraging the establishment of homes for the elderly.4 2 Referencing fed-
eral precedent, the court also discussed the neutrality of the exemption:
The exemption goes, not only to homes for the aged owned by religious
bodies, but to any bona fide homes for the aged duly licensed, owned and
operated in compliance with the terms of the statute by Florida corpora-
tions not for profit .... There is nothing to prevent organizations which do
not believe in a Supreme Being from also complying with the statute.413
The Johnson court went one step further and held that excluding the
religious home from the tax exemption could itself violate the law: "To ex-
empt all homes complying with the statute, except church-related homes,
would indeed be discriminatory and inconsistent with the obvious intent and
secular aims of the Legislature. 414
A year later, in 1971, federal and state law diverged for the first time
with the Supreme Court of Florida still on the neutrality track, while the
United States Supreme Court turned toward no-aid separationism. 415 The
Supreme Court of Florida upheld the Educational Facilities Law, which au-
thorized Florida counties to create county authorities to assist institutions of
higher education, including sectarian institutions, with obtaining financing to
develop and expand educational facilities.4 6 The plaintiff challenged bond
financing for the purpose of constructing a dormitory-cafeteria and purchas-
ing necessary equipment and other facilities at the Florida Institute of Tech-
nology.417 The court ruled against the appellant on the following grounds:
A state cannot pass a law to aid one religion or all religions, but
state action to promote the general welfare of society, apart from
any religious considerations, is valid, even though religious inter-
ests may be indirectly benefited. If the primary purpose of the
state action is to promote religion, that action is in violation of the
412. Id. at 261. "It is apparent that Fla. Stat. (1967), § 192.06(14), F.S.A., was enacted to
promote the general welfare through encouraging the establishment of homes for the aged and
not to favor religion .... " Id.
413. Id. at 261-62.
414. Id. at 262.
415. See Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 307 (Fla. 1971).
416. Id. at 306-07.
417. Id. at 306.
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First Amendment, but if a statute furthers both secular and reli-
gious ends, an examination of the means used is necessary to de-
termine whether the state could reasonably have attained the secu-
lar end by means which do not further the promotion of religion.418
In contrast, in 1971, the United States Supreme Court held that laws au-
thorizing reimbursement for parochial teacher salaries, textbooks, and in-
structional materials used in the teaching of secular subjects were unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that they would cause excessive entanglement with the
Catholic Church. 419  Thus, this ruling began the United States Supreme
Court's roughly two-decade swing toward federal no-aid separationism,
420
which allowed neutral aid to religious organizations in only isolated in-
stances consistent with the Court's previous rulings pertaining to textbook
loan programs and bus transportation. Except in Florida, the trend else-
418. Id. at 307 (quoting Johnson, 239 So. 2d at 261).
419. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07, 614 (1971).
420. See Essex v. Wolman, 409 U.S. 808, 808 (1972), aff'g 342 F.Supp. 399, 411 (S.D.
Ohio 1972) (holding that state tuition grants to parents enrolling children in nonpublic schools
violates Establishment Clause); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 762-65, 798 (1973) (disallowing state law authorizing reimbursement to low in-
come families for portion of parochial school tuition; disallowing sliding scale tax deductions
for families with students in religious schools; disallowing direct grants to private schools
serving low income students for cost of maintenance and repair); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 474, 482 (1973) (disallowing state law authorizing
reimbursement for state-required records and tests); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828, 835
(1973) (disallowed reimbursement to parents for portion of religious school tuition); Franchise
Tax Bd. v. United Ams. for Pub. Sch., 419 U.S. 890, 890 (1974); Griggs v. Pub. Funds for
Pub. Sch. of N.J., 417 U.S. 961 (1974) aff'g 358 F.Supp. 29, 31 (D.N.J. 1973) (holding that
state programs providing cash funding to parents of nonpublic school students for textbooks,
supplies, and auxiliary services is unconstitutional); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 352,
354-55, 366, 372 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000) (disal-
lowing loans to private schools of materials such as maps, photos, films, projectors, recorders
and lab equipment; disallowed counseling, remedial and accelerated teaching, psychological
and speech and hearing therapy to private school children); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434
U.S. 125, 127, 134 (1977) (disallowing parochial school reimbursement for state-mandated
record keeping and testing expenses); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233, 255 (1977),
overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 (disallowing loan of instructional materials to private
schools or to parents; disallowing transportation for field trips by private schools); Sch. Dist.
of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375, 397 (1985) (disallowing practice of providing
remedial and enrichment courses taught by public school personnel in religious schools leased
to the public schools); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404-06, 414 (1985), overruled by
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997) (disallowing practice of providing and monitor-
ing federally-funded Title I remedial services at private schools).
421. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 (1975) (upholding statute authorizing text-
books for private schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (upholding use of
public school personnel to provide guidance, remedial and therapeutic speech and hearing
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where in the country was similar in Blaine-related litigation that frequently
referenced federal precedent.422
In 1972, the Florida Attorney General published an opinion interpreting
the Establishment Clause and article I, section 3, stating that the Duval
County School Board could make available to private secular or parochial
schools "audiovisual materials and other instructional aids" purchased by the
school district without charge.423 Relying primarily upon Southside Estates,
Johnson, and Nohrr v. Brevard County Education Facilities Authority, the
Attorney General reasoned, "[t]he rendering of certain tax-supported services
to a private or parochial school for the benefit of students taught there is not
necessarily unconstitutional, if the services furnished are for the benefit of
the students and not for the support of a particular religious organization. '"24
According to the Attorney General, "state action to promote the general wel-
services on a neutral site; upholding provision of diagnostic services on neutral site; upholding
reimbursing cost of standardized testing and scoring of private school students); Springfield
Sch. Dist. v. Dept. of Educ., 397 A.2d 1154, 1171 (Pa. 1979) (upholding state law requiring
school districts to provide bus transportation for all children, including children enrolled in
religious schools); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 648,
662 (1980) (upholding religious school reimbursement for actual costs of state-mandated tests
and reporting).
422. Compare Sheldon Jackson Coll. v. State, 599 P.2d 127, 132 (Alaska 1979) (stricking
a program providing tuition grants exclusively to students attending private schools based in
part on then-current federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence), and Spears v. Honda, 449
P.2d 130, 139 (Haw. 1968) (striking a program that would provide students transportation to
private schools), and People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 305 N.E.2d 129, 132-36 (I11. 1973)
(striking grants to cover the costs of tuition, textbooks and auxiliary services for students
attending private schools, but did not disturb a statute providing transportation for schoolchil-
dren), and State ex. rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 219 N.W.2d 726, 735 (Neb. 1974) (stricking a
scholarship program offering grants for students attending private colleges), and Dickman v.
Sch. Dist. No. 62C, 366 P.2d 533, 534, 537 (Or. 1961) (stricking a textbook loan program),
and Hartness v. Patterson, 179 S.E.2d 907, 909 (S.C. 1971) (struck a tuition grant program
benefiting only private schools), and Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973, 976, 991 (Wash. 1973),
overruled by State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274, 284 (Wash. 2002) (struck financial
assistance for needy and disadvantaged students to attend public and private schools and tui-
tion support for higher education), with Ala. Educ. Ass'n v. James, 373 So. 2d 1076, 1081
(Ala. 1979) (upholding a college scholarship program neutrally benefiting religious schools
because the purpose of the act was to benefit the public), and Ams. United v. Rogers, 538
S.W.2d 711,718-19 (Mo. 1976) (upholding college scholarship because act was to benefit the
public), and Cal. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513, 522 (Cal. 1974) (upholding
use of revenue bonds to finance facilities at religious schools), and Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 228
N.E.2d 791, 793-94 (N.Y. 1967) (upholding a textbook loan program), and Durham v.
McLeod, 192 S.E.2d 202, 204 (S.C. 1972) (upholding a student loan program benefiting pub-
lic and private schools).
423. 72-246 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 421,421 (1972).
424. Id. at 422.
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fare of society, apart from any religious considerations, has been held valid
by the courts, even though religious interests may be indirectly benefited." '425
In 1977, the Attorney General issued a second opinion interpreting arti-
cle I, section 3, stating that the maintenance of religious facilities in county
jails and of rent-free office space for a chaplain, as well as the payment of
public funds to compensate a chaplain serving the religious needs of prison-
ers, does not violate article I, section 3, provided that the facilities and clergy
are made available to all inmates regardless of religious belief and that no
one religion is given preference over another.426 The opinion found that
county commissioners may fund repairs, construction or other capital im-
provements to provide religious facilities at a jail and the sheriff may fund
the operation and equipping of the facilities.427 The Attorney General noted
authority for the view that refusing religious accommodations in these cir-
cumstances could be deemed inhibition of religion. 8 In dicta, the opinion
also approved a statute permitting "instruction of the prisoners in their basic
moral and religious duties. 429
I. The 1977 Constitutional Revision Commission
The 1968 Florida Constitution incorporated a continuous revision clause
requiring consideration of revisions to the constitution within the first ten
years after approval and every twenty years afterwards. 430 The 1977 Consti-
tutional Revision Commission (CRC) considered article I, section 3, includ-
ing draft amendments to strike it and weaken it, but rejected the changes on
the ostensible grounds that its purpose was merely to fix glitches in the Dec-
laration of Rights, not change them substantively. 3 ' Its decision can hardly
be viewed as a mandate for an exclusionary article I, section 3. Debate even
at this late date incorporated allusions to anxiety over whether the Pope or
425. Id.
426. 77-55 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 117, 119 (1977).
427. Id. at 120-21.
428. See id. at 118-19.
429. Id. at 119 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 944.11 (1977)).
430. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
431. Constitution Revision Comm'n Transcript, Full Comm'n 99 (Dec. 6, 1977) [hereinaf-
ter 1977 Constitution Revision Transcript]. A proposal to strike the Blaine amendment was
rejected. See id. Another amendment considered regarded a committee philosophy of re-
straint. See id. at 100-04. The effort to delete "directly or indirectly" was rejected. Id. at
122. In truth, the 1977 CRC approved draft substantive changes to the Declaration of Rights
including with respect to privacy, pretrial release, grand jury counsel, and non-discrimination
based upon sex. Steven J. Uhlfelder & Robert A. McNeely, The 1978 Constitution Revision
Commission: Florida's Blueprint for Change, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1489, 1492-94 (1994).
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other Catholic Church officials sought to "takeover in this state., 43 2 Ulti-
mately, the debate was unavailing in 1978; the electorate disapproved all the
1977 CRC's proposed revisions-whether or not they concerned the Decla-
ration of Rights.433
Without distinguishing or even discussing prevailing case law, the key
proponents of striking article I, section 3 gave as their reason that it allegedly
precluded aid as simple as vaccinating pupils at religious schools,434 busing
to parochial school or for field trips, 435 offering curriculum guidance, 43 6 util-
izing public sports facilities and participating in sports contests,437 renting
private religious facilities,438 and testing for eyeglasses, 43 9 and indirect aid as
sophisticated as tax credits and vouchers for tuition at parochial schools.440
Opponents disagreed that the 1968 Blaine Amendment forbade the less so-
phisticated forms of aid, ironically, for the reason that the Opportunity
Scholarship Program is constitutional; in other words, they were offered as
part of a generally eligible program to all Floridians regardless of religious
preference. 44'
Neither side betrayed a thoughtful grasp of prevailing case law or prac-
tice. Proponents of striking the amendment overstated what precedent indi-
cated it forbade," 2 and opponents voiced support for the neutrality principle
upon which the constitutionality of school choice programs depend as much
as less sophisticated welfare programs. An alternative amendment proposed
striking "directly or indirectly" from the 1968 Blaine Amendment as unnec-
essary,43 but opponents defeated this proposal twenty to fifteen on the
ground that if the language was superfluous there was no need to eliminate
it.'" The CRC's final decision not to modify the 1968 Florida Blaine
Amendment became a non-event when voters disapproved all of the 1977
432. 1977 Constitution Revision Transcript, supra note 431, at 109, 111.
433. Id. at 101, 120; Kelley H. Armitage, Constitution Revision Commissions Avoid Log-
rolling, Don't They?, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1998, at 62, 64 n.36 (citation omitted).
434. 1977 Constitution Revision Transcript, supra note 431, at 101, 120.
435. Id. at 108, 121.
436. Id. at 102.
437. Id. at 107-08.
438. Id. at 110.
439. 1977 Constitution Revision Transcript, supra note 431, at 121.
440. Id. at 106-07, 112, 114.
441. Id. at 101, 103.
442. For example, Southside held that a church's use of public facilities is permitted.
Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 700-01 (Fla. 1959).
443. 1977 Constitution Revision Transcript, supra note 431, at 102, 105.
444. Id. at 114-15, 122.
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CRC's proposals because, according to pundits, "the casino gambling initia-
tive also on the ballot poisoned the voters to all the initiatives.
J. The 1997 Constitutional Revision Commission
Pursuant to the 1968 Florida Constitution continuous revision clause, 446
the 1997 CRC met without intervening developments in article I, section 3
precedent. 47 The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, was in
the midst of one of the most radical realignments in the Court's history dat-
ing back to its pre-1971 neutrality jurisprudence. The shift is evident in
cases upholding public aid to a blind person attending a sectarian institution
for the purpose of becoming a minister;44 8 a government-provided sign lan-
guage interpreter for deaf children in religious schools;4 49 and remedial edu-
cational services on the campus of private schools.45 ° It was likewise evident
in cases holding that religious persons should be treated equally in public
forums, just as the Supreme Court of Florida held decades earlier that
churches should have equal access to public facilities.45'
The 1997 CRC session opened with the caution that a too ambitious
agenda could lead to the same defeat experienced by the 1977 CRC.452 In
1998, voters nevertheless approved diverse revisions affecting the judiciary,
environment and conservation, education, cabinet, privacy, elections, and
gun sales.453 The legislature encouraged this result by establishing a task
force on the judiciary, funding, and assisting with bill drafting and other ser-
445. Armitage, supra note 433, at 64 n.36 (citation omitted).
446. FLA. CONST. art. XI, §. 2.
447. See Constitutional Revision Comm'n Transcripts (June 16, 1997-Dec. 10, 1998),
available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc/minutes.html.
448. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs., 474 U.S. 481, 483,489 (1986).
449. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993).
450. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997).
451. Compare Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 700-01
(Fla. 1959) (holding a Florida public school may use its building for religious club meeting
during non-school hours), with Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265, 276-77 (1981) (hold-
ing a state university's policy of excluding religious student groups from campus facilities was
unconstitutional), and Bd. of Educ. of Westside County Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253
(1990) (plurality opinion) (holding that a public secondary school that receives federal fund-
ing could not prohibit a student religious club from meeting after school hours on school
premises).
452. W. Dexter Douglass, The 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission: Valuable
Lessons from a Successful Commission, 52 FLA. L. REV. 275, 275 (2000).
453. Id. at 276 n.5, 282 n.22 (citations omitted).
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vices as early as 1994.454 The 1997 CRC did not consider proposals to mod-
ify the 1968 Blaine Amendment made by the public in public hearings re-
quired by the Constitution.455 Under the rules of procedure for the Rules and
Administration Committee of the 1997 CRC, public proposals for revisions
had to be read and were rejected unless moved for consideration by the full
committee by at least ten votes.456
A commissioner on the Rules and Administration Committee motioned
to file with the Secretary for consideration by the 1997 CRC one public pro-
posal to revise the 1968 Blaine Amendment "to ensure that the provision is
not interpreted to prevent students in parochial schools from receiving neu-
tral benefits." '4 57 This motion did not receive the mandatory ten votes for
consideration by the CRC.458 Additional public proposals to modify the 1968
Blaine Amendment were never moved in the Committee; these included a
proposal to remove the language "directly or indirectly in aid of any church,
sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution" so that
the amendment would have stated: "to directly promote any church, sect, or
religious denomination or directly aid any sectarian religious institution or
program. The state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall not
deny equal access to a public benefit on account of religion. '459 Another
public proposal was to modify the 1968 Blaine Amendment to read as fol-
lows: "There shall be no law respecting the establishment of one religion in
preference to any other .... 460 In the end, the Committee prevented any
public proposal to modify the 1968 Blaine Amendment from receiving con-
sideration by the full CRC and Florida voters.46'
K. Last Blaine Amendment Litigation
In the aftermath of the 1997 CRC, two Florida appellate courts have ex-
amined religiously-neutral programs of general eligibility with a secular pur-
pose, including the first to strike such a program.462 Meanwhile, the United
States Supreme Court completed its realignment with neutrality principles
454. Id. at 276.
455. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2(c).
456. 4 J. OF THE 1997-1998 CONST. REVISION COMM'N 39 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 CRC
Journal]; Douglass, supra note 452, at 280.





462. See Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Bush v. Holmes
(Bush 1), 886 So. 2d 340, 342-344 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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and forced opponents of school choice to dismiss their federal causes of ac-
tion and rely with limited success upon state Blaine amendments. 43 First, in
2000, in Rice v. State,464 the Fifth District held constitutional a criminal stat-
ute enhancing penalties for controlled substance crimes near a place of wor-
ship.4 5 Echoing Southside Estates' holding that the expenditure of public
revenue on religious institutions is permissible if not for a religious purpose,
the Fifth District held, "the expenditure of public money to enforce the stat-
ute is too remote to aid any sectarian purpose. 466
In 2002, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,467 the United States Supreme
Court upheld school vouchers permitting parents to send their children to
public or private religious or non-religious schools. 68 The Court held,
where a government aid program is neutral with respect to relig-
ion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens
463. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002). For the results of Blaine
litigation elsewhere thus far, see Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607, 632 (Wis. 1998)
(upholding a school choice program similar to the Opportunity Scholarship Program); Kot-
terman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 625 (Ariz. 1999) (upholding a tax credit-based school choice
program); Toney v. Bower, 744 N.E.2d 351, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (upholding a tax credit-
based statute for a taxpayer's expenses for elementary and secondary school education);
Embry v. O'Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 167 (Ind. 2003) (upholding a program that allocated
state funds to provide secular educational services to parochial school students enrolled in
public school); State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 48 P.3d 274, 288 (Wash. 2002) (upholding a
program that provided funding for certain students to attend colleges or universities, including
those schools affiliated with or operated by a religious group); see also Doolittle v. Meridian
Joint Sch. Dist., 919 P.2d 334, 343 (Idaho 1996) (upholding reimbursement under IDEA for
education at a parochial school); Minn. Fed'n of Teachers v. Mammenga, 485 N.W.2d 305,
310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding statute providing for state payments to colleges and
universities, including those religiously-affiliated but found not to be "pervasively sectarian,"
covering costs incurred by high school students enrolled in college courses for secondary
school credit); Ams. United for Separation of Church & State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d
1072, 1088 (Colo. 1982) (upholding a program permitting students to use scholarships at any
approved public, private or religiously-affiliated college or university); Lenstrom v. Thone,
311 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Neb. 1981) (upholding college scholarship program); Neb. ex rel.
Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 353 N.W.2d 267, 272-73 (Neb. 1984) (upholding research grant to
religious school). But see Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 563-
64 (Vt. 1999) (striking down tuition reimbursement to parochial school program); Bagley v.
Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127, 147 (Me. 1999) (holding an education tuition program
statute that excluded religious schools to be constitutional); Op. of the Justices, 616 A.2d 478,
480 (N.H. 1992) (finding that it would be unconstitutional for school districts to pay partial
tuition for parents who sent students to private schools of their choice).
464. 754 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
465. Id. at 882-83.
466. Id.
467. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
468. Id. at 662-63.
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who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as
a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the
program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establish-
ment Clause.469
The Court fully embraced principles evident in Florida law, just as Florida
law took an about-face.
In 2004, in Bush v. Holmes,470 the First District held the Opportunity
Scholarship Program unconstitutional under article I, section 3 in an en banc
8-5-1 decision.47' The Opportunity Scholarship Program entitles parents
with children in schools underperforming for two-out-of-four years to schol-
arships to enroll their children in private nonreligious or religious schools
which agree: 1) to "[a]ccept scholarship students on an entirely random and
religious-neutral basis," and 2) "not to compel any student attending ... on
an opportunity scholarship to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or
to worship."472
Although insisting its decision "does not reach" other programs,473 the
First District adopted a three-part test for infringements of article I, section 3
that could do none other.474
The constitutional prohibition in the no-aid provision involves
three elements: 1) the prohibited state action must involve the use
of state tax revenues; 2) the prohibited use of state revenues is
broadly defined, in that state revenues cannot be used 'directly or
indirectly in aid of the prohibited beneficiaries; and 3) the prohib-
ited beneficiaries of the use of state revenues are 'any church, sect
or religious denomination' or 'any sectarian institution.'
475
The court hinted that, in its view, "sectarian" might really mean "pervasively
sectarian, 476 and, remarkably, expressed skepticism that the history or text of
Blaine Amendments nationally was associated with religious bigotry or ani-
mus.
477
469. Id. at 652.
470. 886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004), appeal docketed, Nos. SC04-2323,
SC04-2324, SC04-2325 (Fla. Dec. 13, 2004).
471. Id. at 366.
472. FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(3)(b), (4)(e), (j) (2004).
473. Bush 1, 886 So. 2d at 362.
474. Id. at 352.
475. Id. at 352 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3).
476. Id. at 353 n.10.
477. Id. at 351 n.9. The court further noted:
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III. THE CONTEMPORARY MEANING OF THE 1968 FLORIDA BLAINE
AMENDMENT
Florida is one of the few states with a Blaine Amendment where all
branches of government and lesser governmental bodies have interpreted the
constitution to permit religiously-neutral public educational programs of
general eligibility with a secular purpose. 47 Beginning with direct funding
for parochial education and use of sectarian facilities for public education in
the 1840s,479 continuing after the adoption of the declaration of rights, section
6 until the 1910s,4 80 then resuming after the world wars,481 state and local
governments have insisted upon treating persons equally without regard to
religious beliefs.482
A. The Three-Prong Test for Complying with Article I, Section 3
During the half-century of jurisprudence and lawmaking leading to
2004, the following three-part test was applied to assess compliance with
article I, section 3: (1) religion-neutral programs; (2) having a non-sectarian
bona fide public purpose; and (3) of general eligibility and equally available
to both sectarian and nonsectarian institutions, do not violate the Florida
Constitution.483 For programs complying with this test, public revenue pass-
ing to sectarian institutions is not "in aid of' them within the meaning of
article I, section 3484 because it does not have the purpose of, or intent to,
benefit them.485 The purpose of the Opportunity Scholarship Program, for
Whether the Blaine-era amendments are based on religious bigotry is a disputed
and controversial issue among historians and legal scholars .... [Tlhere is no evi-
dence of religious bigotry relating to Florida's no-aid provision. Even if the no-aid
provisions were "born of bigotry," . . . such a history does not render the final sen-
tence of article I, section 3 superfluous. Significantly, nothing in the proceedings of
the CRC or the Florida Legislature indicates any bigoted purpose in retaining the
no-aid provision in the 1968 general Revision of the Florida Constitution.
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 824 (2000)). "[N]othing in the history or text of
the Florida no-aid provision suggests animus towards religion." Id. at 364.
478. See supra Part II.C.
479. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
480. See supra Part II.F.2.
481. See supra Part II.B-E.
482. See supra Part II.F.2.
483. Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla.
1970).
484. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
485. See Johnson, 239 So. 2d at 261.
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example, is to improve the overall quality of Florida's public schools;4 86 it is
not a mere pretext to benefit religious schools.
487
For public programs complying with the three-part test, the primary
beneficiaries are those receiving the service, not the religious institutions.488
For example, the Supreme Court of Florida in Koerner held county taxpayers
were the beneficiaries of any improvements to the park, not the church re-
serving an easement over it for baptismals.489 In Johnson, the tax exemption
for eldercare primarily benefited the elderly and community, not the ,
profit Presbyterian facility.490 Likewise, in City of Boca Raton v. Gidman,49'
a case not interpreting article I, section 3, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the beneficiaries of city funds subsidizing a child day care center run by
a nonprofit organization were the city's disadvantaged children, not the non-
profit corporation.492 The city charter provided, similar to article I, section 3,
that "[n]o city funds shall be expended in any manner whatsoever to accrue
either directly or indirectly to the benefit of any religious, charitable, benevo-
lent, civic, or service organization. '493  The United States Supreme Court
held likewise that children and parents, not private schools, were the benefi-
ciaries of reimbursement for school bus fares in Everson,94 loan of textbooks
in Board of Education v. Allen,495 and tuition and tutorial aid in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris.496
This is not to deny that, as the Supreme Court of Florida stated in John-
son, a benefit "merely incidental to the achievement of a public purpose"
passes to the private service provider.497 Otherwise, crucial social services
486. Initial Brief of Governor John Ellis (Jeb) Bush, CFO Tom Gallagher, Comm'r of
Agric. Charles H. Bronson, Fla. Dept. of Educ., and the State Bd. of Educ., at 8, Bush v.
Holmes, Nos. SC04-2323, SC04-2324, SC04-2325 (Fla. Jan. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Initial
Brief].
487. Plaintiffs may prove a pretextual religious purpose. See Johnson, 239 So. 2d at 261
("[Ihf a statute furthers both secular and religious ends, an examination of the means used is
necessary to determine whether the state could reasonably have attained the secular end by
means which do not further the promotion of religion."); cf Silver Rose Entm't, Inc. v. Clay
County, 646 So. 2d 246, 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (indicating the court may critically
examine any putative purpose of a law).
488. See Johnson, 239 So. 2d at 261.
489. Koerner v. Borck, 100 So. 2d 398, 402 (Fla. 1958).
490. Johnson, 239 So. 2d at 261.
491. 440 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1983).
492. Id. at 1282.
493. Id. at 1278.
494. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
495. 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
496. 536 U.S. 639, 645 (2002).
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might never be delivered. Nor is it to disagree that the private provider may
attract persons who otherwise would not attend. It is merely to point out that
neither has so far been material to Florida courts in analogous cases. Likely,
more elderly Floridians can afford pervasively religious nursing homes due
to the property tax exemption held constitutional in Johnson.498 Possibly,
more persons attend places of worship because of enhanced controlled sub-
stance penalties held constitutional in Rice v. State.499 The university in
Nohrr could presumably build more facilities attracting more students as a
result of tax-advantaged bond financing.5" Church members in Southside
Estates may not have been able to worship at all without equal access to pub-
lic school facilities.50
Modem educational funding programs sever the link between religious
organizations and any alleged government benefit derived from the program
and satisfy the three-prong test more cleanly than any of the aforementioned
cases. A public benefit passed directly to the devoutly religious retirement
home in Johnson,5 2 religious university in Nohrr,50 3 and churches in South-
side Estates, °5 4 and Koerner.505 In contrast, parents and students must decide
where to spend their Opportunity Scholarship,5°6 McKay Scholarship,507
Bright Future Scholarship, 58 Florida Resident Access Grant,5°9 and Florida
Teacher Scholarship. 5'0 As long as a school is qualified, Florida is entirely
neutral about the school parents and students choose, public or private, reli-
gious or non-religious.51' The effect of the parents' discretion is to add an
intervening step rendering the benefit received by the religious organization
even more incidental than was the case in prior precedent. It would be no
498. See id. at 263.
499. See 754 So. 2d 881, 885 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
500. See Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1971).
501. See Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 700-01 (Fla.
1959).
502. See Johnson, 239 So. 2d at 264.
503. Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 307.
504. Southside Estates Baptist Church, 115 So. 2d at 700-01.
505. Koerner v. Burck, 100 So. 2d 398, 402 (Fla. 1958).
506. FLA. STAT. § 1002.20(6)(b)(1) (2004).
507. § 1002.20 (6)(b)(2).
508. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, WANT TO KNOW THE BEST WAY TO PREDICT
YOUR FUTURE? MAKE IT HAPPEN!, http://www.firn.edu/doe/brfutures/pdf/bf-brocure.pdf (last
visited Oct. 14, 2005).
509. Florida Department of Education, Florida Residence Access Grant,
http://www.firm.eduldoe/osfalfragfactsheet.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
510. Florida International University, The Florida Teacher Scholarships,
http://education.fiu.edu/scholarships.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
511. See § 1002.20(6)(a)-(b).
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different if the religious school received the money from a parent who re-
ceived a tax deduction or tax credit or if a parent who was a public employee
spent part of her paycheck on private school tuition or if a welfare recipient
did likewise.512 The effect of the parents', public employees', or welfare
recipients' discretion is analogous to that of a superseding, independent vari-
able as in tort law.
Prevailing precedent and law also does not turn on the extent of an or-
ganization's or publicly financed activity's religiosity. Johnson dealt with a
devoutly religious retirement home engaged in religious instruction,"3 Ko-
erner and Southside Estates with a church,51" and Nohrr with a religious uni-
versity.515 The retirement home and churches were engaged in inherently
religious activity including religious instruction and worship.5 16 Florida
precedent does not single-out these factors because article I, section 3 of the
Florida Constitution does not.5" 7 The plain text of article I, section 3 supports
no difference at all between public funding for: 1) religious organizations,
but not devoutly religious ones; 2) secular activities or social services per-
formed by sectarian persons, but not religious activities or services; or 3)
post-secondary education provided by devoutly religious institutions, but not
kindergarten through twelfth grade education.1 8 Article I, section 3 men-
tions "any church, sect, or religious denomination or . . .sectarian institu-
tion., 5 9 The common theme is that all are religious without distinction as to
degree.52°
B. The Fee-for-Services Exception to Article L Section 3
Public programs may also comply with article I, section 3, because they
do not confer "aid" at all, but are purely fee-for-service transactions or value-
512. See Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 982-83 (6th Cir. 1995) (overturning army regu-
lation precluding religious providers in day care program).
513. Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla.
1970).
514. Koerner v. Borck, 100 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 1958); Southside Estates Baptist Church
v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 1959).
515. Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 1971).
516. Johnson, 239 So. 2d at 258; Koerner, 100 So. 2d at 401; Southside Estates Baptist
Church, 115 So. 2d at 698.
517. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
518. See id.
519. Id.
520. Federal law interpreting the Establishment Clause turned on some of these distinc-
tions in the past, but federal courts have now rejected or called them into question. See Co-
lumbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793, 826-28 (2000)).
2005]
60
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
for-value agreements. Fee-for-service transactions are quid pro quo ar-
rangements that happen to involve the government as the monopoly provider,
whereas classic aid programs do not result in the recipient conferring a direct
and proximate benefit on government;521 for example, public textbook loan
programs or public educators offering guidance counseling in private
schools. 522 In these circumstances, the aid is akin to unrequited donations.523
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court has upheld reimbursing a sec-
tarian school for performing administration and grading of testing required
by the state.524 This is similar to a fee-for-service transaction, where the gov-
ernment receives something of equal value in exchange for payment.
525
The most common fee-for-service transactions involve mail, transporta-
tion (e.g., toll roads; bus, ferry, and train fares; and curb cuts), utilities, air-
port landing rights, pavilion and camping site rentals, building permits, paid
parking spaces, and extra police security or crossing guards.526 Like manda-
tory and universal government-funded services such as police and fire pro-
tection, these optional paid-for services probably attract persons to religious
and non-religious organizations alike who would not otherwise attend; how-
ever, excluding religious organizations from participating in these neutral
and generally eligible programs would, in the words of Johnson, "indeed be
discriminatory. 527 Public services offered for a fee are religiously neutral,
generally available, and have a secular purpose.528
Fee-for-service transactions also occur when the state pays vendors'
market rates to provide mandatory public services such as fee-for-polling
stations, fees-for-probation services, fees-for-healthcare, and fees-for-
education.52 9 Modem scholarship and loan assistance require that, in ex-
change for the scholarship or loan, the state receive an educated teacher,
521. See Initial Brief, supra note 486, at 23.
522. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1997) (examining public school
remedial education teachers, guidance, and job counselors assisting at religious school); Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233 (1977) (examining textbook loans); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (examining loan of textbooks for religious school).
523. See Initial Brief, supra note 486, at 23.
524. Comm'n for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1980).
525. See Initial Brief, supra note 486, at 23.
526. Id. at 23 n.11 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970); Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976);
Allen, 392 U.S. at 242).
527. Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256, 262 (Fla.
1970).
528. See id. at 259.
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nurse, or child.530 Religious and nonreligious private schools provide this
service that taxpayers would otherwise finance through public schools likely
at a greater cost, because taxpayers finance entirely public facilities.
531
School districts could actually lose net public revenue without the Opportu-
nity Scholarship and McKay Scholarship Program because public schools
benefit from state and federal revenue for students participating in both pro-
grams as if they were enrolled in the school districts, but would receive no
such revenue stream if parents chose to finance their child's private educa-
tion entirely on their own.532
1. Unless Neutral, the Blaine Amendment Is Not Self-Executing
The Supreme Court of Florida and Florida Legislature have given a
meaning to article I, section 3 in keeping with its plain text by treating "in
aid of' as "for the purpose of."' 5 33 Courts in other states have done likewise.
534 In contrast, the opponents of school choice treat "in aid of' within the
meaning of article I, section 3 as "any benefit to," but without advocating an
end to literally all public revenue benefiting religious institutions, only reve-
nue for certain religious activities and for "pervasively sectarian" organiza-
tions.535 The Supreme Court of Florida in Southside Estates Baptist Church
and the Fifth District in Rice squarely rejected the notion that any public
revenue benefiting a pervasively religious institution is unconstitutional.536
If, contrary to historic precedent, a religiously-neutral program of general
eligibility with a secular purpose is unconstitutional, the finer distinctions
530. Cf FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Bush v. Holmes (Bush II), 767 So. 2d 668, 675 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
531. See Initial Brief, supra note 486, at 22-23.
532. See id.
533. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
534. See e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 612 (Wis. 1998) (holding school
choice statute had primary secular purpose of "provid[ing] low-income parents with an oppor-
tunity to have their children educated outside of the embattled [public] [slchool system"); Ala.
Educ. Ass'n v. James, 373 So. 2d 1076, 1081 (Ala. 1979) (noting that the purpose of a schol-
arship program was to benefit the public, not individual colleges); Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072, 1084-85 (Colo. 1982) (upholding a
program that permitted students to use scholarships at religious colleges because it was in-
tended to achieve a secular purpose in educating the student).
535. See Brief of Professor Steven G. Gey as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 11-
16, Bush v. Holmes, Fla. S. Ct., Case Nos. SC04-2323, SC04-2324, SC04-2325 (Fla. Mar. 7,
2005) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
536. Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 1959);
Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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appellees draw, without basis in precedent or the language of the amend-
ment, beg the question whether article I, section 3 is self-executing. 37
The basic guide, or test, in determining whether a constitutional provision
should be construed to be self-executing, or not self-executing, is whether
or not the provision lays down a sufficient rule by means of which the right
or purpose which it gives or is intended to accomplish may be determined,
enjoyed, or protected without the aid of legislative enactment. 3
The meaning of key terms that appellees in Holmes debate include "revenue
of the state ... taken from the public treasury," "directly or indirectly," "in
aid of," "aid," and "sectarian., 539 As set forth above, for example, Appellees
contend that "sectarian" means "pervasively sectarian. 54° However, the
Supreme Court of Florida has not treated these terms as ambiguous and the
Florida Legislature has attributed to them their plain meaning by not expend-
ing public revenue for the purpose of benefiting religious organizations, only
for a secular purpose as part of a religiously-neutral program of general eli-
gibility.54'
If not self-executing, article I, section 4 has impliedly been legislatively
implemented repeatedly in a non-exclusionary fashion through scholarship
and loan programs benefiting students at all levels. 42 Once, the Legislature
even enacted a voucher program for exceptional students contemporaneous
with the re-adoption of the state Blaine Amendment. 543 The state's increased
religious diversity and new education policy objectives, such as increasing
educational competition and improving accountability, support the further
expansion of religiously-neutral public programs of general eligibility.5" For
example, it is widely recognized that the state could not meet the educational
challenge posed by a universal pre-kindergarten program without including
religious providers. 45
537. Simon v. Celebration Co., 883 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
538. NAACP, Inc. v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 876 So. 2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (quoting Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960)); accord Tucker v. Resha, 634
So. 2d 756, 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
539. Amicus Brief, supra note 535, at 3-4.
540. Id. at 16-17.
541. See Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256, 261
(Fla. 1970).
542. . See Act effective June 17, 1963, ch. 63-452, § 4, 1963 Fla. Laws 1176, 1178.
543. Act effective July 1, 1968, ch. 68-24, § 5, 1968 Fla. Laws 240, 243.
544. See FLA. STAT. § 1002.205 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 1008.31 (2004).
545. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.53 (West Supp. 2005).
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2. Adequacy, Uniformity, and the State School Trust Fund
Even if the Blaine Amendment does not preclude publicly funded relig-
iously-neutral programs in which religious and nonreligious schools partici-
pate, some argue that article IX, section 1, the adequacy and uniformity re-
quirement, together with article IX, section 6, the School Fund, prohibit it.546
This argument is erroneous. First, in 2004-05, the School Fund accounted
for much less than one percent of all public school funding.5 47 Although
there is no question that from its enactment in 1828, revenue from the School
Fund was limited, pursuant to the federal sixteenth-section trust condition, to
then-Protestant public instruction; however, county funds were not so limited
and, as set forth above, financed private religious education until the
1910s. 548 In modem terminology, this county educational funding represents
"required local effort" within the meaning of the Florida Education Finance
Program (FEFP) and is derived from the school district board millage levy.549
Most of the FEFP comes from general revenue.55 0 As not all of the various
income streams comprising the FEFP are poured into one pot and intermin-
gled, the Department of Education funds the Opportunity Scholarship Pro-
gram strictly from general revenue or categorical funds other than School
Fund revenue.5
The theory that article IX, section 1, together with article IX, section 6,
somehow permits funding only public education, challenges long-standing
practice and the bedrock constitutional principle that the legislature is free to
546. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 6.
547. Appellant's Supplemental Brief in Response to Oral Argument Inquiry on State
School Trust Fund at 2, Bush v. Holmes, Nos. SC04-2323, SC04-2324, SC04-2325 (Fla. June
16, 2005) [hereinafter Appellant's Supplemental Brief] (citing Act effective May 28, 2004, ch.
2004-268, §§ 1-2, 2004 Fla. Laws. 1163, 1164, 1182-86 (budgeting approximately $14.3
billion compared to roughly $91 million)).
548. See id.
549. See FLA. STAT. § 1011.71(1) (2004).
550. See Act effective May 28, 2004, ch. 2004-268, § 2, 2004 Fla. Laws. 1163, 1185.
551. See FLA. STAT. § 1002.38 (2004). Funding for the Opportunity Scholarship Program
is derived from the FEFP and authorized categorical accounts. See id. The FEFP comprises
multiple revenue streams including general revenue and the School Fund. See Act effective
July, 1, 2005, ch. 2005-70 § 73, 2005 Fla. Laws, available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.usllaws/05lawslch_2005-070.pdf; Affidavit, Christian M. Kinsley
dated July 5, 2002 (R: Vol. 16, 2857-60), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub-info/summaries/bfiefs/04/04-2323/Filed-06-16-
2005_AppellantsSupplementalBriefAppendix.pdf (noting that general revenue entirely fi-
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enact any statute, unless the constitution clearly prohibits it.5 52 "The Florida
Constitution is a limitation upon, rather than a grant of, power., 5 3 Article
IX, section 1 unambiguously requires the State to make an adequate provi-
sion for a "uniform, efficient, safe, secure and high quality system of free
public schools" and to establish, maintain, and operate institutions of higher
learning.55' However, it does not expressly or impliedly preclude the legisla-
ture from also funding private education from sources other than the School
Fund, any more than it precludes the legislature from funding highways, or a
host of other annual appropriations that in some remote sense reduce the
revenue available for public education. 55 ' The legislature's contemporary
construction of article IX, section 1 in enacting the Opportunity Scholarship
Program and its purpose to improve public education is also entitled to def-
erence,556 whereas the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the
mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other) has no application
where the constitution does not clearly prohibit the legislature from acting.5 7
C. No-Aid Separationism and Unequal Treatment Implicate Other State
and Federal Constitutional Protections
A construction of article I, section 3 radically different from the past,
requiring no-aid separationism and unequal treatment of religious persons,
would necessarily implicate other state and federal constitutional principles.
It would pit article I, section 3 against the state and federal Free Exercise
Clause and federal Establishment Clause. Additionally, it would implicate
the state and federal Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, an exclusionary
interpretation of article I, section 3 raises troubling separation of powers and
preemption questions related to federal aid distributed by the State.
1. Free Exercise of Religion
The Florida Free Exercise Clause is just two sentences removed from
the Blaine Amendment and provides, "[t]here shall be no law respecting the
552. See State v. Miller, 313 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla. 1975).
553. Bush v. Holmes (Bush 11), 767 So. 2d 668, 673 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000), rev.
denied, 790 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 2001) (citing Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Wright, 76 So. 2d 863,
864 (Fla. 1955); Taylor v. Dorsey, 19 So. 2d 876, 881 (Fla. 1944)).
554. FLA. CONST. art. IX, §1(a).
555. Id.
556. See Bush H, 767 So. 2d at 673 (citing Taylor, 19 So. 2d at 882); Gallant v. Stephens,
358 So. 2d 536, 540 (Fla. 1978); Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. Boone, 234 So. 2d
665, 670 (Fla. 1970).
557. Bush I1, 767 So. 2d at 674 (citing Taylor, 19 So. 2d at 881).
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establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise
thereof.'5 58 It is black letter law that the courts must interpret constitutional
provisions in pari materia, so that each phrase and clause is given "inde-
pendent legal import" with like effect.5 9 "Every ... section of the Declara-
tion of Rights stands on equal footing with every other section. ' '560 Addition-
ally, state courts are forbidden from according lesser rights than the federal
constitution requires.56'
a. Florida Free Exercise Clause
The Supreme Court of Florida has only occasionally interpreted the
state Free Exercise Clause. In 1943, the Court treated as a free exercise vio-
lation a license tax of $50.00 imposed upon Jehovah's Witnesses for distrib-
uting religious pamphlets.562 The relevant ordinance applied to all pamphle-
teers, but selective, arbitrary, and capricious enforcement of similar statutes
against Jehovah's Witnesses was commonplace.563 Similarly, although not
explicitly interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the Court in Johnson said,
"[t]o exempt all homes complying with the [property tax exemption] statute,
except church-related homes, would indeed be discriminatory. ' 56 In effect,
the Supreme Court of Florida has treated public discrimination against a reli-
gious group as an unconstitutional penalty.565
Webster's defines a "penalty" as the "disadvantage, loss, or hardship
due to some action" and a "handicap., 566 An interpretation of the third sen-
tence of article I, section 3 requiring the state to exclude religious persons
from religiously-neutral programs of general eligibility with a secular pur-
pose, would inevitably penalize them contrary to the Free Exercise Clause.567
558. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
559. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 962 (Fla. 1992); see Bumsed v. Seaboard Coastline
R.R. Co., 290 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1974).
560. Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d 536, 552-53 (Fla. 1953).
561. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 961.
562. State ex rel. Singleton v. Woodruff, 13 So. 2d 704, 705-06 (Fla. 1943).
563. See Hord v. City of Fort Myers, 13 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. 1943) (striking permit ordi-
nance to distribute literature on freedom of religion and freedom of speech grounds); see also
State ex rel. Hough v. Woodruff, 2 So. 2d 577, 577-78 (Fla. 1941); State ex rel. Wilson v.
Russell, 1 So. 2d 569, 569-70 (Fla. 1941).
564. Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256, 262 (Fla.
1970).
565. Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trs., 115 So. 2d 697, 698-99 (Fla. 1959)
(citing FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 6).
566. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 846 (1976); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 998 (3d ed. 1994).
567. See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
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One lodestar of legal historical research is that in 1885, "sect" or "sectarian"
within the meaning of state Blaine amendments meant Catholic.568 As the
United States Supreme Court has recognized, the purpose of Blaine amend-
ments nationally was to ensure that the public paid for only Protestant reli-
gious observances. 69 Taxpayers in Florida supported teaching the common
religion in the public schools even later than in other states.57 °
The framers of the declaration of rights, section 6 likely intended to pe-
nalize Catholics or, in effect, to exclude them from the protection of the state
free exercise clause, just as they did with blacks.5 7' Most deny this was any
longer the case after 1968. Yet, rather than adopt the view that all persons
are now protected by the state free exercise clause, no-aid separationists
would exempt an even broader class of persons from its protections to in-
clude all devout religious persons or even all religious persons.57 ' The sepa-
rationists contend this exemption is required or one part of article I, section 3
would now be unconstitutional under another part. 573 To the contrary, if the
state free exercise clause now protects all persons, all that is required is for
the Supreme Court of Florida to continue to apply its post-World War II
three-prong analytical framework, finding constitutional a 1) religiously-
neutral program; 2) of general eligibility; 3) with a secular purpose.5 74
b. Federal Free Exercise Clause
"At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if
the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regu-
lates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. 57 5
As early as Everson, the Court held that New Jersey "cannot exclude indi-
568. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (finding "it was an open secret that
,sectarian' was code for 'Catholic"'); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 721 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting purpose of federal and state Blaine amendment movements
sought "to make certain that government would not help pay for 'sectarian' (i.e., Catholic)
schooling for children"); Lupu, supra note 1, at 386; HAMBURGER, supra note 5, at 335.
569. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
628-29 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
570. See Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction (Chamberlin 1), 143 So. 2d
21, 23 (Fla. 1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 402 (1964) (referencing FLA. STAT. § 231.09 (1961)).
571. FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights, § 6.
572. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962).
573. Answer Brief of Appellees at 43 n.34, Bush v. Holmes, Nos. SC04-2323, SC04-
2324, SC04-2325 (Fla. Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Answer Brief].
574. Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod of Fla., Inc., 239 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla.
1970).
575. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (Lukumi), 508 U.S. 520,
532 (1993). See also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
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vidual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists,
Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of
their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legisla-
tion. 576 In Lukumi, the Court held that "[a] law burdening religious practice
that is not neutral... must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny, ' 57 7 and that
"the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its
face."578 Smith recognized that strict scrutiny applies in the absence of a
"valid and neutral law of general applicability," as when a purported general
law: facially excludes a class of persons due to their religion; includes indi-
vidualized exemptions from a general requirement, but not benefiting a par-
ticular religious group; has as its purpose infringing upon practices due to
their religious motivations; or incorporates hybrid constitutional violations
such as free exercise-free speech violations. 9
Lukumi and Smith govern the permissibility of excluding religious per-
sons from programs of general eligibility to the extent the purpose is to bur-
den their religious exercise.58 ° On the one hand, no-aid separationists deny
excluding religious persons from school choice programs of general eligibil-
ity burdens or has the purpose of burdening their religious exercise.58" ' On
the other hand, they characterize parochial instruction as a quintessential
form of religious expression different from "secular social services" such as
576. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
577. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
578. Id. at 533.
579. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). The
exclusionary rule relieves the individual from observing general laws that do not promote or
restrict beliefs. Id. at 879. The Court bars the application of a hybrid rule involving the Free
Exercise Clause and other constitutional protections. Id. at 881. The Court had held that the
state may not refuse to allow exemptions in religious cases where there is an exemption sys-
tem in place. Id. at 884; accord Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79).
Free Exercise jurisprudence demonstrates that an individual's beliefs do not excuse him from
compliance with otherwise valid law. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534-37. Activities exempted
by other laws, for example, zoning ordinances, are exempted from these prohibitions. Id. at
536. Lukumi does not require a manifestation of animus, consistent with other forms of un-
constitutional discrimination, such as disparate treatment discrimination. See id; Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 732 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954); United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 549-51 (1996);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 552-53 (1923), overruled by West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937)). However, the enactment and enforcement of
the Florida Blaine Amendment was certainly accompanied by religious and racial bigotry.
See Bush v. Holmes (Bush 1), 886 So. 2d 340, 351 n.9 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
580. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
581. See Answer Brief, supra note 573, at 47.
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the provision of healthcare by religious hospitals.5 82  They cannot have it
both ways. According to the Sixth Circuit, a ban on religious providers and
instruction in the army's on-base day care program violated the Lukumi stan-
dard by burdening the childrens' and parents' religious exercise, insofar as
the parents believed it critical for their children to be raised in a religious
environment.58
Compliance with article I, section 3 is not likely to be deemed a permis-
sible compelling interest adequate to satisfy strict scrutiny.58 4 The United
States Supreme Court has expressed serious reservations about the constitu-
tionality of a state Blaine amendment interpreted to require the very exclu-
sion federal courts have deemed a violation of the Free Exercise Clause and
Equal Protection Clause.585 In Mitchell v. Helms, the plurality concluded that
"the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible
aid programs" is premised upon a "doctrine, born of bigotry, [that] should be
buried now." '586 "[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a
shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow. 587 Joining this plural-
ity, the dissent in Zelman recognized that Blaine amendments were intended
to disadvantage Catholics and other religious groups.588
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court held in Locke v. Davey that
with respect to state scholarships available to students pursuing post-
secondary studies, except devotional theology, it would not find unconstitu-
tional a state statute that "codifies the State's constitutional prohibition on
providing funds to students to pursue degrees that are 'devotional in nature
or designed to induce religious faith.' ' 589 This decision did not backpedal
from the Court's expressed reservations about discriminatory enforcement of
a state Blaine amendment, but instead emphasized that the Court was not
considering the constitutionality of a Blaine amendment.5" The Court un-
derscored the otherwise substantial inclusiveness of the scholarship program,
for example, enabling students to spend scholarships at pervasively sectarian
schools to major in anything besides ministry.591
582. Id. at 41-42.
583. Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 979 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995).
584. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-
58).
585. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
586. Id. at 829.
587. Id. at 828.
588. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 720-21 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
589. 540 U.S. 712, 716-18 (2004) (citations omitted).
590. Id. at 723-24 n.7.
591. Id. at 723-25. The court stated:
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The expressed reason that the Court in Locke found no evidence of ani-
mus in the Promise Scholarship Program is the very reason opponents of
Florida school choice programs would strike them.592 The Supreme Court
found no religious animus in Washington's implementation of the Promise
Scholarship Program5 93 precisely because of the ability of Washington Prom-
ise Scholars to "use their scholarship[s] to pursue a secular degree" at a per-
vasively religious institution and take devotional theology classes.594 This
rationale suggests that the United States Supreme Court would not affirm the
unconstitutionality of a Florida scholarship program on the very ground of its
inclusiveness and religious neutrality.595 Article I, section 3 was interpreted
to require the striking of religiously neutral educational programs of general
eligibility with a secular purpose as they would violate the federal Free Exer-
cise Clause.5 96
2. Establishment Clause
To the extent state courts adopted an interpretation of article I, section 3
that public revenue may be expended at some sectarian institutions, but not
pervasively sectarian ones, the decision would prove at least as problematic
as if it barred expending public revenue at all sectarian institutions.597 First,
"the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particul-
lar religion or of religion in general."5 98 Yet, this would be the effect of a
rule prohibiting devoutly religious persons from participating in general pub-
lic programs, but permitting other religious persons to join.599 "[T]o with-
stand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legis-
Far from evincing the hostility toward religion which was manifest in Lukumi, we
believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way to-
ward including religion in its benefits. The program permits students to attend per-
vasively religious schools, so long as they are accredited.... And under the Prom-
ise Scholarship Program's current guidelines, students are still eligible to take devo-
tional theology courses. . . . [S]ome students may have additional religious re-
quirements as part of their majors.
Id. at 724-25 (citations omitted).
592. Id.; see Answer Brief, supra note 573, at 26, 28.
593. Locke, 540 U.S at 725.
594. Id. at 721 n.4.
595. See id. at 725.
596. See id.
597. See Bush v. Holmes (Bush 1), 886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
598. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (Lukumi), 508 U.S. 520,
532 (1993) (citations omitted); accord Rusk v. Crestview Local Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 418,
423-24 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F. Supp. 2d
897, 911-12 (W.D. Mich. 2000)).
599. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532; Rusk, 379 F.3d at 423.
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lative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion." 6'
Second, the states and courts may not "troll[] through a person's or in-
stitution's religious beliefs" to decide whether they are too religious to re-
ceive public benefits. 60' To enforce a state orthodoxy test of devoutness as a
condition of eligibility for public benefits, the state would have to judge reli-
gious doctrine and observe religious expression. 60 2 This would put the state
at greater risk of excessively "entangling itself with religion" than observing
strict neutrality.6 3 The church autonomy doctrine, premised primarily upon
the Establishment Clause and, secondarily, upon the Free Exercise Clause,
precludes this unwarranted inquiry.6 °4
The Mitchell plurality explicitly rejected the pervasively sectarian test
on these grounds and due to its "shameful pedigree. 6 5 According to the
Court, "the religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitu-
tional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the government's
secular purpose. ' '606 Justices O'Connor and Breyer joined the plurality in
finding a federal program distributing money to state and local government
agencies to purchase educational material and equipment on behalf of public
and private schools constitutional and in overruling two cases expounding
the pervasively sectarian test in education .1 7 Concluding that the test is de-
funct, the Fourth Circuit held it unconstitutional to deny a religious college's
request for generally available state grant funds.6 °8 According to the Court,
"[t]he First Amendment requires government neutrality, not hostility, to reli-
gious belief.,
60 9
600. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). See also Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (The government "may not be hostile to any religion or to the advo-
cacy of no-religion .... The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.").
601. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000).
602. See id.
603. Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 981-82 (6th Cir. 1995).
604. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Govern-
mental Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1, 44-50 (1998).
605. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
606. Id. at 827; accord Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 501-02 (4th Cir.
2001) (quoting Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 827).
607. Oliver, 254 F.3d at 503 (citing Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 844-45, 850 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
608. Id. at 507-08.
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3. Federal and State Equal Protection
State and federal courts have generally deemed a constitutional provi-
sion requiring the exclusion of protected persons from programs of general
eligibility an equal protection clause violation.1 ° Contrasting the rational
basis standard of review applicable to economic regulatory legislation, the
United States Supreme Court held "a classification ...drawn upon inher-
ently suspect distinctions such as race, religion or alienage" is subject to
strict scrutiny.6 ' The same is true under state law.612 Consequently, an ex-
clusionary interpretation of the Florida Blaine Amendment should violate
equal protection in two ways: 1) the Blaine Amendment was apparently
"enacted with the constitutionally suspect purpose of discriminating" against
a particular religious group, then reenacted, according to some, with an even
broader discriminatory purpose; and 2) the Blaine Amendment "facially clas-
siffies] on the basis of religion. 6 3
Section 6 of the declaration of rights was enacted to discriminate
against Catholics, a "discrete and insular" minority in the 1880s, 61 4 then re-
enacted as the last sentence of article I, section 3, allegedly not for the pur-
pose of discriminating against Catholics, but either "pervasively religious"
610. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Dubin, Virgil Hawkins: A One-Man Civil Rights Movement,
51, FLA. L. REV. 913 (1999).
61t1. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Likewise, in United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996), the court recognized that "the decision... to prose-
cute may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification."' Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); Bd. of Educ. v. Gru-
met, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford,
504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992) (recognizing that laws may not "classify along suspect lines like
race or religion"); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272 (1951); Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v.
Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900).
612. The Florida Equal Protection Clause is contained in article I, section 2 of the Florida
Constitution and states "No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion,
national origin, or physical disability." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. The Florida and federal Equal
Protection Clauses are coterminous. See In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution
25E, 863 So. 2d 1176, 1178-79 (2003); see also Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n. v. Thomas ex
rel. Thomas, 434 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 1983) (noting that strict scrutiny applies "to those
actions by the state which abridge some fundamental right or affect adversely upon some
suspect class of persons"); Henry v. State, 825 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that "[dieliberately basing the decision to prosecute upon race, religion, or other
'unjustifiable' classification ... is prohibited"); State v. A.R.S., 684 So. 2d 1383, 1386-87
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding a prosecutor's motive for prosecuting a case may not
be based on an unjustifiable standard).
613. Heytens, supra note 1, at 145-46.
614. Id. The original rationale for heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases was to
prevent "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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persons or all religious persons.' 5 Appellees in Holmes argue that the reen-
actment cured the original invidious defect.6" 6 Reenactment can cure an
original invidious purpose in some circumstances, 617 but not here where the
alleged new purpose of article I, section 3 has an effect more prejudicial than
the original. The impact of the revised interpretation is actually to broaden
the class of religious persons ineligible to participate in public programs.6 8
By all indications, these devoutly religious persons are as discrete and insular
today as Catholics were in the 1800s.619
615. See Answer Brief, supra note 573, at 25 n.19.
616. See id. at 26.
617. Compare Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1223, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005)
(affirming summary judgment against article VI, § 4 of the Florida Constitution concerning
felon disenfranchisement, because, although enacted for a racially discriminatory purpose, it
was reenacted for a legitimate purpose applicable to a narrower class), with Hunter v. Under-
wood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (striking Alabama constitutional provision that disenfran-
chised any person convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, notwithstanding that the
provision could conceivably now serve legitimate nondiscriminatory state interests).
618. Cf Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1223-24 (recognizing that the disenfranchisement provision
at issue was enacted with discriminatory intent before it was amended).
619. Case law is unsettled whether discrimination between religious and nonreligious
persons, as opposed to among religious persons or sects, is prohibited under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. See Heytens, supra note 1, at 142-43. "[T]he modem Supreme Court has never
analyzed a claim of discrimination against a religious group or against religion in general
under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 142. Religious persons in general, as opposed to
devout religious persons, are not a discrete and insular minority, but the Unites States Su-
preme Court has protected other non-insular groups such as Caucasians and males. Id. at 143-
45 (citing Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Cro-
son Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)). Some conclude that
religious persons are presumptively protected. Colleen Carlton Smith, Note, Zelman's Evolv-
ing Legacy: Selective Funding of Secular Private Schools in State School Choice Programs,
89 VA. L. REv. 1953, 1991 (2003).
[D]ifferentiation among religious sects would trigger the strictest scrutiny, yet [the
Court] has never addressed this question with regard to laws that make a more gen-
eral distinction between the secular and the religious. The weight of the evidence,
however, supports the view that the Equal Protection Clause requires at least some
form of heightened review and probably mandates strict scrutiny.
Id. at 1991 (footnote omitted). Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341, 370 (1999) ("[T]he court has often said that
religious discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause; though it has generally said this
about discrimination among religious sects, this principle should at least presumptively apply
to discrimination between religious and nonreligious people and institutions."). Case law is
also unsettled as to whether religious organizations, as opposed to individuals, may constitute
a suspect class. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 536 (1933) ("Corporations are
as much entitled to the equal protection of the laws.., as are natural persons."); Christian Sci.
Reading Room v. City & County of S.F., 784 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1986), ("It seems
clear that an individual religion meets the requirements for treatment as a suspect class ...
[w]hether all religions together constitute a suspect class for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause is a far more complex question that the courts have not previously addressed."); Civil
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Some United States Supreme Court precedent suggests that the exclu-
sion of religious persons from generally eligible programs is properly subject
to free exercise analysis, rather than equal protection analysis,620 but Lukumi
applied strict scrutiny when "[in determining if the object of a law is a neu-
tral one under the Free Exercise Clause," it looked for "guidance in our equal
,,621Ih lprotection cases. Locke held on its distinguishable facts, not involving a
Blaine amendment and not challenging a broadly inclusive scholarship pro-
gram, that rational basis scrutiny applied to Davey's equal protection
claim. 622 The Court relied upon an equal protection case dealing with fun-
damental rights analysis, 623 rather than suspect classification analysis at the
heart of Blaine amendment litigation.624
A federal court has not yet ruled squarely on an equal protection chal-
lenge to Blaine-inspired exclusion; however, in Peter v. Wedl, the Eighth
Circuit held that a Minnesota rule excluding private religious schools from
participating in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act program "ex-
plicitly discriminated against children who attended private religious
schools," and violated the Free Exercise Clause, Free Speech Clause, and
Equal Protection Clause.625  Likewise, in Columbia Union College v.
Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 910, 911 n.5 (N.D. Ill.
2001), ("While individuals of a particular religious faith may constitute a suspect class ...
there is no proof churches as an entity qualify as a suspect class here."). In the context of
school choice programs, directors of schools are natural persons who could be members of a
suspect class, along with parents prohibited from spending scholarships at religious schools.
See Peter v. Wedl, 155 F.3d 992, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 1998) (remanding on whether the state
could condition a parent's right to participate in a generally available program upon their
forbearance to exercise their right to send a child to the school of their choice); Hartmann v.
Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 979 n.4 (6th Cir. 1995) (parents who wished to enroll their children in
religious day care had standing to sue the Army for prohibiting it).
620. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,626 (1978).
621. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (Lukumi), 508 U.S. 520,'
540 (1993); see also Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (rejecting exclu-
sion of a picketer protesting racial discrimination within 150 feet of a school, but not picketers
protesting labor policies, the Court held, "[n]ecessarily, then, under the Equal Protection
Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a
forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less
favored or more controversial views").
622. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 n.3 (2004).
623. Id.; Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (upholding statute excluding
conscientious objectors from veterans' educational benefits because, inter alia, conscientious
objectors are not a suspect class).
624. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-33.
625. 155 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Clarke,6" 6 the Fourth Circuit held that excluding a religious college from a
state grant program presumptively violated these clauses.627
4. Separation of Powers and a Political Question
It is perhaps fitting that as in times past, the future interpretation of a
"doctrine, born of bigotry ' 628 must be decided in the field of education. On
the other hand, it is unfortunate that a political conflict over a single educa-
tional program now colors the public's view of a previously consensual ana-
lytical framework for interpreting article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitu-
tion with implications reaching far beyond school choice. The ugly truth is
that many of those seeking to enforce article I, section 3 against educational
reform programs care more about defeating the policy initiative than the
proper balance between church and state in Florida.629 Their agenda raises
political and policy questions, which the courts are not competent to rule
upon and which are reserved by the separation of powers doctrine to the leg-
islature.63 °
626. 159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998).
627. Id. at 155 n. 1, 155-57 (referencing plaintiff s constitutional claims as "one constitu-
tional inquiry"). Plaintiffs in Hartmann also made an equal protection and "Parental Liberty"
claim. Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 978 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Vineyard Christian
Fellowship v. City of Evanston, 250 F.1 Supp. 2d 961, 978 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding a zoning
regulation that classified on the basis of religion was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and subject to strict scrutiny). The district court in Vineyard Christian Fellowship
distinguished Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906
(N.D. Ill. 2001), on the grounds that the zoning ordinance in that case treated religious institu-
tions like similarly-situated counterparts. Id at 977; cf Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of
Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 n. 13 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Absent evidence of purposeful discrimina-
tion based on religious status, the rational basis standard should apply. The disparate impact
of the ordinance on the Church is insufficient to support an inference of discriminatory pur-
pose."); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 669 (D. Minn. 1990)
("If the zoning ordinance did establish a classification based solely on religion," the "zoning
ordinance is subject to strict scrutiny because it establishes a classification which is drawn
upon the inherently suspect distinction of religion.").
628. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000).
629. Many of the same educational organizations supporting the plaintiffs/appellees in
Bush v. Holmes (Bush I), 886 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004), challenged school
reform in other states. See, e.g., Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers & Students, 92
P.3d 933, 934 (Colo. 2004) (including amici, inter alia, Colorado Education Association,
American Federation of Teachers, Colorado Association of School Boards); see also Kotter-
man v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 610-11 (Ariz. 1999).
630. See State v. Brooke, 573 So. 2d 363, 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Johnson v.
State, 660 So. 2d 648, 663 (Fla. 1995).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Florida has reached an important crossroad leading either in the direc-
tion of neutrality and equal treatment, consistent with Florida and federal
jurisprudence, or in the direction of no-aid separationism and unequal treat-
ment, consistent with discredited federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and traditional national Blaine amendment jurisprudence. It is the choice
between a state agnostic toward religious confession or concern about it;
between a national doctrine borne of religious and racial bigotry or this
state's Blaine amendment jurisprudence, rooted in American equality and
pluralism; between encouraging charity and education, regardless of impetus
or only if secular; between widening or narrowing the cultural rift separating
nonbelievers and devout believers; between federal or state law; and between
providing market-sensitive equal educational opportunities to have-nots, or
perpetuating systemic educational inequity.
Each factor that state courts are required to examine in order to construe
the Bill of Rights points in the same direction: 1) preexisting and developing
state education law includes numerous examples of religion-neutral pro-
grams of general eligibility with a secular purpose; 2) the express language
of article I, section 3 of the Florida Constitution forbids only programs "in
aid of' or for the purpose of benefiting sectarian institutions; 3) the formative
history of the declaration of rights, section 6 reveals that it was likely in-
tended to bar public funding of Catholic schools, but was implemented in
this manner only during a short interlude of anti-Catholic nativism; 4) but for
this bigoted period, the state's history generally reflects religious pluralism
and tolerance; 5) evolving conditions within the state support greater in-
volvement of private schools on a religion-neutral basis to meet Florida's
most pressing educational challenges; and 6) external influences that have
shaped state law including state and federal constitutional prohibitions pre-
clude discriminating against persons on the basis of their faith.63'
Until now, Florida's experiment with the Blaine amendment has been
unusual, generally vindicating: 1) religiously neutral programs; 2) of general
eligibility; and 3) with a secular purpose.632 The constitutionality of a host of
educational and social welfare initiatives with deep historical roots turns on
the continued application of this three-prong test. We should be proud of
and expand upon Florida's non exclusionary Blaine history, rather than de-
part from it and risk literally transforming Florida, as religious schools are
disqualified from assisting with Florida's most pressing educational chal-
631. See supra Part III.C.
632. See supra Part III.A.
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lenges and indeed, faith-based organizations are precluded from meeting the
basic needs of our most vulnerable citizens. Excluding persons from public
programs solely on the basis of their faith is not the vision of most Floridians
vindicated in the legislature. If it becomes the vision of Florida's courts, it
will erode public confidence and surely inspire a new and unnecessary con-
stitutional reform movement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey will review major cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Florida and the Florida District Courts of Appeal from July 2003 until July
2005. It does not cover every single appellate opinion from that time period,
but does address those that dealt with substantive tort issues for the first time
or clarified existing doctrines and issues. It does not deal with cases that
dealt primarily with evidentiary rule violations or restated, well-established
principles.
Part II addresses a variety of situations clarifying when or whether a
duty exists on behalf of a number of actors. Part III covers cases that re-
solved causation disputes. The remaining parts deal with recurring situations
or special rules that have resulted in multiple opinions being issued during
this time period. For example, a number of cases during the past two years
have tried to clarify the extent of coverage of Florida's nursing home resi-
dent rights statutes. In addition, Florida courts continue to develop and ex-
plain the contours of the evolving area of emotional distress claims. Finally,
the last part includes a number of cases involving a broad range of issues.
The number of cases decided indicates that Florida courts are still quite busy
in refining and clarifying the contours of various tort doctrines.
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, J.D.,
Indiana University, 1978; B.A., Indiana University, 1975.
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The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the question of duty in relation
to streetlight maintenance in Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson.'
This case involved "fourteen-year-old Dante Johnson ... [who] was struck
and killed by a truck" in the early morning "where a streetlight was inopera-
tive."2 His grandmother sued the truck driver, truck owner, and streetlight
maintenance company, Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Clay Electric). In
the trial court, Clay Electric "moved for summary judgment, which was
granted."
4
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue of whether Clay
Electric assumed a legal duty to the plaintiffs to act with reasonable care in
maintaining the streetlights.' The court ruled that it created an increased risk
by failing to maintain the light and rejected the argument that an inoperative
light was no worse than the risk would have been absent a streetlight.6 The
court also stated that the deceased's grandmother relied upon Clay Electric to
maintain the lights in foregoing other precautions for the deceased It also
rejected the defendant's immunity argument.8 Justice Cantero argued in dis-
sent that the holding "places Florida in the decided minority of states that
have considered this issue." 9 He also argued that the decision to hold the
utility company liable involved a legislative policy decision.1°
In Smith v. Florida Power & Light Co.," the Second District Court of
Appeal also addressed the duty of a public utility. 12 Smith appealed the entry
of a summary judgment in favor of Florida Power & Light (FPL).'3 Smith
was injured while working at a construction site. 14 "[P]ower passed from an
uninsulated overhead power transmission line through the boom of a crane
while Smith was working below ground and touching the cable of the
crane.""5 Smith's employer had determined that its employees could safely




5. Id. at 1185.
6. Clay Elec. Coop., Inc., 873 So. 2d at 1187.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1188.
9. Id. at 1195 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 1202-05.
11. 857 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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work around the electrical lines.' 6 The court held that the power company's
general knowledge that a construction project would be conducted in prox-
imity to its power lines was insufficient to establish a foreseeable zone of
risk creating a duty. 7
In Bowling v. Gilman,8 the Second District Court of Appeal considered
another duty issue in a construction site accident.' 9 Bowling was a carpenter
working for a subcontractor engaged in the construction of an adult congre-
gate living facility.2 ° The subcontractor engaged defendant Gilman and his
solely owned corporation for the use of cranes.2' It was alleged that a fore-
man on the site was negligent in directing a crane.2 The court noted that
Florida law deems a crane to be inherently dangerous and that the owner and
operator of such has a non-delegable duty to use due care.23 The court held
that a crane operator could assign its performance to another, but not liability
for negligent breach of that duty, and thus remanded the case for a new trial
so that the jury could be instructed on Gilman's potential vicarious liability.24
The Third District Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of duty in Fisher
v. Miami-Dade County.25 The case involved a claim by the personal repre-
sentative of Fisher, who died in an automobile accident as a passenger in a
car driven by a friend who was speeding and being pursued by a Miami-
Dade police vehicle.26 The trial court granted summary judgment to the de-
fendant based upon the conclusion that a police officer owes no duty to a
passenger in a fleeing vehicle unless the officer knows or should know of the
passenger's presence.
The court noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has held that "police
owe a duty to innocent bystanders or third parties injured as a result of high
speed chases. 28 It also noted that courts in other states have split on the is-
sue of whether the police owe a duty of care to passengers in a fleeing vehi-
cle.29 The court decided that the chilling effect of imposing upon law en-
16. Smith, 857 So. 2d at 227.
17. Id. at 235.
18. 870 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).




23. Bowling, 870 So. 2d at 43.
24. Id. at 43-44.
25. 883 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
26. Id. at 335-36.
27. Id. at 337.
28. Id. at 336 (citing City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 1992)).
29. Id. at 337.
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forcement the duty to determine if there was a passenger in the vehicle and
also to determine if the passenger was involved in a crime, was too burden-
some to impose, and, therefore, affirmed the decision that no duty was owed
in this case. 0
In Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Center,31 the Fourth Dis-
trict considered a spoliation of evidence case.32 Royal & Sunalliance (Royal)
insured vessels which were burned while being repaired in a space leased by
Cay Marine, located at the Lauderdale Marine Center (LMC).33 Royal filed a
subrogation action to recover amounts paid to the owner of one of the vessels
against Cay Marine.3 4 In 2002, Royal added LMC as a defendant. Royal
asserted in its fourth amended complaint that LMC "had a common law duty
to preserve debris" that was collected by fire inspectors from the fire and
placed in barrels. 36 The debris had been discarded in July 1998. 3' According
to the court, because Royal did not allege a contractual or statutory duty to
preserve the evidence, nor did they allege that a discovery request was
served, the complaint against LMC was properly dismissed.38 The court re-
fused to accept Royal's argument that "there was a common law duty to pre-
serve the evidence in anticipation of litigation."39
In K.M. v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. ,40 the Fourth District again con-
sidered the duty issue. 4' K.M., a minor, and her father appealed a granted
motion to dismiss an action which claimed that her mother's employer
should have warned her about another employee's criminal background.42
K.M.'s mother arranged for Robert Woodlard, another Publix employee, to
baby sit for seven-year-old K.M.43 The store manager was aware that Wood-
lard was doing the babysitting and "also knew that Woodlard was on parole
from a previous conviction for attempted sexual battery on a minor under
[twelve]."44 "Woodlard sexually abused K.M. on at least two occasions. 45
30. Fisher, 883 So. 2d at 337.
31. 877 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).




36. Royal & Sunalliance, 877 So. 2d at 844-45.
37. Id. at 845.
38. Id. at 845-46.
39. Id. at 846.
40. 895 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).




45. K.M., 895 So. 2d at 1116.
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The court refused to find a special relationship that imposed a duty on Publix
to warn in this case.46 The court held that "[a]n employer does not owe a
duty to persons who are injured by its employees while the employees are off
duty, not then acting for the employer's benefit, not on the employer's prem-
ises, and not using the employer's equipment.
47
The Fourth District Court of Appeal resolved an appeal of a dismissal of
a negligence claim in Marinacci v. 219 South Atlantic Blvd.48 The "plaintiff
sued the defendant, a night club, for negligently advising her to park at a
nearby city-owned parking lot, late at night," where she was assaulted.49 The
plaintiff alleged that the club knew or should have known about similar
criminal incidents at that lot.5° The court ruled that the fact that the club did
not own the lot did not absolve it of liability if it was negligent in advising its
patrons to park there. 51
I. CAUSATION
In Deese v. McKinnonville Hunting Club, Inc.,5  the First District Court
of Appeal addressed the classic tort issue of proximate causation.5 3 The De-
ese case involved an accident that occurred during a dog hunt organized by
the defendant hunt club in which dogs were used to drive deer into open ar-
eas to be shot by the hunters. 4 During this hunt, the dogs drove the deer
toward a county highway with a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour.55
While parked alongside the road, the appellant's twelve-year-old son asked
the appellant if he could help catch the dogs.56 After being given permission,
he exited the appellant's truck and was struck by a vehicle traveling down
the highway. Three days later, he died.58 The appellant alleged that the
hunt club "breached its duty to promulgate, draft, and enforce rules and regu-
lations to ensure that club activities would be conducted in the safest manner
46. Id. at 1120.
47. Id. (footnote omitted).
48. 855 So. 2d 1272, 1272 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1273.
52. 874 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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possible."' 9 The defendant successfully moved for summary judgment, argu-
ing that it was not negligent as a matter of law and that "its actions were not
the proximate legal cause of the accident."' However, the court of appeal
held that it was not appropriate to grant summary judgment on these facts
where reasonable persons could conclude that conducting a hunt near a
highway in which dogs might enter and where club members were directed
to catch when possible could foreseeably lead to some injury as occurred in
this case.61 Furthermore, the court held that to the extent that the appellant's
part in permitting his son to exit the vehicle contributed to the accident, it
was a question of comparative negligence as opposed to a superseding inter-
vening cause relieving the appellee from liability.
62
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed a final judgment on a
proximate cause issue in Murphy v. Sarasota Ostrich Farm/Ranch, Inc.
63
This case involved a claim by the ostrich farm that dogs owned by one of the
defendants and kept on the property of another caused death or injury to
some of its ostriches. 64 At issue on appeal was whether the defendants could
be held liable for lost bird production caused by the dogs' harassment of the
ostriches.6 5  The plaintiffs expert "testified that a male ostrich can be
stressed to the point where he will not breed," but because he failed to state
that the acts of the dogs were "more likely than not... a substantial factor in
bringing about any loss in production," the court found the evidence insuffi-
cient to support that their acts were a legal cause of the injury.66
In Trembath v. Beach Club, Inc.,67 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
also decided a case on appeal on the issue of proximate cause.68 Beach Club,
Inc., sued Trembath for crashing his rental car into its building.69 Amongst
the damages awarded, it claimed expenses for the installation of a sprinkler
system.70 The club had managed to avoid being cited for failure to have such
a system in an earlier routine inspection, but pursuant to the inspection con-
ducted after the crash, which permitted a more thorough inspection, the club
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1286.
61. Id. at 1290.
62. Deese, 874 So. 2d at 1290.
63. 875 So. 2d 767, 769 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
64. Id. at 768.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 768-69.
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was found to be in violation of relevant safety codes.7' Testimony at trial
indicated "that the club was not in compliance with the code before the acci-
dent," but had simply managed to avoid being discovered as out-of-
compliance until the inspection after the accident.72 The court held that the
defendant could not be held responsible for the cost of installing the sprinkler
system because it was not a cause-in-fact of that requirement, which was a
duty existing separate and apart from the accident.73
IV. PREMISES LIABILITY
In the case of Poe v. IMC Phosphates MP, Inc. , Scotty Poe drove a
vehicle containing his three minor children from a public highway onto a
paved driveway through an abandoned entrance to a mine owned by the de-
fendant, IMC Phosphates, and hit a large metal pipe placed about twenty feet
inside the entrance by the defendant.75 The paved portion at the entrance,
which lacked a sign or other warning, appeared to be a continuation of the
highway and was not illuminated.76 The pipe, which was a rusty brown color
that was neither bright nor reflective, was placed at the point where the
pavement ended.77 In opposition to the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of an expert who opined that
the defendant could have used a different type of fencing and an easily visi-
ble lightweight barricade along with a sign to minimize possible collisions.78
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed the trial court's analysis
which focused on the issue of the status of the Poes as entrants to the defen-
dant's property.79 The court noted that courts from several jurisdictions have
held "that a traveler who enters private land that appears to be a continuation
of the public highway becomes an implied invitee.' '80 For implied invitees,
the landowner has a duty to exercise due care. 8' Noting that legal commenta-
tors have criticized the "transparent legal fiction" of the "implied invitee,"
71. Id.
72. Trembath, 860 So. 2d at 514.
73. Id. at 515.
74. 885 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
75. Id. at 398-99.
76. Id. at 399.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 399-400.
79. Poe, 885 So. 2d at 400. The court noted that the accident occurred before the 1999
amendments to section 768.075 of the Florida Statutes, which immunized property owners
from liability for injuries to trespassers. Id. at 400 n.3.
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the court instead referenced the modem approach which focuses on the cause
of the traveler leaving the public road.82 Thus, it held that the classification
of the visitor was irrelevant, and, instead, the analysis should depend upon
whether the actor's conduct misled the traveler into reasonably believing that
the land entered is a highway.8 3 The court noted that the Third and Fourth
Districts have also adopted this approach,' which is consistent with section
367 of the Second Restatement of Torts.85 Therefore, in this particular case,
summary judgment was obviously inappropriate because of factual issues
concerning the placement and visibility of the pipe in addition to issues un-
der section 368 of the Second Restatement of Torts concerning artificial con-
ditions near a highway.86
The Second District also dealt with a premises liability case in St. Jo-
seph's Hospital v. Cowart,8 7 in which a patient at the defendant St. Joseph's
Hospital was bitten by a black widow spider in the emergency room. 88 The
court noted the general rule is:
[a] landowner owes two duties to a business invitee: (1) to use reasonable
care in maintaining its premises in a reasonably safe condition; and (2) to
give the invitee warning of concealed perils that are or should be known
to the landowner and that are unknown to the invitee and cannot be dis-
covered through the exercise of due care. 8
9
Florida law does not impose a general duty to protect invitees from harm
caused by wild animals except in special circumstances. 90 The District Court
reversed the jury award because "[tihere was no evidence that the pest con-
trol company was not performing its services satisfactorily," nor that it knew
that a black widow spider was on its premises.9 Further, the plaintiffs ex-
82. Id. at 402.
83. Poe, 885 So. 2d at 402.
84. Id. at 403 (citing Felton v. W. Gables Homes, Inc., 484 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Hollywood Corporate Circle Assocs. v. Amato, 604 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992)).
85. Section 367 states:
A possessor of land who so maintains a part thereof that he knows or should know that others
will reasonably believe it to be a public highway is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to them, while using such part as a highway, by his failure to exercise reasonable care to main-
tain it in a reasonably safe condition for travel.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 367 (1965).
86. Poe, 885 So. 2d at 404; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 368 (1965).
87. 891 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
88. Id. at 1040.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1041.
91. Id. at 1042-43.
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pert testified that "he did not think [that] the hospital employees should have
suspected [the spider's] presence. 92 Of more interest is a claim by the plain-
tiff for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon the plaintiff feel-
ing that the hospital employees were not taking his condition seriously and
the emergency room physician joking about the situation with one of his
colleagues.93 Fortunately for the defendant hospital, Florida's reliance upon
the impact rule prevented liability because the court correctly held that the
impact of the spider's bite was not caused by negligence.94
The Third District Court of Appeal decided a premises liability action in
Longmore v. Saga Bay Property Owners Ass'n 95 a case in which the plain-
tiff's sixteen-year-old child drowned in a man-made lake owned by appel-
lee. 96 The parents claimed that the appellee knew that its lake had a precipi-
tous drop-off from less than sixty-nine inches to over forty feet, which cre-
ated a duty to either "warn or provide life guards to protect children from this
'exceptionally dangerous concealed peril."' 97 The court refused to find that a
sudden drop-off constituted a dangerous condition or trap because such a
condition was also characteristic of conditions existing in natural lakes.98
The court also rejected the parents' argument that, because the defendant had
previously been sued, it had a duty to warn because of its superior knowl-
edge of the drop.99 The court held that such a warning was not required be-
cause the drop "did not constitute a concealed dangerous condition."'"
In Weissberg v. Albertson's, Inc.,'0 l the Fourth District addressed the
breadth of the "dangerous instrumentality doctrine" in a case involving an
injury suffered by the plaintiff, who was struck by a "powerized" shopping
cart in the defendant's grocery store."02 The court considered the appropri-
ateness of dismissal of the complaint by the trial court.10 3 The appellate court
noted that, although Florida's relevant statute prevented defendant from be-
ing liable for the negligence of the operator of the shopping cart, it did not
prevent Albertson's from being liable for its own negligence in entrusting the
92. St. Joseph's Hosp., 891 So. 2d at 1042.
93. Id. at 1042-43.
94. Id. at 1043.
95. 868 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
96. Id. at 1268.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1270.
99. Id.
100. Longmore, 868 So. 2d at 1270.
101. 886 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
102. Id. at 306.
103. Id. at 307.
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cart.' °4 Further, the court held that the defendant could be held liable under a
premises liability theory, which the plaintiff alleged was violated by a failure
to provide safety warning devices."' 5
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also decided another premises li-
ability case in Burns International Security Services Inc. of Florida v. Phila-
delphia Indemnity Insurance Co.,1°6 which dealt with a final judgment in a
case dealing with liability for a theft. 10 7 Defendant Burns was the security
company for Parkway Commerce Center, in which D & H Distributing Cor-
poration (D & H) was a tenant insured by Philadelphia Indemnity for a theft
that occurred at D & H's warehouse space. 0 8 Burns argued on appeal that it
had no duty to secure the premises until there was evidence of similar prior
criminal activity.' °9 After noting the various categories of cases involving
premises liability, the court noted that the duty of security providers arises
from a different basis." ° The court correctly noted that the security provider
contracts to provide security, and thus should not be able to argue that it is
not liable for a criminal act simply because it was the first of its type upon
the premises."'
The Bums case also dealt with an issue of the proper apportionment of
fault between parties pursuant to section 768.81 of the Florida Statutes."2
The verdict form also included two prior parties who had been voluntarily
dismissed from the action, whom the jury also determined to be at fault." 3
The court noted that it should "'first determine the amount of damages for
which Burns is liable based upon its own percentage of fault."' 14 Because
Burns was found forty-five percent at fault, the court should then add the
amount for which it was jointly liable, up to an additional $500,000. "'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered a premises liability
case that involved the scope of duty of a security company in Robert-Blier v.
Statewide Enterprises, Inc. 116 This case involved a lawsuit against a security
company hired by a condominium association "to provide one unarmed
104. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.093(2) (2002)).
105. Id.
106. 899 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
107. Id. at 362-63.
108. Id. at 363.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 364.
111. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Inc. of Fla., 899 So. 2d at 365.
112. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2004).
113. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Inc. of Fla., 899 So. 2d at 365.
114. Id. at 367.
115. Id.
116. 890 So. 2d 522, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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guard to patrol the community . . . to escort residents to their homes upon
request, and to observe and report suspicious incidents."' 17 A visitor to one
of the buildings "was forced into her car, driven off the premises, and
raped."'1 18 The court noted that the association "owed a duty to visitors to
protect or warn them of known dangers in the common areas," but that it had
only contracted "for the appearance of security" with this security com-
pany.19 Although it rejected the defendant's argument that it owed no duty
to the plaintiff, the court was unwilling to hold that the company had as-
sumed the association's broad duty to protect invitees, but instead held the
company only had a duty to provide the services contractually agreed
upon. 1
20
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the liability of social
hosts in Estate of Massad v. Granzow.12 ' This case involved a claim by the
Estate of Roger P. Massad, who was a guest in Dee Janet Granzow's
home. 122 Massad became drunk, in part on alcoholic beverages served by
Granzow, and fell and struck his head in the home "sustaining a concussion
with significant bleeding."' 23 "Granzow gave Massad a prescription pill not
prescribed for his use, which worsened his intoxication.' 24 She abandoned
him next to an unfenced pool, into which he later fell and drowned.
125
Granzow argued that section 768.125 of the Florida Statutes, which
provides immunity for serving alcohol to guests, should be available to social
hosts, as well as vendors of alcohol.1 26 The court agreed that both the com-
mon law and the statute shield social hosts from liability for "dispensing or
furnishing alcohol.' 27 However, pursuant to the theory found in section 324
of the Second Restatement of Torts, the court noted that the defendant was
not entitled to dismissal of the complaint because she could still be held li-
able based upon her conduct when she 'took charge of Massad,' when he
was helpless and unable to adequately aid or protect himself."'' 28
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 523.
120. Id. at 524.





126. Massad, 886 So. 2d at 1052 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (2003)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1052-53. Section 324 states, in part:
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to
aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by
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V. NURSING HOME LIABILITY
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the interplay between Flor-
ida's Wrongful Death Act and Florida's statute covering nursing home Pa-
tient's Bill of Rights in Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc.12 9 The
case was filed by the personal representative of Gladstone Knowles, who
died from severe bedsores and other ailments while residing at the defen-
dant's nursing home. 30 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the claim based upon violation of the Patient's Bill of Rights'
statute because none of the statutory violations caused the death.' 3' The case
proceeded to trial upon a common law negligence theory, but after the ver-
dict, the court ruled "that it had erred in granting a summary judgment on the
statutory claim."' 132 The Fourth District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc,
held that the trial court was initially correct in dismissing the statutory
claim.133 The relevant statutory section stated:
Any resident whose rights... are deprived or infringed upon shall
have a cause of action against any licensee responsible for the vio-
lation. The action may be brought by the resident ... or by the
personal representative of the estate of a deceased resident when
the cause of death resulted from the deprivation or infringement of
the decedent's rights.' 34
The import of this decision has been lessened by statutory amendments
during the pendency of the legislation that have added language indicating
that the representative may file an action for violation of the resident's rights
"regardless of the cause of death."'135 The Supreme Court of Florida held that
the plain meaning of the language prevented the action and rejected argu-
ments that its conclusion wrongfully failed to consider the language in con-
(a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other
while within the actor's charge, or
(b) the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in
a worse position than when the actor took charge of him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965).
129. 898 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 2004).
130. Id. at 2-3.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Beverly Enterprises-Fla., Inc. v. Knowles, 766 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
134. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1) (1997).
135. FLA. STAT. § 400.023(1) (2004).
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cert with the Survival Statute and Wrongful Death Acts. 36 The concurring
opinion of Justice Cantero137 and the dissenting opinion by Justice Lewis
138
provide an interesting debate concerning the role of the court in referring to
legislative intent when the language of the statute is arguably ambiguous.
139
As the opinions exemplify, this old canard of statutory construction depends
upon the willingness to accept that language as ambiguous.
The First District Court of Appeal considered damages issues in nursing
home cases in Estate of Williams v. Tandem Health Care of Florida, Inc. 140
This case was brought by the estate of Lucille Williams, who fell while a
resident of the defendant nursing home and later died as a result.' 4' The es-
tate brought an action alleging infringement of a resident's rights and wrong-
ful death under the appropriate statutes. 142 Pursuant to new rulings issued by
the Supreme Court of Florida,143 the court ordered a new trial because it
deemed that those rulings precluded non-economic damages to survivors
resulting from medical malpractice.44 The estate argued that damages avail-
able to heirs under the wrongful death statute should be incorporated under
the resident's rights provision. 145 The court disagreed, noting that the statute
refers to the rights of the resident and refused to add or imply that survivors'
rights to damages are also available under that statute.
146
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also decided a case involving nurs-
ing home negligence in Carr v. Personacare of Pompano East, Inc., 4 which
considered an appeal of a complaint dismissal. 48 The court reversed the trial
court decision that chapter 400 remedies preclude a common law negligence
action.149 This decision is consistent with a relatively recent Supreme Court
of Florida decision. 1
50
The Fifth District Court of Appeal also considered a nursing home resi-
dent's rights case in Extendicare Health Services, Inc. v. Estate of Patter-
136. Knowles, 898 So. 2d at 8-10.
137. See id. at I 1-14 (Cantero, J., concurring).
138. See id. at 14-25 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
139. See id. at 11-25 (Cantero, J., concurring; Lewis, J., dissenting).
140. 899 So. 2d 369, 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 372.
143. See, e.g., Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So. 2d 998, 1002 (Fla. 2003).
144. Williams, 899 So. 2d at 373.
145. Id. at 374.
146. Id. at 374-75.
147. 890 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
148. Id. at 289.
149. Id.
150. See Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 852 (Fla. 2003).
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son, '5 in which the decedent was alleged to have died as a result of the dep-
rivation of rights.1 52 Extendicare, the alleged operator of the home, appealed
the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration.' 53 The arbitration
provision appeared in a contract between the alleged operator and owner of
the nursing home and the manager of the home. 4 Extendicare argued "that
their only connection to the nursing home was through this agreement" and
the financial support that they provided the manager.'55 The court ruled that
since the deceased was not a party to the contract, nor an intended third party
beneficiary, he could not be bound by its arbitration provision even though it
arguably provided a basis for Extendicare's responsibility because the suit
was brought pursuant to statutory and negligence claims.'
5 6
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a nursing
home liability claim in Jackson v. York Hannover Nursing Centers. 57 The
claim was filed by the personal representative of a nursing home patient who
died three weeks after admission to the nursing home. 8 The defendants
claimed that the death occurred because the medical center from which she
was transferred "was negligent in its care and treatment," and they subse-
quently placed the medical center on the verdict form even though it was not
a party. 59 The plaintiffs expert then testified that the medical center's care
fell below the standard of care.' 6° The court held that the trial court properly
permitted the jury to apportion damages because there was only a single in-
jury to which both parties contributed, as opposed to two distinguishable
injuries. 161
VI. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
The Supreme Court of Florida decided a case concerning emotional dis-
tress injuries in a claim of the tort of negligent interference with parental
rights in Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, Inc. v. Welker. 62 In this case,
the plaintiff filed an action against a psychologist employed by the defendant
151. 898 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).




156. Extendicare Health Servs., Inc., 898 So. 2d at 990.
157. 876 So. 2d 8,9 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
158. ld. at 9-10.
159. Id. at 10.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 13.
162. 908 So. 2d 317, 318 (Fla. 2005).
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hospital, which gave an opinion to a court that the appellant had abused his
children while in his custody, which resulted in an injunction removing cus-
tody of his minor children from him to his former wife and denied him ac-
cess to the children. 63 The court declined to answer the certified question as
to whether the impact rule precludes recovery for emotional injuries in an
action for negligently interfering with parental rights because the courts be-
low had not addressed whether an action for negligent interference with pa-
rental rights exists.t 64 Although the court acknowledged that it had previ-
ously determined that Florida recognizes an intentional interference with
parental rights cause of action, it still declined to indicate whether it would
recognize an action for negligent interference with parental rights. 1
65
The First District Court of Appeal addressed a case dealing with an
emotional distress claim in Hernandez v. Tallahassee Medical Center, Inc.
166
Ms. Hernandez, a surgical nurse, appealed the dismissal of her complaint
against her employer which stated that the defendant was aware that she suf-
fered from an epileptic-seizure disorder that her neurologist had advised pre-
vented her from driving to work.167 The hospital, which informed her that
her job was in jeopardy because of missed work, instructed her to take a taxi
and obtain reimbursement for travel to and from work while on call. 168 The
plaintiff called work, claiming to be sick, but was told to come "right away",
although they were allegedly aware that she would be forced to drive to work
herself. 69 As she drove to work, she "suffered a seizure, lost control of her
car, and suffered serious and permanent injuries" as a result. 7° The court
found that ordering an employee to work right away, despite awareness of
her suffering from a serious condition, "did not exceed all bounds of de-
cency" as required for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 7' Of per-
haps even more importance was the finding by the court that the employer
did not have a duty to its employee to avert the harm for negligence pur-
poses. 172 The court noted that driving to work was normally outside the
scope of employment and that awareness of the threatened harm did not cre-
ate a duty. 173 The court also noted that the demand to come to work, did not
163. Id. at318-19.
164. Id. at 320.
165. Id.
166. 896 So. 2d 839, 840 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 840-41.
170. Id. at 841.
171. Hernandez, 896 So. 2d at 841.
172. Id. at 842.
173. Id. at 842-43.
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include an express order to drive to work and that the plaintiff could have
chosen to decline to come to work or to seek other means of transportation.
74
The First District also decided an emotional distress claim in the area of
veterinary malpractice in Kennedy v. Byas.17 ' The plaintiff, Robert Kennedy,
filed an action for veterinary malpractice and emotional distress based upon
the treatment received for his pet basset hound. 176 The defendant won a par-
tial summary judgment motion on the emotional distress claim and moved
for transfer of venue to county court from circuit court because the remaining
damages for the malpractice claim were under the jurisdictional limit for
circuit court. 77 The court accepted the plaintiff's writ of certiorari to quash
the order of transfer so that the substantive issue could be reached. 178 The
court refused to abandon the impact rule for this veterinary malpractice
case. 179 Acknowledging that the Supreme Court of Florida permitted dam-
ages to be recovered in a case involving the malicious destruction of a dog in
La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc. 180 and that other jurisdictions are
split on the issue of permitting recovery of emotional distress claims for neg-
ligent provision of veterinary care, the court opted to not permit an exception
to the impact rule out of fear of placing an unnecessary burden on courts by
expanding this tort.' 8'
The Third District Court of Appeal dealt with an emotional distress
claim in LeGrande v. Emmanuel, 82 in which "a Baptist minister.., sued two
congregational members ... for slander, slander per se, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of
consortium.' ' 83 The Pastor's complaint, which was dismissed, alleged that
his congregation members had accused him of stealing money from the
church to purchase a Mercedes and "referred to [him] as 'Satan' and
'Makout,"' a name typically used for oppressive secret police from Duva-
lier's regime. 84 The court correctly reversed the dismissal of the slander and
slander per se claims because the minister alleged that he was falsely accused
of criminal acts, which are actionable per se.' 85 The court also correctly up-
174. Id. at 844.
175. 867 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1196-97.
178. Id. at 1196.
179. Id. at 1198.
180. 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964).
181. Kennedy, 867 So. 2d at 1198.
182. 889 So. 2d 991, 993 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 994.
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held the dismissal of the infliction of emotional distress claims because it
deemed the comments to not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous con-
duct as to satisfy the requirements for an intentional infliction claim and be-
cause his allegations of memory loss and aggravation of a pre-existing dia-
betic condition were wholly insufficient for a negligent infliction action.,
86
The Third District also considered an emotional distress claim in Wil-
liams v. Worldwide Flight Services Inc.,187 which involved an appeal of a
dismissal of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and neg-
ligent retention.188 The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was exposed to
intentionally discriminatory behavior by his general manager on the basis of
race. 89 Amongst other complaints, the plaintiff alleged that he was called a
"nigger" and a "monkey" as well as being subjected to false accusations of
theft.' 9 The court found that the behavior did not rise to the level of outra-
geousness to permit recovery. 91 Whether this is accurate in the abstract is
debatable, but the court did correctly note that the federal and state employ-
ment discrimination statutes are available to remedy such conduct.
192
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered a negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim in Thomas v. Ob/Gyn Specialists of the Palm
Beaches, Inc., 9 which dealt with an appeal of summary judgment against
the plaintiff. 94 The case involved a claim by the husband for the alleged
malpractice of a doctor who performed a D & C (dilatation and curettage)
procedure upon the plaintiffs pregnant wife. 95 The existence of the fetus
had not been diagnosed and did not survive the procedure. 196 The court re-
fused to expand the abrogation of the impact rule in this line of cases,197 dis-
tinguishing it from the wrongful stillbirth exception recognized by the Su-
preme Court of Florida in Tanner v. Hartog.'98
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal also considered Florida law in re-
lation to an emotional distress claim in Gonzalez-Jiminez De Ruiz v. United
186. Id. at 994-95.
187. 877 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
188. Id. at 869-70.
189. Id. at 870.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Williams, 877 So. 2d at 871.
193. 889 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
194. Id. at 971.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 972.
198. 696 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 1997).
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States,'99 a case brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act by survivors of a
prisoner who died from cancer. °° In dismissing the infliction of emotional
distress claims by the children of the prisoner and his alleged common-law
wife, the court noted that substandard medical care, failure to provide access
to the deceased while he was ill, failure to inform the family of his death, and
delay in transporting his remains did not constitute intentional infliction.20 '
The court also held that, without physical injury, it could not recognize a
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.
202
VII. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in an en banc decision, reversed
the dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint in Burke v. Snyder,2 °3 in
which the plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of a sexual battery during
a medical examination by the defendant at the Nova Southeastern University
Osteopathic Treatment Center.2' The plaintiff alleged that Nova was vicari-
ously liable for the doctor's conduct and also negligent in hiring, supervising,
and retaining him in its employ, but "the plaintiff did not comply with the
notice and pre-suit screening requirements for medical malpractice actions
[n]or file suit within the two-year statute of limitations for such [actions]. 2 5
Noting that it had decided to the contrary in an earlier opinion, O'Shea v.
Phillips,°6 it also acknowledged that other district courts had disagreed with
its interpretation of the relevant Florida Statutes, including Florida Statutes
section 766.110.207 It receded from its prior decision because it deemed that
the sexual misconduct did not arise "out of the rendering of... medical care
or services. 2 8
The Fourth District also decided an appeal of a medical malpractice
claim in Grobman v. Posey,2 9 a case involving the right of non-settling de-
199. 378 F.3d 1229 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
200. Id. at 1230 & n.1.
201. Id. at 1231.
202. Id. (citing Holt v. Rowell, 798 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
203. 899 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (en banc).
204. Id. at 337.
205. Id.
206. 746 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), reh'g denied, 767 So. 2d 459 (Fla.
2000).
207. Burke, 899 So. 2d at 337-39; FLA. STAT. § 766.110 (1997).
208. Burke, 899 So. 2d at 338 (quoting O'Shea, 746 So. 2d at 1109 (quoting FLA. STAT. §
766.106(1)(a) (1993))) (internal quotations omitted).
209. 863 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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fendants to obtain a setoff for amounts paid by a settling defendant.2 '0 The
case involved a malpractice claim against a number of physicians, an anes-
thesiologist, a hospital, and Prudential Insurance Company, which provided
HMO (Health Management Organization) coverage.21 Two of the physi-
cians and Prudential settled with the plaintiff before trial.212 Prudential was
sued under vicarious liability and negligent credentialing theories, but the
settlement did not indicate the causes of action, nor did it allocate between
economic and non-economic damages.21 3 At trial, the remaining defendants,
Dr. Grobman and Mercy Hospital, asked for the jury to apportion fault to the
other physicians and anesthesiologist, but not the HMO/health insurer.2 4 In
order to resolve the dispute, the court was forced to consider the applicability
of section 768.81, which "eliminates joint and several liability for non-
economic damages and limits joint and several liability for economic dam-
ages. '21 5 However, vicarious liability would not result in apportionment be-
cause the vicariously liable party is liable for all of the harm caused by the
primary actor.1 6 Furthermore, the court ruled that the negligent credential-
ing claim was derivative in nature and therefore, like vicarious liability,
would not require apportionment of damages.1 7 Therefore, the court held
that Prudential was not a proper Fabre defendant to be placed on the verdict
form, and its payment required a complete set-off against the verdict under
sections 46.015 and 768.041 of the Florida Statutes.
218
VIII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue of sovereign immu-
nity in Pollock v. Florida Department of Highway Patrol,21 9 an appeal of two
actions brought by the survivors of a deceased driver and passenger of a car
that "collided into the back of an unlit tractor-trailer which had stalled...
[on] the Palmetto Expressway. '20 A driver had earlier called 911 and was
transferred to the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP), informing a dispatcher of
210. Id. at 1232.
211. Id. at 1232-33.
212. Id. at 1233.
213. Id.
214. Grobman, 863 So. 2d at 1233.
215. Id. at 1234 (citing D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003)).
216. Id. at 1235.
217. Id. at 1235-36.
218. Id. at 1237.
219. 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).
220. Id. at 930.
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the existence of the hazard in the highway.22' He was informed by the dis-
patcher that a unit would be dispatched, but apparently the dispatcher failed
to enter the call into the computer for assignment.222 FHP has internal opera-
tional rules requiring the dispatch of a trooper to the scene of a stalled vehi-
cle, and evidence at trial revealed that officers were available. 2 3 Its rules
also indicate that crash prevention and crash investigation are primary func-
tions of the FHP.224 The trial courts in both cases entered judgments for the
plaintiffs, but the decisions were reversed by the Third District Court of Ap-
peal, which certified a conflict with decisions by the Second District.225
As noted by the Supreme Court of Florida, Florida has waived sover-
eign immunity in tort actions "'for any act for which a private person under
similar circumstances would be held liable.' 226 The issue before the court
was whether the FHP owed a common law or statutory duty to the plain-
tiffs. 2 7 Although the court acknowledged the duty of a public or private
entity that owns, operates, or controls property to maintain it and to warn of
and correct dangerous conditions thereon,228 it held that FHP was not bound
because it lacked ownership or control over the highways. 229 The court noted
that the operation and maintenance of the roads is the province of the Florida
Department of Transportation and the local governments in which the roads
are located and that Florida law permits, but does not require, FHP to remove
stalled or abandoned vehicles from state highways.23° It also opined that the
responsibility of enforcing laws for the public good does not create a duty
towards a particular individual, absent the officers becoming directly in-
volved in circumstances that place a person within a "zone of risk., 231' The
court examined a number of instances in which a special duty could arise and
found that this situation did not fit within any of them.2 32 It also rejected the
argument that the internal procedures created an independent duty of care.233
221. Id. at 931.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 931.
225. Id. at 931-32.
226. Id. at 932 (quoting Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 534-35 (Fla. 1999)).
227. Id. at 933-34.
228. Id. at 933 (citing Bailey Drainage Dist. v. Stark, 526 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1988)).
229. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 934 (citing Alderman v. Lamar, 493 So. 2d 495, 498 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 935-36. (citing Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989); Everton v.
Willard, 468 So. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 1985)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 936-37.
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Justice Pariente dissented, arguing that FHP's actions were operational
in nature and therefore not within the protection of sovereign immunity.2 3
She argued that the general duty/special duty dichotomy had been abandoned
after the passage of section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes.35 Although ac-
knowledging that some decisions seem to have receded from this abandon-
ment, she argues that the court should focus on conventional tort principles,
particularly foreseeability 6 Justice Pariente argued that because the FHP
assured the caller that a unit would be sent, it therefore assumed control over
the situation and its failure to so respond created a foreseeable "zone of risk"
of harm.237
The First District Court of Appeal also addressed sovereign immunity in
Rudloe v. Karl,238 an action in which a Florida State alumnus and the corpo-
ration of which he was president and "closely affiliated" sued Florida State
University (FSU) and another alumnus for statements made in the FSU De-
partment of Oceanography Newsletter.239 The newsletter in question in-
cluded responses to the Department's request for students to relate their ex-
periences of departmental history.24 One of the experiences was an account
by Dr. Karl that Rudloe may have stolen a priceless specimen from the de-
partment.24 The plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleged that FSU was
negligent in failing to verify the facts contained in Dr. Karl's submission to
the newsletter. 42 The court held that sovereign immunity was not a bar to
the action because it did not involve basic law enforcement or governmental
policy making, nor discretionary planning or judgment.243
The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided a sovereign immunity issue
in City of Ocala v. Graham,244 a case involving a claim that a woman was
shot because of the negligence of one of the city's police officers. 245 Appel-
lant called the Ocala police to complain about a death threat from her former
husband.246 She alleged that the officer agreed that he, or someone else from
234. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 939 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 940 (citing Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010,
1016 (Fla. 1979)).
236. Id. at 941.
237. Id. at 942 (citing McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992)).
238. 899 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
239. Id. at 1162-63.
240. Id. at 1163.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Rudloe, 899 So. 2d at 1164.
244. 864 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
245. Id. at 474-76.
246. Id. at 475.
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the department, would talk to her former husband, which she believed would
deter him from carrying out his threat.247 Two days later, the appellant en-
gaged in three different conversations with her husband, and she acknowl-
edged that she realized that no one from the police department had contacted
him. 248 The estranged husband appeared at her residence, got into a fist fight
with their adult son and shot at the son, hitting the appellant instead.249
The court first noted that "there is no common law duty to prevent the
misconduct of third persons.,250 The court observed that in relation to law
enforcement and public safety, "sovereign immunity may disappear" if a
special relationship exists between the victim and the governmental offi-
cial.25' In looking at the required elements for such a relationship, the court
held that the appellant could not establish justifiable reliance upon the offi-
cer's assurance that he would talk to the assailant and that the failure to con-
tact the estranged husband was not the proximate cause of the appellee's
injuries. 2 First, the court noted that the threats occurred in a jurisdiction
outside of the control of the Ocala Police Department and that the officer
informed the appellant of the appropriate law enforcement authority to con-
tact.253 In addition, it found that it was sheer speculation to posit that the
officer's failure to contact the assailant caused the harm and the physical
attack by the adult son upon the estranged husband was a superseding cause
of the injuries.254
IX. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
The Second District Court of Appeal resolved a tortious interference
with a business relationship issue in Advantage Digital Systems, Inc. v. Digi-
tal Imaging Services, Inc.25' The appeal arose from an injunction obtained
by Digital Imaging (Digital) against three of its former employees who were
subsequently employed by Advantage Digital (Advantage), which was in-
corporated by one of the employees and a customer of Digital Imaging. 6
The court ruled that the injunction was too broad against the former employ-
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Graham, 864 So. 2d at 475-76.
250. Id. at 476 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 315 (1965)).
251. Id. at 476-77 (citing Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n v. City of Haileah, 468 So. 2d 912,
921 (Fla. 1985)).
252. Id. at 477.
253. Id. at 478.
254. Graham, 864 So. 2d at 478-79.
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ees who had signed a non-competition agreement to not solicit Digital cus-
tomers because it extended beyond a ban on solicitation, it restrained solici-
tation of prospective customers, and it extended beyond two years without
evidence overcoming the statutory presumption pursuant to Florida Statutes
section 542.335(1)(d)(1)257 that restraints in excess of that time period are
unreasonable.258 In relation to the injunction against former employee Mi-
chael Knaus, who had not signed a non-competition agreement, the court
reversed the injunction restraining him from doing business with Digital cus-
tomers because of the assumption that he had sabotaged Digital's machines
while working as an independent contractor for Digital.2 59 Because Knaus
had ended his relationship with Digital and therefore could no longer sabo-
tage the machines, the court found the injunction to be an inappropriate rem-
edy because the alleged harm had already occurred. 26" The court then re-
versed the injunction against Advantage because it could permissibly com-
pete for business, unless it was inducing a breach of a contract not terminable
at will.2 61 It did note that Advantage could not assist the former employees to
breach their non-competition agreements with Digital and that an injunction
to that effect would be permissible. 62
An appeal of a dismissal of a "tortious interference with a business rela-
tionship" claim was decided by the Third District Court of Appeal in Rubin
v. Alarcon.263 In the case, the plaintiff law firm undertook representation of
Benito Santiago against Morena Monge.264 Defendant Alarcon, a mutual
friend of Santiago and Monge, proceeded to act as Monge's agent in settling
the case with Santiago.265 In the second amended complaint, the plaintiffs
allege that Alarcon urged Santiago not to tell his attorneys about the negotia-
tions, but instead to tell them that he no longer wanted to pursue the law-
suit.266 In addition, it was alleged that Santiago was urged to not disclose the
payments made to him in settlement of the case.2 67 Although acknowledging
that parties may settle cases without attorney intervention, the court held that
they may not engage in fraud or collusion in order to interfere with the
257. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(d)(1) (2000).
258. Id.; Advantage Digital Sys., Inc., 870 So. 2d at 114-15.
259. Advantage Digital Sys., Inc., 870 So. 2d at 115-16.
260. Id. at 116.
261. Id. at 116-17.
262. Id. at 116.
263. 892 So. 2d 501, 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
264. Id.
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agreement between the attorney and client.268 The court also noted in dicta,
however, that a provision in the contingent fee agreement that the client
could not settle the case without prior written approval of the law firm was
void.269
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also considered a case involving
tortious interference of a contract for attorneys' fees in Ingalsbe v. Stewart
Agency, Inc. 270 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis of abso-
lute immunity. 271 In the case, the lawyers "were retained by their client to
sue appellees [Stewart Agency] under the Lemon Law. 272 The client won a
jury verdict, which was reversed on appeal.273 After remand, the appellees
approached the client and urged settlement without involving the lawyers.274
The appellees and client then agreed on how much the appellees would pay
in attorneys' fees to the appellants, which met only one of the alternatives
available in the fee agreement between the client and the appellants.275 The
appellees argued that the appellant's claim was barred by the "litigation
privilege. 27 6 This privilege has been defined as one that applies to "any act
occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding.277 However, as the
court noted, although the appellee was privileged to propose and conclude a
settlement, it was not entitled "to interfere with a fee contract between one of
the settling parties and his lawyer. '271 Judge Gross dissented, arguing that
the decision "impinge[d] on a client's right to settle a lawsuit," noting that
the settlement far exceeded the damages awarded at the initial trial2 79 The
dissent argued that the settlement did comply with one of the alternatives in
the fee contract and did not involve a design or defeat payment of attorney's
fees.28° Upon a motion for rehearing, the court did certify the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Does the litigation privilege of Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Tho-
mas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. United State Fire Insurance Co.,
268. Rubin, 892 So. 2d at 503.
269. Id. at 504 n.5.





275. Ingalsbe, 869 So. 2d at 31.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 32 (quoting Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v.
U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla. 1994)).
278. Id. at 33.
279. Id. at 35-36 (Gross, J., dissenting).
280. Ingalsbe, 869 So. 2d at 36.
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639 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1994), apply to claims alleging direct inter-
ference with an attorney's fee earned by representing a con-
sumer's claim for unfair or deceptive practices in a sale of a motor
vehicle, where the interference arose from a seller-initiated settle-
ment without counsel in which the fee due the lawyer was reduced
without the lawyer's consent.
281
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered an appeal of an injunction
involving a "tortious interference with business relationships" claim in Ani-
mal Rights Foundation of Florida, Inc. v. Siegel.282 Plaintiff Siegel was
president of a timeshare development that hired a production company to
conduct entertainment for potential buyers that included twice weekly animal
shows. 283  The complaint alleged that defendant foundation's supporters
picketed at the plaintiff's residential community and business offices as well
as circulated leaflets that claimed Siegel abused animals n.2 8  The court ruled
that the injunction's prohibition on picketing that would impede the flow of
traffic was improper in light of a lack of record evidence that "the Founda-
tion had impeded or was likely to impede the free flow of traffic. 285 It also
ruled that the noise restrictions were an improper burden on speech "because
they enjoin[ed] all shouting and all uses of bull horns or megaphones, rather
than tailoring a prohibition against impermissible conduct.' 28 6 Additionally,
the court invalidated restrictions on the number of protestors and location of
demonstrations absent evidence showing the need for such regulation.287 It
also struck bans on videotaping passers-by because of a failure to demon-
strate irreparable harm.288 Furthermore, it struck parts of the injunction that
banned certain statements from being made. 289 Finally, the court noted that
because the speech involved was pure speech and because the foundation
was not a competitor of Siegel or the development and it was not promoting
an economic interest, the speech "was not properly restrained to prevent the
tortious interference alleged. ' 290 In a partial concurrence and dissent, Chief
Judge Sawaya argued that the conduct engaged in by the defendant was har-
281. Id. at 38-39.
282. 867 So. 2d 451, 452-53 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The case also involved claims
of "invasion of privacy, slander, and libel." Id. at 453.
283. Id. at 452.
284. Id. at 453.
285. Id. at 455.
286. Siegel, 867 So. 2d at 456.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 457.
290. Id. at 458 (footnote omitted).
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assment as opposed to speech 291 and that some of the speech was not politi-
cal, but commercial in nature.292
X. "SLAvIN" DOCTRINE
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the application of the
Slavin doctrine in Gonsalves v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. 293 The plaintiff's
mother purchased carpeting for her staircase from Sears, which was installed
by its contractor, Flamingo.294 The first installation was incorrect and had to
be replaced.295 A problem became apparent after the second installation,
which the mother made several unsuccessful attempts to get rectified.296 She
was reassured by Sears that it would remedy the problem so she did not seek
an independent company to repair the problem.2 97 Before the problem was
remedied, she "fell on the staircase sustaining [a] serious injury., 298 The trial
court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Sears and Flamingo
pursuant to the Slavin doctrine. 299 This doctrine refers to the case of Slavin v.
Kay300 and holds that "a contractor is relieved of liability for damages caused
by a patent defect after control of the completed premises has been turned
over to the owner."3 °1 The court noted that this case involved a patent defect,
but held that it could not be conclusively established that the work was ever
completed.30 2 It also noted that this case did not really fit into the rationale of
Slavin, as Sears had actually been asked to fix the problem. 30 3
In Foreline Security Corp. v. Scott,3° the Fifth District Court of Appeal
also applied the Slavin doctrine. 3°  This case involved liability for a 1999
bank robbery.30 6 "Foreline installed a bank security system at the Mount
Dora branch of the United Southern Bank (USB) in 1993. "307 Scott, who was
291. Siegel, 867 So. 2d at 464 (Sawaya, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
292. Id. at 468.





298. Gonsalves, 859 So. 2d at 1208.
299. Id.
300. 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958).
301. Gonsalves, 859 So. 2d at 1209.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 871 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
305. Id. at 909.
306. Id. at 908.
307. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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a teller at the bank at the time of the robbery, was shot and rendered a quad-
riplegic as a result.3"8 Scott sued Foreline, alleging several causes of ac-
tion." 9 The jury found that Foreline was fifty percent at fault and that USB
was fifty percent at fault for the injury, but the trial court entered judgment
against Foreline for the full amount of the damages pursuant to section
768.81 of the Florida Statutes.3 0 The court first noted that a majority of
states have adopted a "completed and accepted rule" for this type of factual
situation.31' Having completed installation of the security system six years
prior to the robbery, Foreline argued that it should have received a jury in-
struction on the Slavin doctrine.1 2 The court agreed.3 13 The court also held
that it was error to instruct the jury to allocate fault between USB and Fore-
line and then ignore the allocation as the jury may have decided differently
had it been aware that Foreline would bear responsibility for the entire
amount of the verdict.314
XI. MISCELLANEOUS
In Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. American Aviation,
Inc.,31 the Supreme Court of Florida responded to certified questions of law
concerning the economic loss rule from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.31 6 Indemnity Insurance Company (Indemnity) and
Profile Aviation Services, Inc. (Profile) sued American Aviation (American)
for negligent maintenance and inspection of an aircraft's landing gear on a
Profile aircraft.317 The court noted that the economic loss rule, which prohib-
its tort actions in certain cases where the only damages are economic losses,
is applied to those in contractual privity to prevent the circumvention of the
allocation of such losses set forth in the contract. 38 Thus, it would be inap-
propriate to permit a tort action where the only breach of duty was a breach
of the contract.31 9 Similarly, the products liability economic loss rule devel-
oped in order to prevent manufacturers from being held liable for economic
308. Id.
309. Scott, 871 So. 2d at 908.
310. Id. at 908-09.
311. Id. at 909 (footnote omitted).
312. Id. at909-10.
313. Id. at 910.
314. Scott, 871 So. 2d at 911.
315. 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004).
316. Id. at 534.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 536.
319. Id. at 537.
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damages beyond that provided for by warranty law.3 20 The latter limitation
has generally been applied to products which damage themselves as a result
of a defect in the product.32' The court held that the economic loss rule did
not apply in this case where the plaintiffs were not in privity and noted that it
continued to recognize the "other property" exception to products liability
economic loss cases.322
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ginsberg,323 the Supreme Court of Florida
decided an invasion of privacy claim.324 The case was responsive to several
certified questions of law from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals involv-
ing claims by Elaine Scarfo that, while employed by corporations owned by
Victor Ginsberg, she was subjected to "unwelcome offensive conduct, in-
cluding physical touching and comments of a sexual nature.,3 5 Amongst the
claims brought by Scarfo was a claim of invasion of privacy, and the case
required a resolution of whether this conduct fit within that tort as recognized
in Florida.326 The court held that the tort does not include this type of intru-
sion to the plaintiff's body as opposed to physical space or holding the per-
son free from public gaze.32 7
The First District Court of Appeal also considered a warning issue in
McGraw v. R & R Investments, Ltd.328 In this case, Patricia McGraw ap-
pealed from a final summary judgment finding R & R, an equine activity
sponsor, not liable for injuries that she suffered as an equine trainer em-
ployed by R & R after she was thrown by a horse owned by R & R. 329 The
resolution of the case depended upon analysis of the immunity provided to
equine sponsors by section 773.02 of the Florida Statutes.330 Section 773.04
requires that equine sponsors post notices and give written warnings an-
nouncing that the sponsor is not liable for injuries from inherent risks of
equine activities, but provides no consequences for failure to provide such
warnings. 33' The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that the
320. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 891 So. 2d at 538.
321. Id. at 542 (citing Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 984 (Fla. 1999) (Wells, J.,
concurring)).
322. Id. at 543.
323. 863 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2003).
324. Id. at 157.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 158.
327. Id. at 162.
328. 877 So. 2d 886, 888 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 889 (citing FLA. STAT. § 773.04 (2000)).
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statutory obligation to provide the notice was mandatory if the sponsor was
to be afforded the statutory immunity.332
In Hopkins v. Boat Club, Inc. ," the First District Court of Appeal con-
sidered an appeal of a case involving a release.334 This case, filed by Ruby
and Ronald Hopkins, involved injuries suffered by Mrs. Hopkins when she
was thrown from a boat operated by Mr. Hopkins under the direction and
supervision of one of the boat club's employees.335 The plaintiffs signed an
agreement with the boat club for use of the club's boats and then signed in-
dividual releases which included a clause entitled "Assumption and Ac-
knowledgment of Risks and Release of Liability Agreement. ' 336 Although
controlled by federal maritime law, the court stated that it was consistent
with Florida law to look unfavorably upon exculpatory clauses seeking to
absolve a party from its own negligence and to find such clauses ineffective
absent clear and unequivocal language.337 The court found the language in
this release to be sufficient in its specific reference to a number of risks, in-
cluding "ship's wakes," which caused the injury in this case and the refer-
ence to release all "principals, directors, officers, agents, [and] employees...
from any and all liability ... for any and all injury or damage. ''338
The Third District Court of Appeal decided a case dealing with a claim
of interference with testamentary capacity in In re Hatten.339 The case, an
appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dealt with an alle-
gation that the decedent had disinherited three relatives, including her
brother, Louis. 34 The plaintiffs filed an adversary action against Louis, al-
leging that he had taken away the will of the deceased and destroyed it.34'
The evidence supporting the existence of the will consisted of statements
from the three plaintiffs, who were beneficiaries of the alleged will.342 The
defendant argued that the evidence should be barred by the hearsay rule and
the Dead Man's Statute.343 After quickly disposing of the hearsay objection
by noting the specific exemption for statements relating to wills, the court
332. Id. at 893.
333. 866 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
334. Id. at 109.
335. Id. at 110.
336. Id. at 109.
337. Id. at 111.
338. Hopkins, 866 So. 2d at 112.
339. 880 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1273.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1274.
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next addressed the Dead Man's Statute issue.3" Because the Dead Man's
Statute applies to a person interested in an action in a representative capacity,
the court held that it did not apply to this action, in which the defendant was
being sued for damages in his personal capacity for his tortious act.
345
In Haskins v. City of Fort Lauderdale,34 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal decided an appeal of an invasion of privacy and negligent investiga-
tion claim. 347 The plaintiff, Robin Haskins, alleged that while working as a
civilian employee for the City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department, her
office was illegally searched for illegal diet pills. 348 In the criminal case in
which she was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent
to sell and/or deliver, the evidence obtained in the search was suppressed and
the state nolle prossed the charge.349 Her labor union filed a grievance in
relation to her job termination, which resulted in a finding that there was not
just cause for her dismissal.35° The appellate court upheld the trial court's
summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations. 35 ' The appellate
court rejected the arguments that the statute was either tolled until the crimi-
nal court ruled that the search was illegal or until the arbitration proceedings
on the labor grievance were completed.352
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered an appeal of malicious
prosecution and false arrest claims in Daniel v. Village of Royal Palm
Beach.353 In this case, Felicia Daniel filed a malicious prosecution claim for
her arrest for aggravated assault.354 According to witnesses, Daniel was driv-
ing carelessly and harassing an unmarked police car.355 The court held that
"the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Daniel for reckless driv-
ing. 356 She was later tried and acquitted of this charge.357 Despite the fact
that she was arrested for aggravated assault and disputed many facts alleged
by the witnesses, the court held that a summary judgment was appropriate
because "[t]he validity of an arrest does not turn on the [charge] announced
344. Hatten, 880 So. 2d at 1274-75.
345. Id. at 1276.
346. 898 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).




351. Haskins, 898 So. 2d at 1124.
352. Id. at 1123.
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by the officer at the time" of an arrest and the factual disputes are not mate-
rial to the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest.358
The Fourth District also decided a claim concerning a loss of consor-
tium set forth by a child who was a fetus at the time of injury in Larusso v.
Garner.3 5 9 The mother was three months pregnant with the child, Braden,
when she was in an automobile accident that resulted in her sustaining severe
brain injuries.3" Despite being in a coma, she carried Braden to term.361 The
court evaluated the claim under the Florida Statutes establishing a child's
right to loss of parental consortium-section 768.0415.362 It was argued that
the defendants did not fit within the statutory term "unmarried dependent" so
as to qualify for the damages.363 However, the court held that "[b]ecause
Florida follows the 'born alive' doctrine," which permits minors who are
"born alive" to seek compensation for injuries occurring to them or their
parents, it would deem the statute to provide coverage. 6 It did, however,
find that the lower court erred in awarding filial consortium damages beyond
Braden's reaching the age of majority, although it agreed that Braden's dam-
ages could so extend.365
In Broz v. Rodriguez,366 the Fourth District Court of Appeal considered
the application of a release.367 The plaintiff, Grace Broz, appealed a final
judgment in favor of a number of defendant doctors. 368 Broz fell at the Rock-
ing Horse Ranch and first sued the ranch in a lawsuit that was settled.369 She
then filed suit against the defendants in this action for surgery on her injuries,
which she claimed was negligently performed.370 In the general release
signed with the ranch, she did not reserve a claim against the defendants in
this action.37' In interpreting section 768.041, Florida Statutes, the court
held that she must have so reserved to hold subsequent tortfeasors liable.372
358. Daniel, 889 So. 2d at 991.
359. 888 So. 2d 712, 716 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
360. Id. at715.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 720; see FLA. STAT. § 768.0415 (2004).
363. Larusso, 888 So. 2d at 719.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 721.
366. 891 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).




371. Broz, 891 So. 2d at 1206.
372. See id. at 1207-08.
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The res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applied by the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in Nodurft v. Servico Centre Ass'n.373 The plaintiff, Colleen
Nodurft, alleged that she was injured in the ladies' restroom of an Omni Ho-
tel when "a wall-mounted trash receptacle fell from the wall and struck her
foot. '374  Two witnesses testified that receptacles in the restrooms were
loose.375 The plaintiff requested a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, which
was denied. 376 The court noted that Florida courts had expanded the doctrine
beyond its origins, including the notion that the defendant had exclusive con-
trol of the instrumentality causing injury.377 The court then held that al-
though the receptacle "was in a public place and accessible to ... the public,
the Omni had 'sufficient exclusivity' [of its control] to rule out the chance
that [it] fell from the wall as a result of the actions of some other agency." 378
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.379
The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided a malicious prosecution ap-
peal in Doss v. Bank of America, N.A. 380 Bank of America sued Doss for
payment on bogus checks, endorsed by a forger.3 8 Doss opened a savings
account at the bank, but did not have a checking account with it.382 The
forger, who forged Doss' name on the checks, presented identification indi-
cating that she was Doss.383 The bank's fraud investigator concluded that
Doss had nothing to do with the check-cashing scheme and recommended
that no collection action be taken against Doss.384 The bank could not ex-
plain why the lawsuit had been filed.385 Doss agreed to a joint stipulation for
dismissal of the bank's collection action.386 In Doss' malicious prosecution
action, the bank asserted that Doss had not received "a 'bona fide' termina-
tion of the collection suit" because of the joint stipulation of dismissal.387
Although the court noted that cases that terminate due to settlements or
joint stipulations do not normally qualify as bona fide terminations for mali-
373. 884 So. 2d 395, 396 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
374. Id.
375. See id.
376. Id. at 397.
377. See id. at 398.
378. Nodurft, 884 So. 2d at 398.
379. Id.
380. 857 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
381. Id. at 994.
382. Id. at 993.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 993-94.
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cious prosecution actions, such is not always the case.388 It noted that courts
must look at "the total circumstances." '389 Although the bank agreed to resti-
tution of $37.14, which it had set-off when it first discovered the forged
checks, the court held that such was actually an admission by the bank that it
recognized Doss' innocence.390 Further, it deemed her waiver of interest to
be de minimus because the interest on the $37.14 would have been miniscule
and her waiver of attorney's fees in the action was not significant since there
was no basis to claim them.39' It held that her failure to seek attorney's fees
pursuant to section 57.105 in the collection suit was also not fatal.392
The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided a defamation case in
Fariello v. Gavin.393 Fariello appealed the dismissal of his complaint on the
basis of the litigation privilege.394 Fariello claimed that Craig Gavin, presi-
dent of the Crystal Hills Mini Farms Unit I and 2 Association, Inc., made
slanderous comments about Fariello that "Fariello had committed the crime
of perjury in connection with certain of his professional qualifications. 395
The trial court granted motions for summary judgment on the basis that it felt
it permissible for Gavin to question the credibility of "Fariello publicly be-
cause the two men were adversaries in the prior lawsuit. ' 396 Because immu-
nity is an affirmative defense, the court held that it would normally be inap-
propriate to dismiss the complaint unless it demonstrated on its face that the
defense applied.3 97 The court held that it was not so apparent in this case.398
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied
Florida's crashworthiness doctrine in Bearint v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc. 3
9 9
The plaintiff's parents appealed a verdict that Cosco, manufacturer of an
automobile safety seat in which their son, Kagan, was seated at the time of
an accident was not liable for the injuries that he sustained.4°° Saturn auto-
mobile company, which was also sued, settled prior to trial.4"'
388. Id. at 995.
389. Id.
390. Doss, 857 So. 2d at 995.
391. Id. at 995-96.
392. Id. at 996.




397. Id. at 1245.
398. Fariello, 873 So. 2d at 1245.
399. 389 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11 th Cir. 2004).
400. Id. at 1343.
401. Id. at 1344.
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In considering the applicable Supreme Court of Florida case, D'Amario
v. Ford Motor Co.,4°2 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the
applicability of the crashworthiness doctrine, which precludes consideration
of the fault of initial tortfeasor who cause a crash when a device in the car
causes enhanced injuries.43 In this case, in which the design of Saturn's
front seat was considered a cause of the injury, the court ruled that a proper
application of the doctrine would permit the jury to consider Saturn's contri-
bution to the injury of the infant.n n
402. 806 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2001).
403. See Bearint, 389 F.3d at 1345-47.
404. See id. at 1348.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What comes to mind for most people when they think about torts or
personal injury lawsuits is sensational newspaper headlines about a doctor
found liable for medical malpractice or a business ordered to pay a huge
amount of money because of a product defect. Nowadays, these thoughts
are usually quickly followed by some thought about "tort reform" or some
vision of wealthy lawyers.3 This perception of torts or personal injury law-
suits is quite far from the reality of the day to day work of your ordinary
plaintiff and defense tort lawyers, especially in Florida. 4 Like most every-
where else, the largest amount of personal injury legal work in Florida con-
cerns automobile injuries.5 This is not surprising given that Florida has an
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK 127 (Bar-
bara A. Mowat & Paul Werstine eds., Washington Square Press 1992) (1602).
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
** Allan R. Seaman & Associates, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; J.D. Nova South-
eastern University Law Center, 2005.
2. See, e.g., Firestone Set to Pay $7.5 Million in Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2001, at Cl.
3. See, e.g., Bush Outlines Medical Liability Reform, CNN.cOM, Jan. 16, 2003,
http://www.CNN.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/16/bush.malpractice/index.html.
4. The overall award median for all plaintiff verdicts collected from the years 1995 to
2001 was $41,380. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH SERIES No. 1.20.8, CURRENT AWARD TRENDS IN
PERSONAL INJURY 8 (Catherine Thomas ed., 2002 ed. 2003) (on file with authors). The me-
dian compensatory award for Florida from the years 1995-2001 was $67,500 and the percent
of cases that awarded punitive damages in Florida for the years 1995-2001 is two percent. Id.
at 39, 41.
5. Approximately sixty percent of plaintiff verdicts between 1995 and 2001 were for
instances of vehicular negligence. Id. at 51.
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estimated 13,715,866 licensed motor vehicles 6 and 15,483,582 licensed driv-
ers.7 Add to these numbers the tourists and business travelers who come to
Florida on a yearly basis and the number of motor vehicles and drivers using
Florida roadways are staggering.8 With all of the these motor vehicles and
drivers on the road, it is also not surprising that there were 243,294 motor
vehicle accidents in Florida last year.9 Unfortunately, with car accidents,
many times personal injury follows. Simple math reveals that based on the
number of motor vehicle accidents per year, potentially trillions of dollars of
both insurance coverage and insurable losses occur.
This article will focus on Florida's Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law and, in
particular, the Personal Injury Protection coverage ("PIP") required by this
statute. 10 The first part of this article will describe the legislative purpose and
specific provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law concerning
PIP. The second part of this article will examine the conflicting case law in
Florida regarding the application of the PIP provisions to persons who do not
have PIP coverage and are injured in a motor vehicle accident. Finally, this
article will propose a resolution to the conflicting case law in Florida involv-
ing the application of the PIP provisions to uninsured, injured parties.
II. FLORIDA'S PIP PROVISIONS
Florida's Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law requires anyone owning a motor
vehicle to obtain a minimum of $10,000 in medical coverage." This re-
quired insurance is called Personal Injury Protection coverage, or PIP.'2
Auto owners can purchase PIP insurance with a variety of deductibles. 3 PIP
coverage kicks in when a person is injured arising out of the use or mainte-
6. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Motor Vehicles Facts & Figures,
http://www. hsmv.state.fl.us/reports/facts mv.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
7. Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Driver License Facts and Figures
(Apr. 5, 2005), http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/reports/dlfacts.pdf [hereinafter FHSMV Driver
License].
8. Florida welcomed 74.6 million tourists in 2003. VISIT FLORIDA, Research,
http://media.visitflorida.org/about/research (last visited Oct. 12, 2005). Florida also has
1,653,345 estimated "problem drivers" for 2004-05. FHSMV Driver License, supra note 7.
These drivers are ones who have had their licenses suspended, revoked, or cancelled or have
been refused a driver's license because they are "high risk." Id. A percentage of these people
undoubtedly continue to travel Florida's roadways illegally.
9. FLA. DEP'T OF HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAFFIC CRASH STATISTICS
REPORT 7 (2003), available at http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/hsmvdocs/cf2003.pdf.
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nance of a motor vehicle.' 4 PIP insurance pays, according to the Florida
Statute, regardless of whether the injured party is or is not at-fault for the
injuries sustained. 5
The Florida No-Fault Law PIP provisions also provide limited tort im-
munity for at-fault car drivers and owners.' 6 Under these provisions, the at-
fault driver avoids tort liability and is immune from suit, unless the injury
caused by the at-fault driver, "consists in whole or in part of:
(a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily
function.
(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical
probability, other than scarring or disfigurement.
(c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement.
(d) Death."' 17
This statutory provision is sometimes referred to as the "permanent in-
jury" or "threshold" requirement. 8 Therefore, under the Florida Motor Ve-
hicle No-Fault Law, an injured person may not bring suit against an at-fault
party unless the person's injury meets the definition of the type of injury
contained in the foregoing statutory section.' 9
Florida's Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law then goes on to state that even if
an injured party satisfies the type of injury requirement to bring suit against
an at-fault driver, the "injured party ... shall have no right to recover any
damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or pay-
able. "20
The end result, when all of these statutory provisions are read in con-
junction with each other, is that if an injured person's medical bills are paid
under a PIP policy and the injured person files suit against the at-fault owner
or driver and recovers a judgment against that at-fault owner or driver, the
amount of PIP benefits paid to the injured person will be subtracted from the
judgment as a set-off.2'
It seems pretty clear that the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law and







20. § 627.736(3) (emphasis added).
21. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 14 (Fla. 1974).
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quick payment to the injured person for medical treatment and not subjecting
at-fault drivers and owners to double payment for the same injury.22
In 1971, the Florida Legislature decided that the traditional "fault"
based tort system, when applied to auto accidents, was too slow and ineffi-
cient.23 The legislature also noted that the traditional tort system had "led to
inequalities of recovery, with minor claims being overpaid and major claims
[being] underpaid.,, 24  Florida's first version of the Florida Motor Vehicle
No-Fault Law, entitled the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act,
took effect on January 1, 1972.25 One of the key provisions in this original
statute and the statute as it exists today is the PIP insurance provision. 26 PIP
was designed to provide "medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance
benefits without regard to fault. '27 The statute mandates the purchase of PIP
insurance for motor vehicles required to be registered in Florida. 8
At the time of the Act, seventeen percent of all lawsuits filed were auto-
mobile related lawsuits.29 The legislature figured that PIP coverage would
reduce the number of motor vehicle accident lawsuits and free up valuable
court time.3° The legislature's further design was to enable an injured person
to receive money quickly to cover out of pocket medical expenses from the
injured person's own insurance company.31
22. See §§ 627.736-.737.
23. Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 16.
24. Id.
25. Act effective Jan. 1, 1972, ch. 71-252, §§ 1-11, 1971 Fla. Laws 1355, 1355-71.
26. See § 627.731.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 17 n.15.
30. Id. at 20.
31. The Florida No-Fault law requires that all vehicle owners purchase PIP insurance.
See § 627.731. Further, the design of the No-Fault law contemplates that both drivers in-
volved in a car crash will be covered under their own no-fault policies. § 627.736. This is
evidenced by the multiple provisions written into the Act, which penalize drivers who fail to
obtain no-fault insurance. See § 627.733. Section 627.733(4) of the Florida Statutes provides
that anyone "who fails to have [no-fault insurance] in effect at the time of an accient shall
have no immunity from tort liability." § 627.733(4). Additionally, section 627.733(6) man-
dates that anyone failing to maintain no-fault insurance shall have their driver's license sus-
pended until such time that no-fault insurance is obtained. § 627.733(6). Therefore it be-
comes illegal to drive a car that is not insured under a PIP policy. See id. Through these
provisions the legislature expects that all motorists will be covered under a PIP policy and
those who are not, will no longer be allowed to drive. See id. Section 627.736(3) of the Flor-
ida Statutes provides that "[an injured party who is entitled to bring suit under the provisions
of ss. 627.730-627.7405 [the Act], or his or her legal representative, shall have no right to
recover any damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable." §
627.736(3) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the statute provides no guidance in the situation
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What the Florida legislature did not anticipate is how to deal with the
injured party in a car accident who does not carry the mandatory PIP cover-
age.32  Does this uninsured injured party become self-insured for the first
$10,000 in medical bills? If the uninsured injured party receives a judgment
against the at-fault party, is the at-fault party's insurance company entitled to
a set-off of $10,000, even though no PIP benefits were paid? The answer to
these questions seems to depend on where in Florida the accident occurred.
Il1. PIP INSURANCE SET-OFF
Four different Florida District Courts of Appeal have wrestled with the
question of whether an at-fault driver or owner is entitled to subtract the
amount of statutorily required PIP benefits from a judgment received by an
injured party who was required to carry PIP coverage but did not.33
where there are no PIP benefits that are paid or payable. See § 627.736. Further, the statute
gives no definition of "paid or payable." See id. This leads to several different interpretations
and clearly conflicting decisions in the different districts of the Florida District Court of Ap-
peal. Thus, this article is necessary to explain the decisions of the different District Courts of
Appeal and to propose a solution to this conflict.
Section 627.736(1) of the Florida Statutes lays out who is covered by a PIP policy. §
627.736(1). The statute states that a PIP policy covers:
the named insured, relatives residing in the same household, persons operating the
insured motor vehicle, passengers in such motor vehicle, and other persons struck
by such motor vehicle and suffering bodily injury while not an occupant of a self-
propelled vehicle ... for loss sustained by any such person as a result of bodily in-
jury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of
a motor vehicle.
Id. Therefore, according to the statute, PIP will even be extended to pedestrians if the pedes-
trian either: owns a motor vehicle which is covered by a PIP policy, or is a third party who
neither owns a motor vehicle nor has obtained any PIP insurance. Id.
32. See § 627.733. Section 627.733 of Florida Statutes delineates those who are required
to obtain PIP insurance, stating:
(1) Every owner or registrant of a motor vehicle, other than a motor vehicle used
as a taxicab, school bus as defined in s. 1006.25, or limousine.., shall maintain se-
curity as required by subsection (3) [of this statute] in effect continuously through-
out the registration or licensing period.
(2) Every nonresident owner or registrant of a motor vehicle which.., has been
physically present within this state for more than 90 days during the preceding 365
days shall thereafter maintain security as defined by [this statute].
§ 627.733(1)-(2). Therefore, all those who own a car or who have a car registered in their
name are required to maintain a PIP insurance policy. See id. Those who do not own a car or
have a car registered to them are not required to be covered under a PIP policy. See id.
33. See Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Cases v. Gray, 894 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Jedlicka v. Proctor, 724
So. 2d 668 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Stephens v. Renard, 487 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1986); Reynolds v. Life Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Erie
Ins. Co. v. Bushy, 394 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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A. The No Set-off Appellate Court Decisions
The first case to confront the PIP set-off issue was Ward v. Nationwide
Mutual Fire Insurance Co.34 The Ward case was actually the consolidation
of two appeals-Ward v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. and Johns-
ton v. United Services Automobile Ass'n.35 The plaintiffs in each case were
injured while occupying a vehicle owned by someone else, yet both injured
plaintiffs owned their own car but had failed to purchase PIP coverage as
required by Florida law.36
The defendants' insurance policy stated that medical payments (other
than PIP benefits) will be available "only over and above any personal injury
protection benefits that are paid or payable for the bodily injury under this or
any [insurance] policy. 3 7 The injured plaintiffs contended that because the
plaintiffs did not purchase PIP insurance, no PIP benefits were paid or pay-
able to them.38 Therefore, the injured plaintiffs argued that the defendants'
insurance companies should be responsible for paying the injured plaintiffs'
full medical expenses with no set-off for the amount of PIP benefits.39
The defendants' insurance companies countered that until the plaintiffs'
medical bills exceeded the statutorily required amount of PIP coverage,4° the
insurance companies were not liable to pay for any of the medical expenses
incurred by the injured plaintiffs. 4' The insurance companies "argued that
PIP benefits should be considered as paid or payable, regardless of' whether
the plaintiffs purchased coverage or not because section 627.733(4) of the
Florida Statues,42 which is the same provision in effect today, states that:
An owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is required by
this section who fails to have such security in effect at the time of an acci-
dent . . . shall be personally liable for the payment of benefits under s.
627.736. With respect to such benefits, such an owner shall have all of
the rights and obligations of an insurer under ss. 627.730-627.7405.
43
The insurance companies urged the court to give full force and effect to
this provision by classifying these injured, but PIP uninsured plaintiffs, as
34. 364 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 75-76.
37. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Ward, 364 So. 2d at 76.
40. The amount of required PIP insurance in 1978 was $5,000.00. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. FLA. STAT. § 627.733(4) (2004).
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self-insurers.44 By doing so, the insurance companies figured that the statu-
tory amount of PIP coverage required should be subtracted from any amount
of medical payments ordered in the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.45 By
allowing such a set-off, the insurance company's obligation to pay any
money for medical expenses to these plaintiffs would be extinguished.46 The
insurance companies noted further that to permit injured parties to recover
without regard to a set-off for PIP benefits would reward these plaintiffs for
failing to comply with the Florida Motor Vehicles No-Fault Law.47
The court concluded that although the plaintiffs have failed to obtain the
statutorily mandated PIP coverage, the insurance companies are not entitled
to a set-off.48 The court in Ward determined that even though a motorist who
fails to obtain PIP coverage has, by statute, all the rights and obligations of
an insurer, this statutory provision does not actually make that motorist an
insurer.49 The court also remarked that because the legislature already set
forth in the statute the penalty for motorists who fail to purchase the required
PIP coverage, it is not for this court or for a private insurance company to
impose another penalty against an injured, but PIP uninsured motorist.5"
This issue surfaced again in Reynolds v. Life Insurance Co. of Vir-
ginia.51 In Reynolds, the plaintiff, who did not carry PIP insurance, was in-
jured while driving his personally owned car. 2 The defendant's insurance
company policy provided that "[b]enefits payable under this policy will be
reduced by the amount of benefits payable for the same loss pursuant to a
Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, or similar law. 53 The injured plaintiff in-
curred medical bills well in excess of the PIP benefit amount. 54
The plaintiff argued that the Ward case was precedent and the insurance
company is not entitled to a set-off equal to the statutorily required amount
of PIP coverage.55 The defendant insurance company claimed that the Ward
44. Ward, 364 So. 2d at 77.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 78.
48. Id.
49. Ward, 364 So. 2d at 77 (citing Farley v. Gateway Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)).
50. Id. at 78.
51. 399 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
52. Id. at 519.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 519-20. The injured plaintiff incurred $11,000.00 in medical expenses. Id. at
519. The insurance company wanted a $5,000.00 set-off, the amount of statutorily required
PIP, and, as such, claimed that the plaintiff was only due $6,000.00 ($11,000-$5,000 =
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case was distinguishable because of the language contained in the defen-
dant's insurance policy. 6 In Ward, the policy language in question provided
"any personal injury protection benefits that are paid or payable ... under
this or any [insurance] policy. '57 In Reynolds, the policy language stated
"benefits payable . . . pursuant to a Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law., 58 The
defendant insurance company claims that the court's reasoning in Ward was
based on the absence of an insurance policy providing PIP benefits while, in
Reynolds, the reduction was triggered by the existence of the Florida Motor
Vehicle No-Fault Law.59
The court, however, was not swayed by the insurance company's argu-
ment.6 Instead the court ruled against a set-off of the amount of required
PIP coverage because "PIP benefits will be paid under the required insur-
ance, not directly by reason of the operation of the statute."'"
In the case of Jedlicka v. Proctor, the Second District Court of Appeal
rather summarily ruled that no set-offs will be allowed for at-fault defendants
who injure PIP uninsured motorists. 62 The court's only comment was "[wie
find merit only on Jedlicka's claim that the trial court erred in reducing his
damage award because of his failure to obtain statutorily required personal
injury protection. ' The court went on to say that Reynolds and Ward are
controlling, and it is reversible error to reduce an injured party's damage
award because of his or her failure to obtain PIP insurance.
64
The PIP set-off issue then made its way to the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, in the case Erie Insurance Co. v. Bushy, where the court reached the
same conclusion as the Second District Court of Appeal.6' The plaintiff in
Erie was injured while driving his automobile and had failed to obtain PIP
insurance.'
The court, in discarding the insurance company's argument that the
plaintiff was a self-insurer, ruled that
56. Id.
57. Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (emphasis added).
58. Reynolds, 399 So. 2d at 519.
59. Id. at 520.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 724 So. 2d 668, 668 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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[h]olding an [injured] owner of [a PIP] uninsured motor vehicle li-
able as a self-insurer for damages suffered from an [at-fault] in-
sured driver would avoid the express insuring contract provisions
in Erie's liability policy. It should make no difference to Erie un-
der its liability olicy whether the injured person has or does not
have insurance.
Accordingly, the Erie court disallowed a set-off to the defendant insurance
company.68
In another Fifth District Court of Appeal case involving PIP set-offs,
Stephens v. Renard, the court merely parrots the ruling in Erie by stating
"that it is error to reduce a[n injured] plaintiffs damage award for her failure
to obtain the statutorily required [PIP insurance] .
B. The Set-off Appellate Court Decisions
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Holt v. King,70 was the first ap-
pellate court to rule in favor of a PIP set-off.7 ' At the time of the car crash,
King's PIP "policy had been cancelled... [for] failure to pay her insurance
premium."72 Prior to trial, King moved to strike Holt's affirmative defense
that Holt was entitled to a set-off due to King's failure to obtain PIP insur-
ance.73 The trial court granted King's motion and disallowed the at-fault
defendant a set-off because the court felt bound to follow the Ward,
Stephens, and Erie decisions, which disallowed a set-off equal to the amount
of required PIP coverage. 74
The Court of Appeal in Holt disagreed with the trial court's decision
and held that, under the statutory language of section 627.733(4) of the Flor-
ida Statutes, King was self-insured to the extent of the PIP coverage that she
should have purchased so the defendant insurance company was entitled to a
set-off of that amount.75 Further, the court ruled that Holt, who had pur-
chased his own PIP insurance, was also entitled to limited tort immunity pro-
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 487 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
70. 707 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
71. Id. at 1144.
72. Id. at 1142.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Stephens, 487 So. 2d 1079; Erie Ins. Co. v. Bushy, 394 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
75. Holt, 707 So. 2d at 1143.
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vided by the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault law.76 This later ruling meant
that not only was the insurance company due a set-off for PIP coverage, but
also the plaintiff, King, would have to meet the statutory threshold for dam-
ages for the insurance company to have to pay any money for her medical
expenses.77
The Holt court was able to distinguish the Ward case because the Holt
case "did not involve a tortfeasor's right to a set-off pursuant to the statutory
tort exemption, but, rather, involved the question of whether public policy
relieves an insurer of his contractually undertaken duty to a claimant when
the claimant has failed to comply with the no-fault laws. 78
With regard to Erie, the court stated that the Erie Insurance Company
had undertaken a contractual obligation to insure the injured party, whereas
there was no such obligation in Holt.
79
The court acknowledged that the instant case was factually similar to
the Stephens case.8" The court stated that the instant ruling in Holt was in
direct conflict with the Fifth District's holding in Stephens,81 which expressly
denied a set-off for an at-fault driver causing injury to an uninsured motor-
ist. 82 The conflict between Holt and Stephens was certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida.83
After the Holt case, the Third District Court of Appeal stepped forward
with its decision in Cases v. Gray.84 On appeal, the court simply ruled that
"[o]n the authority of, and for the reasons well expressed in Holt, we hold
that a PIP set-off is required. 85 Conflict was again certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida between Cases, Stephens, and Jedlicka.86
It appeared as though the Supreme Court of Florida would hear the
Cases case and resolve the conflict in the decisions between the Second and
Fifth District Courts of Appeal and the Third and Fourth District Courts of
Appeal.87 However, according to the Supreme Court of Florida's docket, a
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1144.
78. Id. at 1143.
79. Id. at 1143-44.
80. Holt, 707 So. 2d at 1144.
81. Id.
82. Stephens v. Renard, 487 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
83. Holt, 707 So. 2d at 1144; see also Cases v. Gray, 894 So. 2d 268, 268 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (certifying conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida); Jedlicka v. Proctor, 724
So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (certifying conflict to the Supreme Court of
Florida).
84. 894 So. 2d268.
85. Id. at 268.
86. Id.
87. Gray v. Cases, No. SC04-1579, 2004 Fla. LEXIS 2439, at *1 (Fla. Dec. 20, 2004).
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motion to dismiss the Cases case for lack of jurisdiction due to an untimely
filing was granted on December 20, 2004.88 In addition, a motion for rein-
statement of the Cases case on appeal was denied March 11, 2005.89 There-
fore, the conflict in these decisions remains.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is almost pure folly to try and predict the outcome if the PIP set-off
conflict between the District Courts of Appeal decisions reaches the Supreme
Court of Florida. Yet, perhaps in this instance, the answer rests in a plain
reading of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law.
Subsections (1) and (2) of section 627.737 of the Florida Statutes pro-
scribe that if an injured plaintiff has obtained the required PIP coverage, the
injured plaintiff may only sue the at-fault defendant for additional damages,
including non-economic damages, if the injured plaintiff's injuries meet the
statutory threshold for a recoverable injury.90 This is the limited tort immu-
nity provision that insulates at-fault defendants.9 However, the Florida Mo-
tor Vehicle No-Fault law goes on to provide, in subsection (4) of section
627.733 of the Florida Statutes:
An owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is re-
quired by this section who fails to have such security in effect at
the time of an accident shall have no immunity from tort liability,
but shall be personally liable for the payment of benefits under s.
627.736. With respect to such benefits, such an owner shall have
all of the rights and obligations of an insurer under [the No-Fault
Law] .92
This provision of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law seems to
hold the key to resolving the conflict between the District Courts of Appeal
decisions on the PIP set-off issue. The Second District Court of Appeal in
Farley v. Gateway Insurance Co., stated that subsection (4) of section
627.733 of the Florida Statutes did not render an injured but PIP uninsured
plaintiff a self-insurer because an insurer can only be someone who is "in the
business of selling insurance. '93 However, this statutory provision clearly
88. Id.
89. Gray v. Cases, No. SC04-1579 (Fla. Mar. 11, 2005) (order denying motion for rein-
statement).
90. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(l)-(2) (2004).
91. Id.
92. § 627.733(4) (emphasis added).
93. 302 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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mandates that the automobile owner who fails to purchase PIP insurance
takes on the rights and obligations of an insurer.94 The trick is to figure out
what the Florida legislature meant by this statutory provision.95
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to identify the purpose
and intention of the legislature in creating the statute, in order to effectuate
that intention.96 The court in Farley held that the purpose of "the act was
... to broaden insurance coverage while at the same time reasonably limit-
ing the amount of damages which could be claimed. 97
Perhaps the answer to the PIP set-off issue resides in a simple reading
of the exact language of subsection (4) of section 627.733 of the Florida
Statutes.98 This statutory provision states that it covers the "owner of a mo-
tor vehicle."99 The statute goes on to say that an owner of a motor vehicle
can lose the limited tort immunity provided by the PIP law if that vehicle
owner fails to carry PIP insurance."°° Applying this section to the injured
plaintiff makes no sense because limited tort immunity does not apply to an
injured plaintiff, but rather to an at-fault defendant.)' Moreover, the remain-
ing part of this statutory provision, which bestows on the PIP uninsured de-
fendant the rights and obligations of an insurer, also seems to logically fol-
low.1 2 Under this interpretation of section 627.733(4), if the at-fault defen-
dant fails to purchase PIP insurance coverage, then the limited tort immunity
provided for in the statute shall not apply.10 3 Consequently, the question is
not whether the injured plaintiff carries PIP insurance, but whether the at-
fault defendant has purchased PIP insurance that makes a difference. There-
fore, when an injured but PIP uninsured plaintiff sustains an injury that does
not meet the statutory threshold, the at-fault defendant is not liable to the
uninsured injured plaintiff for the amount of damages covered by PIP insur-
ance, if the at-fault defendant has purchased PIP coverage for his own motor
vehicle.' 4 On the other hand, if the at-fault defendant has not purchased PIP
insurance coverage for his own motor vehicle, then the at-fault defendant
loses the limited immunity provided for in the statute.0 5 In turn, the at-fault
94. Id.
95. See Deason v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 705 So. 2d 1374, 1375 (Fla. 1998).
96. Id. (citing State v. Nunez, 368 So. 2d 422, 423-24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
97. Farley, 302 So. 2d at 179.
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defendant will be liable for any and all damages sustained by the injured
plaintiff, without regard to whether the injured plaintiff has or has not pur-
chased PIP insurance.1
0 6
Approaching the interpretation of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault
Law from this angle eliminates the need to address the PIP set-off issue be-
cause it is not a question of set-off, but a question of the application of the
limited tort immunity to at-fault defendants. The injured but PIP uninsured
plaintiff faces other penalties for failing to carry PIP insurance.'07 Such fail-
ure is not relevant to whether or how much an at-fault defendant has to
pay.'08 Trying to connect the two issues has led to this conflict of appellate
court decisions."° Perhaps, the Supreme Court of Florida can avoid the PIP
set-off issue by separating, rather than connecting, the rights and obligations
of the injured plaintiff and the at-fault defendant. At least, it may be a better
approach than torturing the language of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault
law to sanction or deny the set-off of the amount of PIP benefits against an
injured but PIP uninsured plaintiff.
Will the Supreme Court of Florida ever accept the task of resolving the
conflict of the appellate decisions in this matter? Probably not! The Florida
Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law is scheduled to be sunset on October 1, 2007. " 0
Consequently, the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law may end, along with
this conflict, before the Supreme Court gets a chance to decide the issue.
Until then, Florida car owners, drivers, and insurance companies need to pay




109. See, e.g., Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Cases v. Gray, 894 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Jedlicka v. Proctor,
724 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Stephens v. Renard, 487 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Reynolds v. Life Ins. Co., 399 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Erie Ins. Co. v. Bushy, 394 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
110. Act effective July 11, 2003, ch. 2003-411, § 19, 2003 Fla. Laws 3816, 3858. The
2003 Laws of Florida provides:
(1) Effective October 1, 2007, sections 627.730, 627.731, 627.732, 627.733,
627.734, 627.736, 627.737, 627.739, 627.7401, 627.7403, and 627.7405, Florida
Statutes, constituting the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, are repealed, unless
reenacted by the Legislature during the 2006 Regular Session and such reenactment
becomes law to take effect for policies issued or renewed on or after October 1,
2006.
(2) Insurers are authorized to provide, in all policies issued or renewed after Octo-
ber 1, 2006, that such policies may terminate on or after October 1, 2007, as pro-
vided in subsection (1).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey maps out the key developments in the law governing
public employment in Florida during 2004-05. Part II on hiring, privatiza-
tion, screening, ethics, nepotism, and crime looks at such issues as back-
ground checks on applicants for employment and medical screening for HIV
and genetic predisposition to certain illnesses. Privatization deals with the
controversial process by which governmental functions are assumed by pri-
vate entities in an effort to save money. Ethical issues may arise, for exam-
ple, when a public official acquires a personal stake in city contracts. Nepo-
tism is the practice of hiring relatives, which is generally against the law in
Florida's public sector.
Part III on terms of employment explores a wide array of legal issues
dealing with hours and wages, public employee pension plans, health insur-
ance, the Family Medical Leave Act, drug testing, employee privacy, defa-
mation, workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, and smoking
in the workplace.
Part IV on employment discrimination is subdivided into constitu-
tional challenges to workplace discrimination under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and statutory claims stemming largely from federal statutes
outlawing discrimination on grounds of race, sex, national origin, religion,
age, and disability.
Finally, Part V on arbitration, collective bargaining, and just cause
takes a quick look at the role played by unions in the life of Florida's public
sector.
II. HIRING, PRIVATIZATION, SCREENING, ETHICS, NEPOTISM, AND CRIME
A. Background Checks: Genetic and HIV Screening
Employers owe a duty to conduct background checks on applicants for
employment if they are to avoid liability for the emerging tort of negligent
hiring. For example, under this tort, third parties sue an employer for failing
to discover an employee's previous history of violence. Before the employer
[Vol. 30:1:123
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faces liability for this tort, "the plaintiff must first establish that the employee
committed a wrongful act that caused the [plaintiffs] injury.' "[U]nlike
vicarious liability, which requires that the negligent act of the employee be
committed within the course and scope of the employment, negligent hiring
may encompass liability for negligent acts that are outside the scope of the
employment.",
2
Some local police departments have come under fire by whistleblowers
for failing to conduct adequate background checks on police applicants. One
study "found that [forty] of [sixty-seven] Hollywood, [Florida] police offi-
cers hired within the [last] decade had 'moderate to serious' problems in
their backgrounds, including arrest records, a history of abusing prisoners,
suspended driver's licenses and falsified employment applications."3
One version of negligent hiring involves an injured employee suing the
employer for failing to disclose, for instance, the violent tendencies of a co-
worker. In Florida, however, an employer may owe no duty to an employee
injured by a co-worker while the employees are off-duty.4 In one case, the
court held that a Florida supermarket owed no duty to tell its employee that a
co-worker she hired outside of work, as a day care provider, was a convicted
sex offender.5
In 2005, the National Transportation Safety Board recommended that
"the Federal Aviation Administration require commercial and small airlines
to find out if a pilot has failed a flight test before hiring him or her."6
In Florida, it is a first degree misdemeanor to disclose the results of an
HIV test or the identity of the person tested except under certain circum-
stances.7 In one case, an employee was allowed to sue her employer for
mental anguish and emotional distress after confidential HIV test results
were publicly disclosed.8 The case is also noteworthy because damages for
emotional distress ordinarily stem from a physical injury, but the court ruled
1. Anderson Trucking Serv., Inc., v. Gibson, 884 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (footnote omitted).
2. Id. at 1052 n.1 (citations omitted).
3. Jerry Berrios, Ex-chiefAgain Wins $201,100, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 26, 2005, at lB.
4. K.M. v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 895 So. 2d 1114, 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
5. Id. at 1116.
6. Ina Paiva Cordle, NTSB: Lines Should Know if Pilots Fail Tests, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 29, 2005, at 1C.
7. FLA. STAT. § 381.004(4)(d) (2004). Compare id. with Melo v. Barnett, 157 S.W.3d
596, 599 (Ky. 2005). In 2005, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that a doctor who treated
an employee for a workplace injury did not violate the employee's state law privacy rights by
disclosing his HIV-positive status to his employer because he signed a consent form authoriz-
ing the disclosure of relevant medical information. Melo, 157 S.W.3d at 599.
8. Abril v. Dep't of Corrs., 884 So. 2d 206, 207,213 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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that the harm stemming from the disclosure of confidential information can
only be "emotional in nature" in a case like this one.9
Legislative efforts at the federal level, with clock-work precision, have
yet again aimed at restricting the use of genetic screening in employment.
On February 7, 2005, the United States Senate passed a bill that prohibits
employers from relying on an individual's genetic information when making
any employment-related decisions.'0
B. Privatization
Under the leadership of Florida's Governor, Jeb Bush, Florida is at the
forefront of the movement aimed at converting formerly governmentally
performed functions into private hands. In 2005, Florida became "the first
state in the nation to fully privatize its child welfare programs.""
Florida's seemingly unstoppable push to privatize every public function
has come under heavy fire. A Supreme Court of Florida Justice has strongly
inveighed against the state's privatization of death-penalty appeals. 2 Instead
of speeding up these appeals, he said that the shoddy quality of legal work by
inexperienced private lawyers has slowed the process. 3
At times, privatization is driven by cost-saving rather than by attempts
at fixing a broken system. For example, in 2004, the Fort Lauderdale City
Commission tentatively approved a plan to completely privatize city trash
collection, a move aimed at saving nearly $890,000 per year.14
C. Ethics
While Florida's ethics law requires "government officials to publicly
disclose gifts they receive" from non-relatives, 15 state lawmakers may have
crossed the line with a bill proposed in 2005 involving disclosures by lobby-
9. Id. at 212. A happy post-script: the lab's testing produced a false positive-Abril
was, in fact, HIV-negative. Id. at 207.
10. See S. 306, 109th Cong. § 202 (2005).
11. Carol Marbin Miller, State Finishes Privatizing of Child Welfare, MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 16, 2005, at 13B. Given that Florida's "foster care system [is] often described as one of
the worst in the United States," it's hard to see how this innovative move will leave the state's
foster children worse off. Id.
12. Marc Caputo, Justice Blasts Lawyers over Death Row Appeals, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
28, 2005, at lB.
13. Id.
14. Samuel P. Nitze, City Leaders Back Big Tax Hike, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 14, 2004, at
3B.
15. Scott Andron, Gift Law Confusing, Experts Say, MLAMI HERALD, Feb. 8, 2004, at lB.
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ists. Under a proposed "booty call" amendment, lobbyists with ties to the
Florida Legislature would be forced to reveal whether they are "having a
romantic or sexual relationship with a lawmaker."'
6
D. Nepotism
Anti-nepotism laws make it unlawful for public officials to put relatives
on the public payroll. While Florida has an anti-nepotism law,'7 it is less
clear whether the law was violated when a Florida town administrator hired
his wife than when he hired his daughter as town clerk.'8 Freedom of asso-
ciation has sometimes been enlisted (usually unsuccessfully) to challenge
anti-nepotism policies adopted by public employers. 9
E. Workplace Crime
In Florida, workplace crime costs employers $27.4 billion a year.20 Al-
most 70% of all crime costs are "business related or nonresidential."'2' "Flor-
ida employers are two and a half times more likely to experience crime
losses than Florida residents. And white-collar crime accounts for 47[%] of
all business crime costs.
22
1I. TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Hours and Wages
1. Fair Labor Standards Act
New federal overtime rules (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)) took effect August 23, 2004.23 While some critics charged that the
16. Marc Caputo, The "Booty Call" Amendment: Lovemaking vs. Lawmaking, MiAMI
HERALD, May 5, 2005, at 8B.
17. FLA. STAT. § 112.3135(2)(a) (2004).
18. Amy Sherman, Family Hiring Dispute Flares, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26, 2005, at lB.
19. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 712-13 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that public employer's anti-nepotism policy was rationally related to that employer's
reasonable fear that spousal loyalty would undermine discipline and, thus, did not violate the
First Amendment right of marital association).




23. Defining and Delimitng the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified
20051
129
: Nova Law Review 30, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LAW REVIEW
new rules would cost six million American workers their overtime, police
officers, firefighters, and other public-safety officers remain unaffected.
The Class Action Fairness Act, signed February 18, 2005, by President
George W. Bush, shifting class action lawsuits filed in state courts to federal
courts, 5 will not affect § 216(b) of the FLSA, which governs collective ac-
tions alleging violations of the FLSA, the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act. 6 Under the new law, federal district courts
would exercise jurisdiction over any civil action involving more than $5 mil-
lion and in which the opposing parties are from different states.27
According to a Department of Labor Wage and Hour Opinion Letter, an
employer does not jeopardize the exempt status of in-house attorneys under §
13(a)(1) of the FLSA from overtime pay rules by insisting that they submit
biweekly timesheets that document time spent working in various "cost cen-
ters. ' 28
2. Public Employee Wages
Under federal law, employees who are called up for active duty in the
military are entitled to return to their former jobs without loss of benefits or
seniority when their service is completed 9.2  Despite this law, many soldiers
face a gap in pay while on active duty: the difference between their military
pay and their former civilian salaries. 30 To reduce this gap, a bill was intro-
duced in the 2005 Florida Legislature that will assist state National Guard
and Reserve soldiers who lose wages when they are called up for active
duty.3 I About twenty-eight percent of the Florida Guard or Reserve on active
duty formerly worked for the government as civilians.32 Even before this
proposed "Citizen Soldier" bill, the state of Florida and many local govern-
ments already paid "all or part of their Guard or Reserve workers' missed
salaries. 33 For example, "[c]ompanies and agencies such as the Broward
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541); Elaine Walker & Patrick Danner, New Rules for Overtime Start Today,
MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 23, 2004, at IA.
24. Walker & Danner, supra note 23.
25. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 4-5, 119 Stat. 4, 9-12
(2005).
26. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
27. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4.
28. Dep't of Labor Opinion Letter FLSA2005-16 (Apr. 11, 2005).
29. See 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a) (2000).






Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss1/1
2004-05 SURVEY OF FLORIDA EMPLOYMENT LAW
County Sheriffs Office" go above and beyond federal standards by paying
reservists "half of the difference between what the military pays them and
what [the employer] ordinarily pays them., 34
On March 10, 2005, the Department of Labor (DOL) published its final
rule requiring private and government employers to notify workers who
might leave their jobs to serve in the military of their right to return to their
jobs at the same pay, benefits, and status, under the Uniformed Services Em-
ployment and Reemployment Rights Act.35
To help state agencies retain young lawyers, Florida lawmakers are
weighing a bill aimed at helping attorneys in paying off their student loans.36
The law "would allow the state to repay up to $44,000 on student loans for
assistant public defenders, assistant state attorneys, assistant attorneys gen-
eral and assistant statewide prosecutors. 37 Without this law, government
lawyers, who make an average of $65,000 a year, feel pressed by looming
student loans to find work in private practice where the median income of
lawyers is $120,000.38
Labor negotiations over public employee pay also made news in the last
year.39 A 2004 employment contract between the Broward Teachers Union
and the school district grants the county's 15,000 teachers an average of a
four percent raise at a cost of $35 million.' In addition, the contract includes
monetary incentives for teachers to earn advanced degrees.4'
In 2004, the First District Court of Appeal ruled that a city's legislative
imposition of a pay freeze contained in an earlier contract, after impasse over
a new contract, did not amount to an unfair labor practice.42 The court found
that the old contract made clear that if no new collective bargaining agree-
ment was reached, then salaries would remain at current levels until a new
contract was signed.43 For this reason, the court concluded that the employ-
ees had no expectation of wage increases once the old contract expired. 44
34. See Dalia Naamani-Goldman, Military Praises Employers, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 29,
2005, at 5B.
35. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002 (2005).
36. Sherri M. Owens, State Looks at Helping Its Lawyers: Big College Loans Often
Force Attorneys into Private Practice, ORLANDO SENT., Apr. 17, 2005, at B 1.
37. Id.
38. Id.




42. City of Winter Springs v. Winter Springs Prof 1, 885 So. 2d 494, 498-99 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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3. State Minimum Wage
On May 2, 2005, as a result of a statewide voter initiative, Florida's
minimum wage rose to $6.15 hourly, while servers and other workers sala-
ries who receive tips went from $2.13 to $3.13 an hour.45 As part of article X
of the state constitution, Florida's minimum wage "will be indexed to the
inflation rate in the future. 4 6 New rates will go into effect each January 1.47
While thirteen other states have minimum wages set above the national stan-
dard, such a rate hike will have more impact in a state like Florida, which is
"more dependent on low-paying jobs" than most states.48 Among other fea-
tures, the Amendment: bars Florida employers from discriminating in any
manner or retaliating against any person for exercising rights it protects; al-
lows employees to sue any employer who refuses to pay minimum wage; and
permits Florida's Attorney General to file a civil action to enforce the law.49
Moreover, a full range of remedies are recoverable by prevailing employees,
with a four year statute of limitations for non-willful violations and five
years for willful violations.5°
B. Public Employee Pension Plans
Florida's state pension plan covers 225,000 retirees and 650,000 current
employees in public employment. 5' After the stock market bubble burst in
2001 and the public pension fund ended up with worthless Enron stock, the
fund filed a landmark lawsuit against its stock investment manager, Alliance
Capital Management, claiming "breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud and negligence. '52 The fund claimed Alliance invested in Enron, even
after the company's accounting irregularities were publicly called into ques-
tion.53
In April 2005, a jury did not find found Alliance liable for $281 million
in Enron-related investment losses suffered by Florida's public pension




49. Fla. SB 2638 (2005) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24).
50. Id.
51. Sophia Pearson, Pension Fund Loses Legal Battle, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 19, 2005, at
1C.
52. Id.
53. Harriet Johnson Brackey, Enron Among Various Targets, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 9,
2005, at IC [hereinafter Brackey I].
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fund.54 Jurors concluded Alliance "didn't breach its contract with the Florida
State Board of Administration and wasn't negligent in supervising the fund's
account. 5 ' The fund was also ordered to pay Alliance $1.1 million in unpaid
management fees.56 Despite this legal setback, "the state pension system has
reaped $40 million in settlement payments during the last two years [as part
of] class-action securities lawsuits."57
Merrill Lynch, Florida's largest pension advisor, acts as consultant for
ninety-three public pension funds from Jacksonville to Hallandale Beach.5
North Miami Beach is looking to hold Merrill Lynch accountable as pension
consultant for the dismal growth-"only 0.9% on average in each of the last
five years"-of its police and general employee pension fund. 59 By contrast,
nationwide, public pension funds grew 4.1% a year.6° Significantly, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission has launched an investigation into con-
sultants who advise pension boards and fail to reveal conflicts of interest.
6
'
To prevent abuses, "[t]he SEC is calling for pension consultants to separate
their consulting activities from other businesses, to increase disclosure and
put policies in place to prevent conflicts of interest."
62
In a similar vein, "[t]he city of Coral Gables, [Florida] is suing its for-
mer [public] pension fund advisor, UBS Paine Webber, for over $25 million
in losses" of fund assets.63
Finally, with regard to public pension developments, proposed changes
for the city of Hollywood, Florida's 220 firefighters include: increasing em-
ployee pension contributions from 7% to 8% per year; permitting employees
to retire after twenty-three years of service rather than twenty-five years; and
changing the formula for calculating pension benefits.'
54. Pearson, supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Brackey I, supra note 53.
58. Harriet Johnson Brackey, SEC Targets Pension Board Advisors, MIAMI HERALD,
May 17, 2005, at 1C [hereinafter Brackey II].
59. Harriet Johnson Brackey, Florida Pension Funds Report Poor Results, MIAMi
HERALD, May 17, 2005, at 4C [hereinafter Brackey III].
60. Id.
61. Brackey II, supra note 58.
62. Id.
63. Brackey III, supra note 59.
64. Jerry Berrios, 3-Year Firefighter Pact Approved, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 30, 2004, at
7B [hereinafter Berrios I].
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C. Health Insurance
Under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(COBRA), employers who already offer health benefits owe a duty to offer
continued coverage to most former employees and their dependents for
eighteen to thirty-six months or until coverage under another plan begins.65
Final COBRA notice regulations issued by the DOL went into effect in 2005
and provided an updated sample COBRA notice for use by employers of
single-employer group health plans. 66 If an employer adopts the model no-
tices, the DOL will consider the employer to be in good faith compliance
with its rules.67
As a complement to COBRA, under the Veterans Benefits Improvement
Act of 2004, effective December 10, 2004, employees absent from the work-
place because of military service are entitled to twenty-four months of con-
tinuation coverage in the employer's health insurance plan.68
As of January 1, 2005, Blue Cross of Florida, the largest health plan in
the state with 3.5 million members, will no longer cover weight-loss sur-
gery.69 "Doctors in Florida submitted 2522 requests for weight-loss surgery
coverage to Blue Cross in 2004, up from 1500 a year earlier., 70 Critics sus-
pect that Blue Cross of Florida dropped coverage because of the $25,000
surgery cost.
71
Locally, Fort Lauderdale's police union has made major changes in its
self-insured health insurance plan in the face of a financial crisis. 72 Among
the numerous changes, the union fired the plan manager, raised premiums,
switched to a larger plan administrator, and borrowed money.73 While illegal
conduct was not suspected, the plan has run up about $1.17 million in unpaid
65. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, §
1001, 100 Stat. 82, 224 (1986). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that penal-
ties under COBRA may be recoverable only by plan participants, not by plan beneficiaries.
Wright v. Hanna Steel Corp., 270 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11 th Cir. 2001).
66. Health Care Continuation Coverage, 69 Fed. Reg. 30,084, 30,106 (May 26, 2004) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590).
67. Id. at 30,091.
68. 38 U.S.C.A. § 4317(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2005).
69. Lisa Girion, Insurers Weigh Surgery Risks, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at C .
70. Id.
71. Id.
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doctors' bills and quarterly financial reports, required by contract to be filed
with the city, were in arrears until August 2004.7"
Under a 2004 contract between the city of Fort Lauderdale and its po-
lice and fire unions, "the city will increase its monthly contributions toward
employee health insurance CoStS. '7 5 By contrast, under the city of Holly-
wood's three-year contract with its fire union, "[f]irefighters will . . . con-
tribute more money toward their healthcare costs. '76
Finally, a state court ruled in 2004 that a Florida labor union's claim
that a school board committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally chang-
ing terms in its health insurance plan was wholly a question for the Public
Employees Relations Committee and was not suitable for arbitration under
the board's collective bargaining agreement. 7
D. Family Medical Leave Act
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), all eligible state and
local government employees are entitled to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in
a twelve-month period: 1) for birth or adoption of a child or placement of a
foster child; 2) to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health
condition; or 3) for the employee's own serious health condition. 78 To be
eligible for FMLA leave, the employee must: 1) have worked 1250 hours in
the twelve months leading up to the leave request;79 2) have worked for the
current employer for at least twelve total months;80 and 3) have worked at a
worksite that has fifty or more employees within a seventy-five mile radius
of the worksite.8'
In Walker v. Elmore County Board of Education,82 the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that a first year teacher was not eligible for FMLA leave at the time
requested leave was to begin.83 This was because she had not worked for the
74. Id.
75. Samuel P. Nitze, Police, Firefighters OK Deals, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 2004, at 6B.
76. Berrios I, supra note 64.
77. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 888 So. 2d 96, 100-101
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000).
79. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (2000). It is rare that an employee's off-duty time counts as working
time toward meeting the 1250 hours of service requirement. See Rich v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
921 F. Supp. 767, 772 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
80. § 2611(2)(A)(i).
81. § 2611(2)(B)(ii).
82. 379 F.3d 1249 (1lth Cir. 2004).
83. Id. at 1253 n.9.
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school board for at least twelve months. 8' Nevertheless, even employees
who have worked fewer than twelve months may file retaliation claims under
the FMLA"
In Morrison v. Magic Carpet Aviation,86 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
FMLA's threshold requirement that an employer have fifty employees within
a seventy-five mile radius of the worksite.87 In ruling that the entity was not
the pilot's employer, the court applied the following test of an employer-
employee relationship: "1) whether or not the employment took place on the
premises of the alleged employer; 2) how much control the alleged employer
exerted on the employees; and 3) whether or not the alleged employer had
the power to fire, hire, or modify the employment condition[s]. 88
According to a DOL opinion letter, day laborers and "routine temps"
sometimes count as employees for purposes of the fifty-employee threshold
necessary for FMLA coverage.89
Like most federal labor statutes regulating the workplace, FMLA bars
employers from discriminating or retaliating against any employee for exer-
cising rights granted under the Act.90 The circuit courts, however, are in dis-
array over the proper framework for raising such suits. While the Eleventh
Circuit has adopted the burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas framework in
FMLA retaliation suits,9' the Ninth Circuit simply insists that the worker
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her exercise of FMLA rights
amounted to "a negative factor in the decision to [discharge] her. 92
Employers are unhappy with FMLA, citing, for example, the Act's
vagueness and the cost of compliance. 93 According to the Employment Pol-
84. Id. at 1253 & n.9.
85. Beffert v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, No. Civ.A.05-43, 2005 WL 906362, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. April 18, 2005).
86. 383 F.3d 1253 (11 th Cir. 2004).
87. See id. at 1234; 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii) (2000).
88. Morrison, 383 F.3d at 1255.
89. Dep't of Labor Opinion Letter FMLA2004-1-A (Apr. 5, 2004).
90. § 2615(b). Even former employees are entitled to bring retaliation suits under
FMLA. Smith v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 273 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11 th Cir. 2001).
91. Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). "[T]o establish a prima facie case
of retaliatory discharge or retaliation using the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff
must show that 1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; 2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and 3) there is a causal connection between the protected conduct and the
adverse employment action." Id. (citing Parris v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 216 F.3d 1298,
1301 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
92. Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001).
93. See Cindy Krischer Goodman, Balancing Act: Time to Care, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
20, 2005, at 1C.
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icy Foundation, a Washington, D.C. research group, "[c]ompliance with
FMLA cost employers $21 billion in 2004." 94 At one end of the spectrum
are employers who seek a tightening of the definition of a serious health
condition to one requiring at least ten days leave, more specificity over defin-
ing illnesses that qualify for FMLA leave, and curbing the use of intermittent
leave.95 At the other extreme are those advocates who propose expanding
FMLA to countenance "leave to care for a same-sex spouse, domestic part-
ner, parental in-law, sibling, or grandparent.
96
E. Drug Testing
Random drug testing, conducted without prior notice or any evidence or
suspicion of drug taking, faces strong legal challenge as an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.97 An employer's compel-
ling case for random testing is most likely to be sustained when public safety
is at stake.98 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of
random drug testing.
In Wenzel v. Bankhead,99 the plaintiff, Wenzel, worked in an adminis-
trative building in Tallahassee where no juveniles were present and the em-
ployer offered no evidence that the employee would be a safety threat even if
he were under the influence of drugs or alcohol.'0° Wenzel refused to un-
dergo random drug testing and sued his public employer over the issue.'
Although Wenzel had access to confidential juvenile information and facili-
ties, the federal district court deemed the random "suspicionless" drug testing
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, concluding that the facts did





97. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Validity, Under Federal Constitution, of
Regulations, Rules, or Statutes Requiring Random or Mass Drug Testing of Public Employees
or Persons Whose Employment Is Regulated by State, Local, or Federal Government, 86
A.L.R. FED. 420, 423 (1988) (stating that some courts have held that "the government must
have a reasonable individualized suspicion that a drug test will produce a positive result in
order to test [certain governmental] employees").
98. E.g., Smith v. Fresno Irrigation Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775, 785 (Ct. App. 1999) (con-
cluding that construction and maintenance worker's expectation of privacy was outweighed by
irrigation district's substantial safety-related grounds for random drug testing).
99. 351 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2004).
100. Id. at 1319, 1324.
101. Id. at 1317.
102. See id. at 1323-25.
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According to a DOL opinion letter, employers may insist that employ-
ees returning from FMLA leave undergo drug testing as long as all similarly
situated employees are treated the same and the testing relates to the specific
health problem that led to FMLA leave.°
3
F. Privacy
In 2004, the Homeland Security Department instituted a policy requir-
ing its employees to sign a nondisclosure agreement so restrictive that it
raises privacy concerns."° Although the policy affects only new employees,
a lawyer for a public employee union warned that it "would discourage em-
ployees from talking to the public and Congress about 'matters of public
concern."" 5 Since the policy bars "department employees from giving the
public 'sensitive but unclassified' information," public unions claim this
gives the government "unprecedented leeway to search employee homes and
personal belongings in violation of the Fourth Amendment.""
Although the federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) virtu-
ally eliminated polygraph exams in the private workplace, it still comes into
play at the intersection of public and private employment such as when pri-
vate contractors do work for a public employer.'0 7 For example, in Polkey v.
Transtecs Corp.,l08 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the EPPA did not allow a
private contractor performing work for the Department of Defense to admin-
ister lie-detector tests under the Act's "national defense" exemption.' 9 The
court made clear that this exception applies only to the federal government,
not to private contractors."0 In addition, the "ongoing investigation exemp-
tion" did not apply, the court concluded, because Polkey was never suspected
of wrongdoing."' Even though Polkey never underwent polygraph testing,
he recovered damages because under the EPPA it is unlawful for an em-
ployer to request that an employee take a polygraph exam, even if no test is
ever administered." 12
103. Dep't of Labor Opinion Letter FMLA 2004-4 (Oct. 25, 2004).
104. Brian Wingfield, Unions for Border Workers Criticize Rules on Disclosure, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2004, at A20.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Polkey v. Transtecs Corp., 404 F.3d 1264, 1268-69 (11 th Cir. 2005).
108. Id. at 1264.
109. Id. at 1268-69.
110. Id. at 1269.
111. Id. at 1270.
112. Polkey, 404 F.3d at 1267-68.
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G. Defamation
An emerging area of defamation law, known as the "invited defamation
defense," has been successfully invoked by employers when an employee
repeatedly demands that the employer spell out the grounds for discharge."1 3
In one Florida case, the court ruled that an employee's insistence that his
employer tell him why he was being dismissed constituted a complete de-
fense to defamation.
14
Employment-related defamation may arise as well when workers send
offensive e-mails to colleagues. One Florida employee was dismissed for
sending a co-worker e-mails that "included nude videos and pictures, lewd
animation, profanity and suggestive remarks.""' 5
The Supreme Court of Florida imposed a two-week suspension and a
$15,000 fine on a Broward judge for sending an anonymous e-mail to an-
other judge, taking him to task for his unfair treatment of Hispanic defen-
dants.116 The punishment for the inappropriate e-mail had been recom-
mended by the Judicial Qualifications Commission, an agency charged with
probing allegations of judicial misconduct."7
H. Workers' Compensation
In the last year, Florida courts and the Eleventh Circuit have rendered
decisions in which employees have alleged that they were the targets of re-
taliation for exercising rights under the state's workers' compensation law."8
In Borque v. Trugreen, Inc.," 9 the Eleventh Circuit ruled in a case from Flor-
ida that a workers' compensation settlement agreement that does not specifi-
cally release the employer from any retaliatory discharge claim does not bar
an employee from subsequently raising such claims. 20 "[Miere reference to
rights and benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law is insufficient to
waive a claim for retaliatory discharge."''1
113. See, e.g., Charles v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families, 30 Fla. L. Weekly D397 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2005).
114. Id. at D398.
115. Bradenton: Around Florida, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 27, 2005, at 9B.
116. Sara Olkon, E-mail Costs Judge $15,000+, MIAMI HERALD, July 8, 2005, at 1B.
117. Id.
118. See FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (2004).
119. 389 F.3d 1354 (11 th Cir. 2004).
120. Id. at 1358.
121. Id. (citing Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof'I Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983)).
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In Bruner v. GC-GW, Inc.,22 a state court broadly read Florida's work-
ers' compensation anti-retaliation provision to include protecting an em-
ployee who was dismissed for filing a workers' compensation claim against a
former employer. 2 3 In reaching this result, the court rejected the employer's
claim that it did not dismiss the employee for filing a workers' compensation
claim, but out of a good faith concern that his earlier claim would increase
the employer's workers' compensation insurance rates. 
124
In Flores v. Roof Tile Administration, Inc.,25 a Florida court ruled that
there is a right to a jury trial in a suit for retaliatory discharge under Florida's
workers' compensation law. 1
26
In Miami-Dade County v. Lovett, 127 the court determined that, under
federal law, an employer may "offset workers' compensation payments up to
the amount of [social security disability] benefits the claimant is receiving,"
but the law "prohibits the offset from decreasing the claimant's total benefit
below 80% of his monthly [average weekly wage] or 80% of his monthly
[average current earnings], which ever is greater."'' 2 8 The claimant in this
case "was injured in the line of duty" and ended up "permanently and totally
disabled."'2 9 "The [c]laimant ... receiv[ed] $265.05 per week in [social se-
curity disability] [b]enefits, and $1600.38 per month in Florida Retirement
System (FRS) in-line-of-duty disability benefits."' 3° The court ruled that the
employer correctly calculated the offset by providing the claimant with
100% of his average weekly wage.' 3 '
In 2003, the Florida Legislature amended the workers' compensation
law to require medical proof in occupational disease cases where the em-
ployment is the major contributing cause of the disease. 32 In City of Cooper
City v. Farthing,133 a former employee was denied workers' compensation
because he offered no medical evidence that the incidence of his disease in
his job was higher than in the public at large."3
122. 880 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
123. Id. at 1247-48.
124. Id. at 1250.
125. 887 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
126. Id. at 360.
127. 888 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
128. Id. at 137-38.
129. Id. at 137.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 138.
132. City of Cooper City v. Farthing, 905 So. 2d 925, 927 n.2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.151(1)(a) (2003)).
133. Id. at 925.
134. Id. at 927.
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In Lee v. Volusia County School Board, 35 workers' compensation bene-
fits were denied because the claimant made false statements, such as claim-
ing to be in pain and unable to do yard work, but surveillance videos showed
the claimant engaging in activities inconsistent with his earlier reports to
doctors and the employer's insurance carrier.
136
Under workers' compensation law, an employer who commits an inten-
tional act aimed at causing injury or death to an employee may be sued in
tort law.1 37 In Byers v. Ritz,138 dependents of a public safety officer brought a
wrongful death action against the officer's supervisors after the officer was
killed in an accident involving a backhoe taken without permission for use in
post-hurricane clean-up effort. 139 In denying the plaintiffs' claim, the court
ruled that the theft of the backhoe was not the proximate cause of the offi-
cer's death who was killed when he was hit by a tree limb that the backhoe
operator was trying to remove.'" In legal terms, the theft, while an inten-
tional act, was causally superseded by the unintentional act of the backhoe's
operator. 141
In Deere v. Sarasota County School Board,142 the claimant tripped over
toys and injured her lower back while at work as a pre-kindergarten aide. 43
Later, she was in a car accident and asked her doctor whether her com-
pensable injury (under workers' compensation) had worsened.'" The doctor
refused to examine her and the employer's claims adjuster told the claimant
"there is nothing we can do now."'' 45 When the claimant later sought work-
ers' compensation benefits, the employer raised a statute of limitations de-
fense. 46 In ruling for the claimant, the Florida court left no doubt that
"[w]here an [employer or its insurance carrier] misleads a claimant about his
or her rights or availability of workers' compensation, even unintentionally,
resulting in the claimant's failure to file a timely claim, the [employer or its
carrier] will be estopped from denying benefits."' 147
135. 890 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
136. Id. at 398-400.
137. Byers v. Ritz, 890 So. 2d 343, 346 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted).
138. Id. at 343.
139. Id. at 345.
140. Id. at 348-49.
141. Id. at 348.
142. 880 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
143. Id. at 825.
144. Id. at 825-26.
145. Id. at 826.
146. Id.
147. Deere, 880 So. 2d at 826.
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I. Unemployment Compensation
Four Florida cases in the past year have addressed one of the most
common issues to be found in the law of unemployment compensation: what
constitutes employee misconduct sufficient to render the worker ineligible
for such benefits? 48 In Rosas v. Remington Hospitality, Inc.,' 49 the court
ruled that an employee's refusal to answer questions and cooperate in a theft
investigation was "an isolated incident" that did not amount to misconduct
sufficient to foreclose unemployment benefits. 50
In Saunders v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,5' Saunders, a dia-
betic, worked in an after-school program for children.5 2 Amid a diabetic
attack at work, she went two blocks to a relative's house to inject insulin
("she did not keep [it] at the Center because she did not want the children or
clients with drug problems to have access to the insulin or the needles"). 53
In her haste, she did not inform anyone she was leaving because she believed
she would return before the children arrived at 2:30 p.m. 154 While Saunders
returned to the Center at about 2:20 p.m., four children were already there
unsupervised. 155 She was terminated for "leaving her work site without per-
mission and leaving young children unattended.' 56 Saunder's employer
contested her claim for unemployment benefits on the ground that Saunders
was let go for misconduct. 57 The court noted that "where company policies
are concerned, 'misconduct usually involves repeated violations of explicit
policies after several warnings.""' 158 Siding with Saunders, the court con-
cluded that "she did not intentionally refuse to comply with her employer's
policies or willfully and wantonly disregard her employer's interests" suffi-
cient to amount to misconduct warranting denial of unemployment bene-
fits.
159
148. See FLA. STAT. § 443.101 (2004).
149. 899 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
150. Id. at 391.
151. 888 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
152. Id. at 70.
153. Id. at 71.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Saunders, 888 So. 2d at 71.
157. See id. at 70.
158. Id. at 72 (quoting Grossman v. J.C. Penny Co. 2071, 689 So. 2d 1206, 1207 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
159. Id. at 73.
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In City of Largo v. Rodriguez,'6° an employee was dismissed for giving
untruthful testimony during a grievance proceeding conducted to assess dis-
cipline imposed on the employee.' 61 In deciding whether the former em-
ployee was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she
was dismissed for misconduct, the court reiterated that an "employee's action
must be willful, wanton, or deliberate."'' 62 In holding for the employer, the
court reasoned that dishonesty is willful misconduct sufficient to disqualify a
claimant from unemployment benefits. 
163
In Blodgett v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission,'64 an em-
ployee, out on pregnancy leave, was instructed to submit a written request
for each thirty-day leave of absence under the employer's personal leave
policy. 65 The employee failed to make the December 28, 2002, deadline
because she was unable to pick up leave forms from her doctor until January
14, 2003, when she was medically allowed to drive again."6 She was fired
for missing the deadline and she applied for unemployment compensation.
1 67
While misconduct sufficient to bar such benefits can stem from excessive
absenteeism, the court nevertheless granted the former employee unemploy-
ment benefits because she attempted to comply with her employer's policy
and she was not dishonest or malingering.' 68 What many of these cases un-
derscore is that "misconduct" that constitutes sufficient cause for discharge
may not amount to "misconduct" sufficient to bar unemployment benefits.
Florida law excludes from unemployment benefits coverage jobs desig-
nated as "major nontenured policymaking or advisory position[s], including
a position in the Senior Management Service."'169 In Brenner v. Department
of Banking & Finance,'70 a Senior Management Service employee was
deemed ineligible for unemployment benefits because, as part of the execu-
tive branch, his job duties and responsibilities were primarily policymaking
or managerial in nature.'
7
'
160. 884 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
161. Id. at 122.
162. Id. at 123 (citing Anderson v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 822 So. 2d 563, 566
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
163. Id.
164. 880 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
165. Id. at 815.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 815-16.
169. FLA. STAT. § 443.1216(4)(c)(4) (2004).
170. 892 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
171. Id. at 1130.
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Typically, if an employee resigns her position, she is rendered ineligible
for unemployment benefits. 72 In Florida Department of Revenue v. Florida
Unemployment Appeals Commission, 73 an employee signed a settlement
agreement stipulating that he would resign instead of being terminated.
74
While the settlement agreement would have been void if it was intended to
waive the employee's rights to unemployment benefits, the court sustained
the settlement agreement and disqualified the claimant from unemployment
benefits because the primary purpose of the settlement was not to waive the
employee's rights to such benefits.
75
J. Smoking
While Florida does not have a law protecting employees who smoke,
"[t]wenty-eight states and the District of Columbia protect workers who
smoke."' 176 While it is permissible in Florida for public employers to refuse
to hire smokers, 177 two other southern states have taken another route. Ala-
bama and Kentucky, for example, have passed on to state employees the cost
of smokers by raising health insurance premiums for those who smoke.
178
In the first of its kind in the private sector, Weyco, a Michigan insur-
ance benefits administrator, began testing its 200 employees for smoking in
2005.179 Employees face random testing and, if they fail, they will be dis-
missed.1 80  Such policies have fueled outrage by opponents who question
whether employers should be able to shape how employees live their lives,
even at home.'
81
172. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 872 So. 2d 376, 377
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
173. Id. at 376.
174. Id. at 377.
175. Id.
176. Kathy Barks Hoffman, To Smoke, or Not to Smoke?, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 9, 2005, at
1C.
177. E.g., City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1026, 1029 (Fla. 1995) (holding
that there was no privacy violation for the city to require job applicants to sign affidavits
avowing they have not used tobacco for a year).
178. Ariel Hart, Alabama: Trying to Limit Health Spending for State Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A26.
179. Jeremy W. Peters, Company's Smoking Ban Means Off-Hours, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2005, at C5.
180. Id.
181. Hoffman, supra note 176.
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The United States Supreme Court has ruled that public employees have
a First Amendment right to speak out on "matters of public concern.' 82 By
contrast, internal disputes bear no First Amendment weight.1 83 In Feburary
2005, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of a Los An-
geles County prosecutor that tests the line between public and private con-
cern.184  In Ceballos v. Garcetti,185 Ceballos, a deputy district attorney,
learned that a deputy sheriff might have lied about evidence to secure a
search warrant. 86 Ceballos complained about this concern in a memo to his
supervisors.87 Ceballos said he was demoted and transferred in retaliation
for his actions. 188 He sued, alleging that he was punished for speaking out on
a matter of public concern. 189 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for
Ceballos, concluding that it was crucial that public employees be able to dis-
close wrongdoing in public agencies.' 90 The United States Supreme Court's
ruling, expected by June 2006, "could affect the rights of millions of public
employees, from police, prosecutors and teachers to public hospital work-
ers.
,191
A bill introduced in the Florida Legislature in 2005, aimed at protecting
conservatives on public campuses, has some public university professors up
in arms, claiming that the law will chill free speech in the classroom and curb
their ability to discuss hot-button issues.'9 2 Although similar bills have been
filed in ten other states, Florida House Bill 837 "says students should not 'be
infringed upon by instructors who persistently introduce controversial matter
182. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)).
183. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (recognizing that general comments
about the workplace do not count as matters of public concern).
184. David G. Savage, Whistle-Blower Case Gets Justices' Attention, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2005, at A] 8.
185. 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1395 (2005).
186. Id. at 1170-71.
187. Id. at 1171.
188. Id. at 1171-72.
189. Id. at 1172.
190. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1180.
191. Savage, supra note 184.
192. Kimberly Miller, Florida Legislature: Classroom Bill Draws Fire, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 8, 2005, at 7B.
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into the classroom that has no relation to the subject of study and serves no
teaching purpose."",193 The bill does not define the terms "persistent" or
"controversial."' 94 "The bill also states that professors could not be hired,
fired, promoted or granted tenure based on their political leanings or reli-
gious beliefs."' 95
Colorado Governor Bill Owens. in 2005 pressured the University of
Colorado to dismiss a controversial professor "who wrote that some people
who worked at the World Trade Center [on 9/11] were 'little Eichmanns,'
toiling on behalf of American foreign policy just as Adolf Eichmann did on
behalf of the Holocaust."'
196
A federal judge in Tampa ruled in 2004 that the federal government
must prove that a fired University of South Florida professor actually fi-
nanced a Palestinian charity group and that the contributions were literally
used for violent attacks on Israelis. 97 The defendant alleges that the anti-
terrorism law he is charged with violating criminalizes his political speech
and renders him guilty by association.'98 The government's fifty-count rack-
eteering indictment claims the defendant transmitted money to terrorist
groups under the pretext of financing scholarly work and aiding orphans.' 99
The circuit courts are split over the proper definition of an "adverse em-
ployment action" in retaliatory discharge claims brought by public employ-
ees.200 While all courts agree, for example, that dismissals constitute an ad-
verse employment action,2°' courts disagree over whether a transfer amounts
to an adverse employment action.2 °2 In Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 3 the
Eleventh Circuit applied Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 standards
for defining an adverse employment action in a case involving a public uni-
versity professor's First Amendment retaliation claim.2°
193. Id.
194. Id.; see Fla. HB 837 (2005) (proposed FLA. STAT. §§ 1002.21, 1004.09), available at
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/ (search "Find a Bill By Number, Session 2005" for "837;"
then follow "Original Filed Version" hyperlink under "Bill Text").
195. Miller, supra note 192.
196. Kirk Johnson, University President Resigns at Colorado Amid Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2005, at A14.
197. Jay Weaver, Judge: Prove Terror Intent, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 6, 2004, at 1B.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).
201. Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2005).
202. See, e.g., id.; Hinson v. Clinch County, Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 828-29 (11 th
Cir. 2000).
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2. Equal Protection
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,205 a city put into effect an af-
firmative action plan under which thirty percent of its contracting work
would go to minority-owned businesses.2' The Supreme Court struck down
the plan, holding that the single standard of review for racial classifications
should be "strict scrutiny."2 7
In Hershell Gill Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County,2 °8
white-owned engineering firms doing contracting work for the county sued
the county over its affirmative action program, alleging an equal protection
violation. °9 While the federal district court found the program unconstitu-
tional, it awarded no compensatory or punitive damages, only nominal dam-





Damage awards recoverable under Title VII of the United States Code
are subject to taxation.1 Under the civil rights tax relief provision of the
2004 American Jobs Creation Act, however, individuals would be entitled to
a tax deduction from their gross income for attorneys' fees and court costs
paid to litigate claims of unlawful discrimination.212
In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that sums paid by a taxpayer-client to
an attorney under a contingent fee agreement count as gross income to the
client under § 6 1(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.213
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) is not precluded from suing nor is bound by an earlier
judgment in private employment discrimination litigation between employ-
205. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
206. Id. at 477-78.
207. Id. at 493, 505.
208. 333 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Ha. 2004).
209. Id. at 1310.
210. Id. at 1344.
211. Kendrick v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1994)
(citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992)).
212. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 703, 118 Stat. 1418,
1546 (2004).
213. Comm'r v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 831 (2005).
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ees and their employer.214 Thus, the EEOC was free to bring its own en-
forcement action against the employer.215
b. Sexual Harassment
Three Florida cases involving sexual harassment were decided over the
past year. In Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp.,216 the court ruled that harassing
acts, absent sexually explicit content directed at women and driven by ani-
mus against women, may constitute actionable sexual harassment.217
In EEOC v. Six L's Packing Co.,218 although settled, if the court would
have ruled it is likely that the court would have found if employees are not
fluent in English, the prudent employer should translate its harassment policy
into their language so they are "on notice" of the company's policies. 19
In Natson v. Eckerd Corp.,220 the court ruled that because the employer
had three different published versions of its sexual harassment policy, only
two of which were directed at employees, it was "for the jury to determine
which version of the policy was the one that Natson should have fol-
lowed. 22' If she can establish that she satisfied either version of the policy,




A public employee at Port Everglades recovered a $305,000 jury verdict
in 2004 in a lawsuit claiming that his federal employer created a hostile work
environment on account of his Arab ancestry. 223 The employee convinced
jurors that "he was abused, harassed and humiliated by his supervisors in
front of his peers because of his Lebanese national origin and his Arab-
American race. 224 Among other insults, the employee's supervisors made
214. See EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1294 (11th Cir. 2004).
215. Id. at 1295.
216. 887 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
217. Id. at 378 (citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988); King
v. Auto, Truck, Indus. Parts & Supply, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1998)).
218. No. 03-Cv-570-FTM-29DNF (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 26, 2004).
219. G. Thomas Harper ed., Personnel Policies: Do Your Employees Understand Your
Policies, FLA. EMPLOYMENT LAW LETrER, May 2005, at 5.
220. 885 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
221. Id. at 948-49.
222. See id. at 949.
223. Kevin Deutsch, Lebanese-American Worker Wins $305,000 in INS Suit, MIAMI
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fun of his accent and made rude remarks about his prayer rug, even though
the employee was Catholic, not Muslim.
2 5
d. Religion
In March 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a job-
training bill that would allow faith-based organizations receiving federal
funds to consider a person's religious beliefs in making employment deci-
sions.226 Under current law, religious groups that receive federal money for
job-training programs cannot discriminate on religious grounds in hiring or
firing.
227
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
On March 30, 2005, the Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. City of Jack-
son228 that disparate impact claims may be brought under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA). 229 A disparate impact claim emerges
when an employer takes an action that is neutral on its face but has the acci-
dental effect of discriminating against a protected class. 2 30
Under the City of Jackson, Mississippi's pay plan, police officers with
less than five years of service secured proportionately larger raises than those
with over five years of service.23' A group of older officers sued the city
under the ADEA for disparate impact discrimination.232 In response, the city
asserted that it enacted the pay plan not to discriminate against older officers
but to start making salaries more competitive with other police departments
in the area.233 In the language of the ADEA, the city was relying on one of
the "reasonable factors other than age," a defense which is not found in Title
VII. 234 This is so because Congress recognized that an employee's age,
unlike his race, sex, religion, etc., sometimes is relevant to his ability to per-
form certain jobs.235 This employer defense was the strongest argument re-
lied upon by courts that had rejected disparate impact claims under the
225. See id.
226. Job Training Improvement Act of 2005, H.R. 27, 109th Cong. § 129 (2005).
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
228. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
229. Id. at 1540.
230. Id. at 1544.
231. Id. at 1539.
232. Id.
233. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546.
234. Id. at 1540-41.
235. Id. at 1545.
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ADEA.236 While the Supreme Court dismissed the officers' lawsuit based on
the "reasonable factors other than age" defense; it ruled that disparate impact
claims are also allowable under the ADEA,237 while Justice Scalia, in his
concurrence, reached the same result by deferring to the EEOC's reading of
the Act.238
In Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc.,239 the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that district courts are not required to give the jury a pretext instruction
in an employment discrimination suit.
24°
3. Americans with Disabilities Act
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employers may
"discipline, discharge or deny employment" to anyone whose alcohol con-
sumption "impairs job performance or conduct" if the person is not a "quali-
fied individual with a disability." 24' For example, in one Florida case, the
court found no evidence that the employee's alcoholism permanently altered
his ability to engage in a major life activity.242 Thus, the employee was not
disabled under the ADA and could be dismissed for excessive absenteeism
stemming from his drinking.243
According to a 2004 EEOC Advisory Letter, the ADA does not require
employers to alert employees that a co-worker has a disability such as hepati-
tis C.244 Indeed, the ADA bars employers from revealing medical informa-
tion about applicants and employees.245
Under the 2004 guidelines issued by the EEOC, an employer may re-
move a worker from a food handling position if the worker is disabled by a
disease transmissible through food found on the CDC list and the odds of
spreading the disease cannot be reduced by reasonable accommodation.246
236. See id. at 1543.
237. Id. at 1546.
238. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1546-47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
239. 375 F.3d 1228 (11 th Cir. 2004).
240. Id. at 1235.
241. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I)
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, § 8.2 (1992), available at
http://www.adaportal.org/Employment/BrowseTAM-I/ChapterVIII_8-2.html.
242. Roig v. Miami Fed. Credit Union, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
243. Id.
244. ADA Does Not Permit Telling Employees Co-Worker Has Hepatitis C, EEOC Ad-
vises, 73 U.S.L.W. 2137, 2137 (2004).
245. Id.
246. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, How TO COMPLY WITH THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: A GUIDE FOR RESTAURANTS AND OTHER FOOD SERVICE EMPLOYERS,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/restaurant-guide.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
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In 2004, the EEOC issued a fact sheet providing tips on dealing with
employees with epilepsy. 47 The guide spells out: 1) when epilepsy is a dis-
ability under the ADA; 2) when employers may inquire about an employee's
epilepsy; 3) suggested reasonable accommodations; and 4) how to handle
safety concerns. 4
4. Retaliatory Discharge
In general, "[iun order to establish a prima facie retaliation case, the
plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: 1) a statutorily protected
expression; 2) an adverse employment action; and 3) a causal connection
between the participation in the protected expression and the adverse ac-
tion. '"2
49
Under an anti-retaliation provision of Florida law known as the "par-
ticipation clause," it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a
person who has "'made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. ',250 In one Florida case,
a police chief wrote a memo advising another officer about how to file a har-
assment claim.25 1 The memo did not say whether the officer's claims were of
a sexual nature, it did not name the alleged harasser, and it did not describe
the specific acts of harassment.252 After the police chief was dismissed, he
filed a retaliatory discharge claim, invoking the "participation clause" in
support of his suit.253 The court ruled that the city articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for dismissing the police chief, suggesting that he
lacked interpersonal skills and that the police chief did not show a pretext for
retaliation 4.2 " Finally, the court ruled that the police chief could not avail
himself of the "participation clause" simply because he gave another officer
the EEOC's phone number and wrote a memo on his behalf.25 5 The court
247. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT
EPILEPSY IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
http://eeoc.gov/facts/epilepsy.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
248. Id.
249. Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp., 887 So. 2d 372, 379 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (cita-
tions omitted).
250. Guess v. City of Miramar, 889 So. 2d 840, 846 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (quot-
ing EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
251. Id. at 845.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 843, 846.
254. Id. at 848.
255. Guess, 889 So. 2d at 846-47.
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made clear that the participation clause only protected acts occurring "'in
conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge with the EEOC." 256
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972257 provides that "[nlo
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination un-
der any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance. 2 58 The Supreme Court has ruled there is an implied right of action
under Title IX available to victims of sex-based discrimination.259 On March
29, 2005, the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in Jackson v. Birming-
ham Board of Education260 that Title IX also implies a private right of action
for whistleblowers' claims of retaliation over complaints. 61
In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that counties may be subject to suit
under the federal False Claims Act.262 False Claims Act suits amount to
whistleblower suits alleging retaliation over exposing governmental corrup-
263tion.
Finally, a Florida court ruled that under "public policy, employers have
an obligation of reasonable cooperation where an employee's appearance in
the court system is required."264 In other words, it is wrongful for an em-
ployee to lose unemployment benefits over a mandatory court appearance.265
V. ARBITRATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND JUST CAUSE
A. Arbitration
There is an emerging form of mandatory arbitration negotiated between
individual employees and their employers outside the setting of a collective
bargaining agreement. These kinds of arbitrations, administered under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), are binding on the parties and foreclose any
recourse to courts other than to appeal the arbitrator's decision.2" In 2001,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the FAA governs most employ-
256. Id. at 846 (quoting EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.
2000)).
257. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
258. § 1681(a).
259. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979).
260. 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
261. Id. at 1507.
262. Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 133-34 (2003).
263. See id.
264. Thomas v. Peoplease Corp., 877 So. 2d 45, 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
265. Id.
266. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).
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ment contracts except for those involving transportation employees.267 In the
past year, two Eleventh Circuit cases have addressed the FAA's exception
for transportation workers.
In Bautista v. Star Cruises,268 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the FAA's
exception for contracts of employment of seamen does not apply to cruise
ship employment contracts with arbitration clauses governed by the United
Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.269
Similarly, in Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.,27° the Eleventh Circuit ruled
that the FAA's transportation industry exemption does not include workers
who incidentally deliver goods across state lines in the course of their job.27'
In Rappa v. Island Club West Development, Inc.,272 the Florida court
addressed whether a former employee was required by contract to arbitrate
his dispute with his employer over unpaid wages.273 The court ruled that the
trial court was required, as a preliminary matter, to hold an evidentiary hear-
ing to weigh whether the employment contract's arbitration clause was un-
conscionable before assessing whether to compel arbitration.274 Under Flor
ida's Arbitration Code, three elements must be weighed: "1) whether a valid
written agreement to arbitrate exists; 2) whether an arbitrable issue exists;
and 3) whether the right to arbitration was waived. 275 In order to invalidate
an arbitration clause, a "court must find that the clause is both procedurally
and substantively unconscionable.2 76
In Corpion v. Jenne,277 the court interpreted a collective bargaining
agreement as authorizing the arbitrator to decide whether there was "just
cause" for a sheriff to demote a police officer, and that part of that authority
is the power to decide whether the violation of a department policy was seri-
ous enough to warrant demotion or justified a lesser penalty.278
267. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
268. 396 F.3d 1289 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
269. Id. at 1292.
270. 398 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2005).
271. Id. at 1290.
272. 890 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
273. ld. at 479.
274. Id. at 480.
275. Id.
276. Id. (citing Chapman v. King Motor Co. of S. Fla., 833 So. 2d 820, 821 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2002)).
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In DeSocio v. Sonic Automotive,279 a salesperson's claim that the dealer-
ship fired him for threatening to expose unlawful sales practices went to arbi-
tration. 28" The employer won and the claims were dismissed.281 But the arbi-
trator also ruled that the employer bore the cost of the arbitration because it
failed to ask for costs in the case.282 The Florida court ruled that since the
employer never notified the employee of its intent to seek attorney's fees, it
waived them.283 Under Florida law, unlike American Arbitration Association
rules, an employer must give an employee notice of intent to seek fees. 2 4
B. Collective Bargaining
Florida International University's "board of trustees declared an im-
passe in contract negotiations" with the public union representing faculty
members who have been "working without a contract since January 2003 "285
As a public university, "[w]hen an impasse is declared, an outside mediator
is brought in., 286 It is possible for the parties to reach a one-year agreement
on salary if nothing else.287 The mediator "will make recommendations to
the university's board of trustees. 288 The board is authorized "to impose a
one-year settlement without union approval.2 89
C. Just Cause
Under Florida law, the following grounds constitute just cause for dis-
missing a corrections officer: 1) "refus[ing] to truthfully answer questions
specifically relating to the performance" of a guard's duties; 2) insubordina-
tion; 3) neglect; 4) refusing "to follow lawful orders or perform officially
designated duties;" 5) "falsify[ing] reports or records;" and/or 6) "knowingly
submit[ting] inaccurate or untruthful information for or on any . . .record,
report or document.,
290
279. 894 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
280. Id. at 1065.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1065, 1067.
284. DeSocio, 894 So. 2d at 1065.






290. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-208.002 (7), (11), (13), (20) (2003).
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In Wright-Simpson v. Department of Corrections,2 9' the Florida court
ruled that the state agency "proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it
had cause to discipline [a guard] for conduct unbecoming a public employee"
and the Public Employee Relations Commission did not abuse its discretion
in upholding the guard's dismissal. 92
291. 891 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
292. Id. at 1126-27.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The suburban accountant heard scratching noises at his front door.' In
fear, he grabbed his .40-caliber handgun, opened the door, and shot the six-
teen-year-old in the back.2 He told police he thought the teenager was
armed.' In actuality, the teenager and his friend were trying to tie fishing
* J.D. Candidate 2007, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.S., Nova Southeastern University, Farquhar College of Arts and Sciences. The author
wishes to thank her family for their support and encouragement. She would also like to thank
the faculty of the Law Center, with a special thanks to Professor Debra Moss Curtis, for their
support and guidance, and the members of Nova Law Review for their hard work and dedica-
tion.
1. Deana Poole, Gun Bill Could Mean: Shoot First, Ask Later, PALM BCH. POST, Mar.
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line to door knockers as a prank.4 The accountant pled guilty to a charge of
manslaughter, "was sentenced to spend [fifty-two] weekends in the Palm
Beach County Jail and [ten] years of probation."5 He "said he thinks about
the [teenager's] death every day and regrets his action."6 This occurred in
October of 2003. 7 Had it occurred after October 1, 2005, the case would not
have been prosecuted.8 The reason: a new law that purports to codify Flor-
ida's castle doctrine, but which critics say enshrines "shoot first, ask ques-
tions later" into Florida law instead.9
On October 1, 2005, people in Florida gained the right to stand their
ground.' ° On that day, Florida's new law goes into effect, designed to pro-
tect persons and property, authorizing the use of force including deadly force
against an intruder or attacker in a dwelling, creating a presumption that a
reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm exists under certain circum-
stances, and providing immunity from criminal prosecution or civil liability
for using deadly force." No longer do those in Florida have to retreat "to the
wall" before meeting "force with force."' 2  The prospect of this looming
change has ignited gun-control advocates and gun advocates alike. 3  Will
Florida become a modem Wild West, replete with ubiquitous gunfights
played out by local Wyatt Earps and Wild Bill Hickoks, all in the name of





6. Shoot It Down Florida Bill Aims in Wrong Direction, DAYTONA NEWS-J., Mar. 25,
2005, at 04A [hereinafter Shoot It Down].
7. Poole, supra note 1.
8. Shoot It Down, supra note 6; Mary Ellen Klas, New State Law Ads Target Tourists,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 23, 2005, at 8B.
9. Shoot It Down, supra note 6.
10. See Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/laws/05laws/ch_2005-027.pdf.
11. See id. The new provision passed unanimously in the Florida Senate and 94-20 in the
Florida House of Representatives. A. Barton Hinkle, Editorial, To Some, It's No Fair Fight-
ing Back, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Apr. 29, 2005, at A15. It is variously called the "No Re-
treat" and "Stand Your Ground" law. James L. Rosica, 'No Retreat' Gives Right to Defend
Self, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, May 12, 2005, at Al.
12. Id. The phrase "retreat to the wall" describes the law in a minority of jurisdictions
that continue to adhere to the common law doctrine that precludes the defendant's right to
claim self-defense until he or she has "retreated to the wall." 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 164
(1999).
13. See Hinkle, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. David Royse, Florida Law to Let People Meet Force with Force, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2005, at 44.
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This paper examines Florida's new law. Part H briefly discusses the
theory behind justified homicide and the development of the doctrine of self-
defense. Part III follows the origins of the American doctrine of the duty to
retreat when faced with life-threatening force, as well as the eventual split
between states that require retreat and states that permit a person to stand
their ground. Part IV traces Florida law as the state developed exceptions to
the general duty to retreat, and then discusses the new law. Finally, Part V
analyzes the vastly different reactions to the new law, compares the outcry to




"A justified act is one that 'the law does not condemn, or even wel-
comes."' 16 While excuse defenses apply to specific defendants because they
exculpate these individuals for their criminal conduct due to underlying dis-
abilities and disorders, justification defenses exonerate those "who perform
ordinarily criminal conduct in special circumstances that render their behav-
ior socially acceptable."' 17 Morally, justifications and excuses are not equal.' 8
Being justified is preferable to being excused, since a person who is justified
commits an act that, in the eyes of society, was not wrong. 9 Conversely, a
person who is merely excused does commit a wrongful act; however, the
actor is not blameworthy due to underlying circumstances.2 °
Even if accepted, does the concept of justification mean the action was
right? One argument contends that "justified conduct is right rather than
merely permissible."'" If so, then the precepts of the criminal law prescribe
actions that are ideal; that is, no alternative is superior.22 Conversely, others
argue that the criminal law provides minimal standards, meaning it is possi-
ble to surpass the standards justification defenses set.23 An example is when
one who could act pursuant to the precepts of a justification defense never-
16. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 483 (3d ed. 2003)
(quoting JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 206 (3d ed. 2001)).
17. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONs 3 (1998).
18. Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 20HIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 387, 389 (2005).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 389-90.
21. SCHOPP, supra note 17, at 16.
22. Id. at 16-17.
23. Id. at 17.
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theless refrains from acting.24 Yet another argument separates the "best con-
duct" from the "morally obligatory conduct.,
25
Self-defense is a justification defense.26 It encompasses a complex area
of law and of social morality that requires a complex theory of explanation.27
Any offered theory must also account for four widely accepted limitations on
the use of defensive force: 1) "[fjorce may be used only against an unlawful
aggressor;" 2) "[t]he use of force must be strictly necessary;" 3) "[t]he
amount of force must be proportional to the force being threatened;" and 4)
"[t]he attack must be imminent."28 Thus, the theories behind self-defense
and, more generally, justification defenses are complicated and unsettled.
B. The Development of the Doctrine of Self-Defense
There is generally no dispute that deadly force may be used in self-
defense to protect oneself from death or serious bodily injury, and that the
act is justifiable in certain situations.29 Yet, this was not always the case.3°
Indeed, the doctrine of self-defense did not exist in medieval law, but slowly
evolved as a modem doctrine. 3' "From the beginning of the jurisdiction of
the king's courts over crime to the reign of Edward I. homicide could be jus-
tified only ... in cases where the homicide was committed in execution of
the law. 32 In all other cases, in other words, "homicide by misadventure,"
the defendant was not justified.33 Instead, he was convicted, his chattels
were forfeited, and he was required to get the king's pardon. 34 Since the
chancellor signed the pardon in the king's name, obtaining a pardon became
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. SCHOPP, supra note 17, at 55.
27. Id. at61.
28. Whitley Kaufman, Is There a "Right" to Self-Defense?, 23 CRIM. JUST. ETIHCS 20,
20-21 (2004).
29. Re'em Segev, Fairness, Responsibility and Self-Defense, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
383, 383-84 (2005). Less universally accepted is the moral justification for the use of defen-
sive force. Kaufman, supra note 28, at 20. "[Olne's choice of a foundational principle for
self-defense will determine one's conception of the scope and limits of permissible self-
defense, a matter that is continually in controversy." Id. However, it has been argued that
legal justification should remain distinct from moral justification. Baron, supra note 18, at
400.
30. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REv. 567, 567
(1902).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 567-68.
33. Id. at 568.
34. Id. at 569.
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a mere formality, and the chancellor soon dispensed of such formality in the
name of equity.35 Additionally, the statute 24 Henry VIII. c. 5 was enacted
and interpreted "as providing for acquittal without formal pardon., 36 This
combination of statutory change and common law court decisions trans-
formed the previously equitable defense into a legal one.37
Thus, two incarnations of self-defense exist at common law: justifiable
self-defense and excusable self-defense.38 The distinction was once clearly
recognized, but became blurred as various courts offered different interpreta-
tions.39 Indeed, "traditional common law excused some of these defendants
under the doctrine of se defendendo, [which] has proven difficult to explain
and justify."4 An important aspect of justifiable self-defense is that the in-
nocent victim who is attacked must have a "reasonable and honest belief
[that there is] imminent danger of death or grave bodily harm."'" Even if
some use of force may have been justified under the circumstances, the fact-
finder may determine that the use of force was unreasonable.42 If so, "the
defendant will not prevail. 43 What constitutes a reasonable belief remains
ambiguous. 44
Generally, there are three standards of what constitutes "reasonable." '45
The majority view objectively examines "what a 'reasonable person' or 'per-
son of ordinary firmness' would have done in the defendant's situation."46 A
few jurisdictions use a completely subjective standard of reasonableness,
thereby focusing solely on the defendant's perception and foregoing the rea-
sonable person analysis. 47 A third approach declines to expressly state
35. Beale, supra note 30, at 570.
36. Id. at 571 (citations omitted).
37. Id.
38. Monique M. Gousie, Comment, From Self-Defense to Coercion: McMaugh v.
State-Use of Battered Woman's Syndrome to Defend Wife's Involvement in Third-Party
Murder, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 453, 455 (1993).
39. See Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 194 (1876) (discussing the evolution of justifi-
able and excusable self-defense).
40. SCHOPP, supra note 17, at 88.
41. Gousie, supra note 38, at 455.
42. Seth D. DuCharme, Note, The Search for Reasonableness in Use-of-Force Cases:
Understanding the Effects of Stress on Perception and Performance, 70 FORDHAM L. REv.
2515, 2520 (2002).
43. Id.
44. John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of Reasonableness of
Criminal Defendant's Belief for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, that Physical Force Is Nec-
essary-Modern Cases, 73 A.L.R.4th 993, 996-97 (1989).
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whether an objective or subjective approach should be used, and holds "that
the determination of the defendant's reasonableness in using physical force is
for the jury as within its province as the trier of fact., 48 Thus, the law of self-
defense remains far from clear. Further complicating the matter is the so-
called duty to retreat.
III. THE ENGLISH RETREAT TO THE WALL WHILE THE AMERICANS STAND
THEIR GROUND
A. The American Aversion to Retreating
The duty to retreat derives from traditional English common law, which
sought to produce a "society of civility" and retain control of quarrels be-
tween individuals.49 In a threatening situation, one who sought to claim jus-
tifiable homicide had to prove both that he had retreated "to the wall" and
that the homicide was necessary "in order to prevent his own death or serious
[bodily] injury., 50 Indeed, so palpable was the fear that the right to defend
oneself would mutate into the right to murder that the one accused of a
homicide bore the burden of proving his innocence.5'
In the United States of America, the traditional English duty to retreat
survived in only a minority of states.52  Americans rejected such English
cowardice just as they rejected English rule; thus, a majority of Americans
gained the right to stand their ground and defend themselves as their fledg-
ling country gained its independence from England.53
A product of legal discourse, the no duty to retreat mentality spread
westward. 54 In 1876 Ohio, the "true man" ethic emerged when James W.
Erwin claimed self-defense after killing his son-in-law during a dispute over
who had possession of a shed located between their homes. 55 "[T]he de-
ceased [son-in-law], with an ax on his shoulder, approached [Erwin] in a
48. Id.
49. RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, No DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 4-5 (1991).
50. Id. at 3-4.
51. Id. at3.
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id.
54. BROWN, supra note 49, at 8. Mr. Brown traces the spread of this mentality particu-
larly through case analysis revealing Ohio's "true man" ethic, Indiana's "American mind"
theory, and Minnesota's "wild and unsettled wilderness" analysis. See generally BROWN,
supra note 49. This article's analysis similarly follows this historical journey, but includes an
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threatening manner."56 Erwin warned him not to enter and, when the son-in-
law ignored the warning and approached, fatally shot him.57 After he was
convicted of murder in the second degree, Erwin appealed his conviction.58
On appeal, Erwin claimed that the lower court erred in instructing the jury as
to the law of self-defense. 9 More specifically, Erwin argued that the court
should not have followed the doctrine of "retreating to the wall."60 The Su-
preme Court of Ohio held that:
[t]he law, out of tenderness for human life and the frailties of hu-
man nature, will not permit the taking of it to repel a mere trespass,
or even to save life, where the assault is provoked; but a true man,
who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who,
by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him
enormous bodily harm.
6 1
Thus, the court rejected the concept of a duty to retreat and instead focused
on the necessity of the act in question; that is, whether the defendant, a non-
aggressor who was attacked, acted "with the necessity of taking life to save
his own upon him.
62
In Runyan v. State,63 the Supreme Court of Indiana focused on what it
called the "American mind."'  John Runyan was convicted of manslaughter
and appealed his conviction, alleging erroneous jury instructions.65 Appar-
ently, Runyan had traveled to cast his vote in the presidential election.66 He
had an altercation with a man named John Spell, who used threatening lan-
56. Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 193 (1876).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 188.
59. Id. at 192.
60. Id. at 193-94.
61. Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199-200.
62. Id. at 200. In the case, the Attorney General argued that the rule that should be
adopted should be one that "is best calculated to protect and preserve human life." Id. The
court did not reject this rationale, but instead reasoned that the adopted rule was one that was
most likely to "prevent the occurrence of occasions for taking life," since the rule lets the
"would-be robber, murderer, ravisher, and such like, know that their lives are, in a measure, in
the hands of their intended victims." Id.
63. 57 Ind. 80 (1877).
64. Id. at 84.
65. Id. at 80, 82. The relevant portion of the instructions was: "before a man can take
life in self-defence, he must have been closely pressed by his assailant, and must have re-
treated as far as he safely or conveniently could, in good faith, with the honest intent to avoid




Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
guage.67 Later that day, Runyan borrowed an acquaintance's pistol so he
could defend himself in case he was attacked.68 At night, Runyan traveled
with some friends to get election news.69 As he leaned against the side of a
building, an assistant marshal of the town began to argue with him.7 ° The
assistant marshal then tried to push Henry Ray, Runyan's brother-in-law, out
of the crowd.7' As he turned away, Charles Pressnal rushed at Runyan and
hit him a few times.72 Runyan then drew a pistol from his coat pocket and
shot Pressnal, who was mortally wounded and later died.73
The court held that "when a person, being without fault and in a place
where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without retreating,
repel force by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of his right of self-
defence, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable."74 In so holding, the court
noted that "[t]he defendant was already standing practically against a wall. 75
The question of most import to the court was: "[D]id the defendant have
reason to believe, and did he in fact believe, that what he did was necessary
for the safety of his own life or to protect him from great bodily harm?" 76
Thus, these American courts used the age-old imagery of the defendant re-
treating to the wall not as a requisite to establish self-defense, but seemingly
rather as a justification as to why the defendant needed to use deadly force at
all.
In Minnesota, "the wild and unsettled wilderness" of the location in
which the defendant lived, along with the introduction of firearms, was used
to establish that the trial court's charge upon the subject of escape or retreat
was reversible error.77 In State v. Gardner,8 the defendant testified that he
used his gun only to save his own life.79 The Supreme Court of Minnesota
acknowledged that the case presented some of the peculiarities of "frontier
life."8 Further, the court reasoned that "[t]he doctrine of 'retreat to the wall'
had its origin before the general introduction of guns. Justice demands that





72. Runyan, 57 Ind. at 80-81.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 84.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 85.
77. State v. Gardner, 104 N.W. 971, 975-76 (Minn. 1905).
78. Id. at971.
79. ld. at 972.
80. Id. at 973.
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its application have due regard to the present general use and to the type of
firearms. 81 In doing so, the court continued the mostly western theme of no
duty to retreat.
B. Some States Still Demand Retreat
While the majority of the states embraced the no retreat philosophies of
the "true man,' '82 the "American mind, 83 and the "wild and unsettled wilder-
ness,"84 a minority of states still required a duty to retreat.85 Those states
rejected the "hip-pocket ethics of the Southwest" and chose to uphold the
"peaceful though often distasteful method of withdrawing to a place of
safety. 86
This adherence to the duty to retreat philosophy continues today in
some states.87 The Model Penal Code sides with these states and requires the
actor using deadly force to believe such force is "necessary to protect himself
against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse com-
pelled by force or threat. ' 88 Additionally, the Model Penal Code includes a
duty to retreat; that is, the actor is not justified in using deadly force if
the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force
with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of
a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by comply-
81. Id. at 975. The court went on to discuss instances when requiring retreat would make
"good sense." Gardner, 104 N.W. at 975. Drawing a distinction between firearms and a
hand-to-hand encounter with fists, clubs, or knives, the court stated that "[w]hat might be a
reasonable chance for escape in the one situation might in the other be certain death. Self-
defense has not, by statute nor by judicial opinion, been distorted, by an unreasonable re-
quirement of the duty to retreat, into self-destruction." Id.
82. Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199 (1876). The Erwin decision exemplified the
reasoning of the group of states that required no duty to retreat, but claimed they still followed
English law. Beale, supra note 30, at 576. Those states utilized the English distinction be-
tween excusable and justifiable homicide and reasoned their cases in that manner. Id.
83. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877). The Runyan decision typified the rationale of
the other group of states that required no duty to retreat before using deadly force. Beale,
supra note 30, at 576. Those states reasoned that the "conditions of the new country re-
quire[d] a different rule" than the English authority. Id.
84. Gardner, 104 N.W. at 975.
85. BROWN, supra note 49, at 5.
86. Beale, supra note 30, at 580.
87. See Douglas A. Orr, Weiand v. State, and Battered Spouse Syndrome: The Toothless
Tigress Can Now Roar, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 125, 125 (2000).
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ing with a demand that he abstain from any action that he has no
duty to take.89
Thus, the states continue to disagree about what constitutes justifiable
use of deadly force in the name of self-defense.
C. The Position of the United States Supreme Court
With the states split on the issue of whether a defendant had a duty to
retreat before claiming self-defense, the question came before the United
States Supreme Court.90 From 1893 to 1896, the Court, which today is most
remembered for its Plessy v. Ferguson91 decision, decided various cases in-
volving self-defense. 9 Although they received little scholarly attention, an
examination of these early Supreme Court self-defense cases may foster a
better understanding of the hotly contested issues involved.93
First, in Beard v. United States,94 the Court heard the case of the three
Jones brothers involved in an angry dispute with their uncle, Beard, over a
cow. 95 The cow had been given to Edward, one of the brothers, after his
mother's death.96 However, Beard took possession of the cow as a condition
to allowing Edward to live with him.97 Edward left the Beard home a few
years later, but returned with his brothers in an effort to reclaim the cow.98
The Jones brothers took a shotgun with them, but the brothers were unsuc-
cessful in their endeavor, as Beard prevented them from taking the cow and
warned them not to return unless Edward's right to possess the cow was de-
clared through legal proceedings.99 The brothers, ignoring the warning, re-
turned later that same day and again attempted to take the cow, but Mrs.
89. § 3.04(2)(b)(ii).
90. See sources cited infra notes 94, 106, 121.
91. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
92. David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases: How the United States Supreme Court
Confronted a Hanging Judge in the Nineteenth Century and Taught Some Lessons for Juris-
prudence in the Twenty-First, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 295 (2000). Kopel points out that the
Court's Plessy v. Ferguson decision, "which claimed that state-imposed racial segregation was
not intended to be insulting to blacks," sharply contrasts the self-defense string of cases "in
which the Court stood up again and again for the rights of blacks, American Indians, and other
outsiders." Id.
93. Id.
94. 158 U.S. 550 (1895).




99. Beard, 158 U.S. at 551-52.
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Beard prevented them from doing so this time.'0° Mr. Beard then returned
from an errand, carrying a shotgun he normally took with him, and joined the
group in his field, which was a distance from his dwelling.0° During this
dispute, Will Jones approached Mr. Beard in a threatening manner and, when
Jones continued toward him despite Beard's warning him to stop, Beard hit
him over the head with his gun.'02 Jones's skull was crushed, and he died.
10 3
The Court, in reviewing the case, decided that the trial court erred in in-
structing the jury that Beard did not have the right to use self-defense if he
could have retreated safely." Indeed, the Court held that "[t]he defendant
was where he had a right to be" such that if he:
did not provoke the assault and had at the time reasonable grounds
to believe and in good faith believed, that the deceased intended to
take his life or do him great bodily harm, he was not obliged to re-
treat, nor to consider whether he could safely retreat, but was enti-
tled to stand his ground and meet any attack made upon him with a
deadly weapon, in such way and with such force as, under all the
circumstances, he, at the moment, honestly believed, and had rea-
sonable grounds to believe, was necessary to save his own life or
to protect himself from great bodily injury.' 05
Thus, the United States Supreme Court seemed to endorse a no duty to
retreat philosophy, at least when the defendant was on his own premises.
However, a year later, the Court confused the issue. 10 6 In Allen v. United
States (Allen I),107 a fourteen-year-old adolescent killed an eighteen-year-old
teenager named Henson. 0 8 The facts, which were disputed, established ei-
ther that Henson and his two friends attacked Allen and his friend with
sticks, intending to kill them, or that Allen attacked Henson and Henson's
friends with a pistol.' °9
Following Allen's conviction, the Supreme Court eventually heard his
case and reversed the conviction on the grounds that the jury had been erro-
neously instructed that one who claims self-defense "must be regarded as
100. Id. at 552.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 552-53.
103. Id. at 553.
104. Beard, 158 U.S. at 563-64.
105. Id. at 564.
106. See Allen v. United States (Allen 1), 150 U.S. 551 (1893), appeal after remand, 157
U.S. 675 (1895), appeal after remand, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
107. Id.at551.
108. Id. at 552.
109. Allen v. United States (Allen II), 157 U.S. 675, 679 (1895).
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exercising the deliberation of a judge," an instruction the Court believed sub-
stituted "abstract conceptions for the actual facts of the particular case as
they appeared to the defendant at the time.""'
The Supreme Court heard Allen's case again after he was convicted for
the second time."' Again, the Court found reversible error," 2 this time be-
cause the jury instructions precluded a claim of self-defense if the sticks and
clubs used were not "deadly weapons.. 1 3 The Court reasoned that "when a
fight is actually going on sticks and clubs may become weapons of a very
deadly character."' 14 Again, the Court reversed Allen's conviction." 5
Finally, the Court heard Allen's case for a third time in 1896.116 This
time the Court affirmed the conviction." 7 In doing so, the Court upheld a
jury instruction that included language suggesting the defendant must "use
all the means in his power otherwise to save his own life or prevent the in-
tended harm, such as retreating as far as he can.""' 8 The Court distinguished
prior cases in which it held the defendant had no duty to retreat, reasoning
that those cases did not discuss a general duty to retreat instead of killing
when attacked, because in the previous cases the defendants were upon their
own property." 9 Still, the Court "blurred the bright-line 'no duty to retreat'
rule enunciated in Beard."'' 20
In 1921, the Supreme Court decided the case of Brown v. United
States. 2' Brown was convicted of murder in the second degree and the ap-
pellate court upheld the conviction. 22 The Supreme Court re-examined the
evidence, which showed that Hermes, the deceased, had assaulted Brown
twice with a knife and made threatening comments. 23 As a result, Brown
110. Allen , 150 U.S. at 551, 561.
111. See Allen 1I, 157 U.S. at 676.
112. Id. at 679.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 681.
116. Allen v. United States (Allen 111), 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
117. Id. at 502.
118. Id. at 497, 502.
119. Id. at 498.
120. Kopel, supra note 92, at 315. This case also provides an interesting historical aside.
At the trial level, the jurors were deadlocked, so the judge told them to "re-examine their
opinions" such that those favoring conviction "should consider whether the pro-acquittal
jurors might be right" and vice versa. Id. at 316. Today, judges give similar instructions to
deadlocked juries, and such an instruction is termed an "Allen charge." Id.
121. 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
122. Id. at 341.
123. Id. at 342.
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carried a pistol in his coat with him for protection. 24 When Hermes indeed
came toward him with a knife, Brown retreated to where his coat was lying,
retrieved his pistol, and fired four shots, killing Hermes who had been strik-
ing at him. 125 The essential jury instructions stated that the one assaulted is
always under a duty to retreat so long as he can do so safely.1
26
The Supreme Court declined to trace the ancient origins of retreat,
deeming it "useless" to trace the law back that far, since "[c]oncrete cases or
illustrations stated in the early law in conditions very different from the pre-
sent ... have had a tendency to ossify into specific rules without much re-
gard for reason."'' 27 Instead, the Court decided "the failure to retreat is a cir-
cumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine whether
the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical
proof of guilt.' ' 128 The decision of the Court had been that "if a man reasona-
bly believes that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm.
. .he may stand his ground" and lawfully defend himself. 29  Stating that
"[dietached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted
knife," the Court upheld the "no duty to retreat" concept.130
These Supreme Court cases epitomize the difficulty, not only of trying
to rationalize the killing of a human being in the purported defense of an-
other human being, but of fairly and justly trying the accused in a court of
law. Understanding the decisions themselves may also prove challenging
and controversial. The Supreme Court cases remain persuasive authority for
state courts that must decide issues of the common law duty to retreat in rela-
tion to self-defense.13' Some jurisdictions have embraced the concept of not
retreating. 3 2 Others remain wary, continuing their historical dislike of an
ideal that typifies the "ethics of the duelist.' 133
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Brown, 256 U.S. at 342.
127. Id. at 343.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 559 (1895)).
130. Id.
131. Kopel, supra note 92, at 325.
132. See, e.g., State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 703-04 (Tenn. 1995) (discussing the
Tennessee judiciary's adoption of the common law "no duty to retreat" rule, followed by the
Tennessee legislature's codification of the rule in 1989). Some states long supported the
concept of "no duty to retreat." See, e.g., People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341, 347 (Colo. 2000) (hold-
ing that neither historical state common law nor modem statutory law requires a non-
aggressor to "retreat to the wall").
133. Beale, supra note 30, at 577.
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D. The "Castle Doctrine" Exception
Even in jurisdictions that follow the "retreat to the wall" doctrine, ex-
ceptions exist "such as the 'castle doctrine,' which allows a person in his
own home to use deadly force in self-defense without first retreating even if
a reasonably safe means of escape exists." '34  Therefore, regardless of
whether a person is in a "duty to retreat" jurisdiction or a "stand your
ground" jurisdiction, "the law imposes no duty to retreat upon one who, free
from fault in bringing on a difficulty, is attacked at or in his or her own
dwelling or home."'35 One explanation for why the "castle doctrine" abro-
gates the necessity requirement of self-defense while in one's own home is
that "a person should not be required to face a possibly greater danger by
retreating than he would if he remained inside the home."' 36 Judge Cardozo
expressed a second rationale when he stated that
[i]t is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in
his own dwelling is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may
stand his ground and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take
to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home.'
37
The "castle doctrine," however, sometimes provides more confusion,
especially when the relative status of the parties becomes involved. 38 Juris-
dictions disagree about whether the doctrine should apply to cohabitants,
invited guests, or both.'39 For example, what happens if both the attacker and
the innocent victim live in the same home? Following the rationale of the
"castle doctrine," both parties would have an equal right to defend them-
selves against an attack, so the party forced to act in self-defense would not
receive the benefit of the "castle doctrine."' 4
134. Toler, 9 P.3d at 347.
135. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 167 (1999).
136. Stuart P. Green, Castles and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly
Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999).
137. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496,497 (N.Y. 1914).
138. Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense,
86 MARQ. L. REv. 653, 657 (2003).
139. Id. In the area of self-defense, the term "cohabitant" refers to one who has posses-
sory rights over the property, a definition that differs from the non-self-defense meaning of
"cohabitant," which generally refers to two people, who may or may not be married, living
together. Id. at 669 n.57.
140. See Orr, supra note 87, at 129. For one jurisdiction's examination of the inherent
problems in trying to determine the relative status of an aggressor and defendant, see State v.
Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 2001). That jurisdiction's inquiry led to the bright-line
rule that "[t]here is no duty to retreat from one's own home when acting in self-defense in the
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Perhaps exacerbating the confusion is the close-and often confused-
relationship between the "castle doctrine," an exception to the necessity re-
quirement of self-defense, and the use of deadly force in defense of premises,
which may be understood as an exception to the proportionality requirement
of self-defense, which requires that deadly force not be excessive in relation
to the harm threatened.' 4' The defense of premises doctrine provides that
where an aggressor is making an unlawful, felonious, or violent entry into a
dwelling or other premises, a defender who is lawfully in or around his
dwelling or other premises, may use deadly force against that intruder.14
The use of deadly force is permissible even when the defender has not been
threatened with death or serious bodily injury.'4 3 Examples of laws that pur-
port to allow the defense of premises are variously called "Shoot the Bur-
glar," "Make My Day," and "Shoot the Carjacker" laws. 44
The Model Penal Code incorporates a castle doctrine exception into its
required duty to retreat. 45 It provides that an "actor is not obliged to retreat
from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is
assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of work the ac-
tor knows it to be."' 6 The Model Penal Code traces its decision for its ad-
mittedly minority stance in adopting a duty to retreat to its decision to place
"a high value on the preservation of life," while reasoning that an actor who
kills when he knows he can safely avoid such an action has no moral claim to
exoneration. 47 As is the case with nearly all jurisdictions that adopted a duty
home, regardless of whether the aggressor is a co-resident" and the conclusion that the key
inquiry in such cases is into the reasonableness and level of use of force. Id. at 402.
141. Green, supra note 136, at 9. But see Thomas Katheder, Note, Criminal Law-Lovers
and Other Strangers: Or, When is a House a Castle?-Privilege of Non-Retreat in the Home
Held Inapplicable to Legal Co-Occupants (State v. Bobbitt, Fla. 1982), 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
465, 470 (1983) (discussing that the "castle doctrine" is the resolution of the confusion and is
the result of a merge between the duty to retreat and the defense of habitation).
142. Green, supra note 136, at 9. Note that there are cases where both doctrines would
apply. Id. at 10. One example is where an "armed intruder enters a defender's home with the
intent of committing murder or rape." Id. In such a case, both the "castle doctrine" and de-
fense of premises doctrine apply. Id.
143. Id. at2.
144. Green, supra note 136, at 4. The "Make My Day" moniker refers to Clint East-
wood's taunt to a thug in his role as Lt. "Dirty Harry" Callahan. Ted Gest, 'Make My Day'
Laws-the Impact, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 20, 1987, at 12.
145. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (Official Draft and Re-
vised Comments 1985).
146. Id.
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to retreat, the Model Penal Code likewise requires an initial aggressor to
"retreat regardless of where he is threatened."'' 48
IV. FLORIDA
A. The Old Law: Retreat
Florida's self-defense law, before the new "Stand Your Ground" law
was enacted, was a combination of statutory and common law. 149 A person
was justified in the use of deadly force in self-defense "if he or she reasona-
bly believe[d] that such force [was] necessary to prevent imminent death or
great bodily harm."'5° While the statute said nothing about a duty to retreat,
Florida common law established the duty to "retreat to the wall" when one is
attacked in a place outside of one's home.' Indeed, it had long been ac-
knowledged that "it is the duty of a party to avoid a difficulty which he has
reason to believe is imminent, if he may do so without apparently exposing
himself to death or great bodily harm."'
5 2
In Wilson v. State, 53 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the issue
of whether threats of violence by the deceased against the accused are admis-
sible at trial. 54 In deciding that such threats are admissible where the iden-
tity of the aggressor is in doubt; that is, where no direct evidence establishes
either the deceased or the accused as the assailant, the court stated it was
not unmindful that one's home is the castle of defense for himself
and his family, and that an assault upon it with an intent to injure
him, or any of them, may be met in the same way as an assault
upon himself, or any of them, and that he may meet the assailant at
148. Id.
149. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999).
150. FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2004).
151. Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1965), overruled by Weiand, 732 So. 2d
1044.
152. Danford v. State, 43 So. 593, 596 (Fla. 1907). In the case, Mr. Danford argued that
the correct law was that a person had no duty to retreat so long as he was where he had a right
to be, was not engaged in an "unlawful enterprise," and was not the aggressor in combat. Id.
The deceased's brother had previously attempted to use a gun on Danford. Id. The court
found that Danford took his gun, stood in his field, which was near the public road, and spoke
first to the boys warning them to halt, then immediately advanced toward the fence and fired
at them. Id. at 597. The court held that Danford was the aggressor, and therefore, was not
able to claim self-defense. See id.
153. 11 So. 556 (Fla. 1892).
154. Id. at 558.
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the threshold, and use the necessary force for his and their protec-
tion against the threatened invasion and harm.
155
Wilson, then, hinted at a potential Florida "castle doctrine." Later, in
Pell v. State,5 6 the Supreme Court of Florida declared that the duty to retreat
must be qualified.'57 Specifically,
if a person is not the aggressor in a difficulty, and is violently as-
saulted on his own premises, he is not obliged to retreat in order to
avoid the difficulty, but may stand his ground and use such force
as may appear to him as a cautious and prudent man to be neces-
sary to save his life or to save himself from grievous bodily
harm.
158
"While Pell involved a trespasser,"'59 thirty-six years later, in Hedges v.
State, the Supreme Court of Florida held that Hedges, who had killed her
paramour, was entitled to a jury instruction that included the rule of no duty
to retreat in one's own home."'° In doing so, the court extended the applica-
tion of the "castle doctrine" to include not only trespassing attackers, but also
invitees.' 6' Thus, Florida had apparently resolved one of the intricacies of
the "castle doctrine;" namely, whether deadly force may be used justifiably
against those invited onto the premises, as well as against mere intruders. 62
However, eighteen years later, the Supreme Court of Florida was confronted
with another one of those intricacies when it heard State v. Bobbitt.1 63 In that
case, the issue was whether the "castle doctrine" extended to legal occupants
of the same home. 64 In order to decide, the court had to settle a conflict be-
tween two district courts of appeal. 65 The First District Court of Appeal, the
court of origin of the Bobbitt decision, held that the "castle doctrine" applied
even where legal co-occupants are involved, while the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held in Conner v. State166 that the "castle doctrine" does not apply
155. Id. at 561 (citations omitted).
156. 122 So. 110 (Fla. 1929).
157. Id. at 116.
158. Id.
159. Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1965), overruled by Weiand v. State, 732
So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999).
160. Id. at 825, 827.
161. See id. at 827.
162. See id.
163. 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), overruled by Weiand, 732 So. 2d 1044.
164. Id. at 724.
165. Id.
166. 361 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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"where the assailant and the victim are both legal occupants of the same
home."' 67 The court ruled in favor of the Fourth District and distinguished
Hedges, reasoning that since Hedges's paramour was merely an invitee,
when he commenced his attack upon her he lost his invitee status and be-
came, in effect, a trespasser, thereby making the "castle doctrine" applica-
ble. 6 8 Conversely, in Bobbitt, both aggressor and victim were legal occu-
pants of the same home, giving both equal rights to their "castle."' 69 Thus,
the distinction between when the "castle doctrine" applied and when the cir-
cumstances demanded an absolute duty to retreat appeared to depend upon
whether the intruder was a cotenant or invitee.7 ° Justice Overton strongly
dissented.'7 ' Baffled that the majority's opinion entitled a woman who killed
her paramour in her home to claim the benefit of the "castle doctrine" while
simultaneously denying the benefit of the "castle doctrine" to a woman who
killed her husband under similar circumstances, he proposed that the court
adopt a modified "castle doctrine" when the assailant is an invitee, cotenant,
or family member. 7 2 In an effort to acknowledge both the sanctity of human
life and the sanctity of the home, the proposed instruction would impose a
limited duty to retreat in such situations.
173
The Bobbitt decision proved problematic. As Justice Overton stated,
the decision "place[d] the wife in the same position as if the altercation had
occurred in a public place."' 174 The language of the majority opinion focused
on the fact that both husband and wife had "equal rights to be in the 'castle'
and neither had the legal right to eject the other."'' 75 A troubling hypothetical
then arises. What would happen if, for example, a nineteen-year-old daugh-
ter, who lives with her father in his home, kills him in response to an unpro-
voked attack? 76 Based upon the Bobbitt decision, the daughter should not be
able to claim the privilege of non-retreat, since the father had better rights to
the property. 177 Such a result "contravenes the intent of the decision.'
178
167. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 724.
168. Id. at 726.
169. Id.
170. Id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Bobbit, 415 So. 2d at 728.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 727. Another commentator described an abused woman's justifiable right to
defend herself from a physically abusive husband as being "no greater than that of anyone to
defend themselves in a bar fight." Orr, supra note 87, at 125.
175. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726.
176. Alan Michael Grunspan, The Florida Castle Doctrine, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1983, at 644.
177. Id. at 644-45.
178. Id. at 645. The cohabitant exception to the "castle doctrine" has been challenged as
being "based on rigid principles of property interests that have been mistakenly coupled with
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Case law continued to shape Florida's "castle doctrine" exception to the
duty to retreat. The castle itself was expanded in Redondo v. State.'79 In that
case, the court revealed less sympathy for the life of the assailant when it
held that the protected castle may include business or employment prem-
ises. 80 The Second District Court of Appeal tempered this approach when it
combined the result of Redondo with the reasoning of Bobbitt.'8' In Frazier
v. State,'82 the court agreed that the "castle doctrine" protects persons in their
place of employment as they lawfully engage in their occupation.'83 How-
ever, the twist in that case was that the attacker was a co-worker.84 There-
fore, the court reasoned, both victim and assailant had an equal and lawful
right to be in the place where their altercation occurred. 85 Frazier was not
entitled to the benefit of the "castle doctrine" instruction.
86
Florida courts declined to include automobiles under the "castle" um-
brella. 87 In Baker v. State,88 the defendant argued that he had no duty to
retreat if he was attacked in his own automobile. 89 In refusing to further
extend the "castle doctrine" exception to the duty to retreat, the court rea-
soned that the very mobility of the automobile should have provided the de-
fendant with a means of retreat from a self-defense confrontation and that "to
carve out the exception ... could seem to virtually eliminate the retreat obli-
requirements that originated in the common law defense of habitation." Carpenter, supra note
138, at 685. Carpenter identifies three legal assumptions that form the basis of this erroneous
application:
1) some type of an intrusion is required in order for an occupant to stand ground at home and
use deadly force; 2) the deadly cohabitant does in fact maintain the status of lawful possessor
throughout the deadly attack; and 3) the deadly cohabitant's lawful possession usurps the sanc-
tuary's importance to the innocent cohabitant.
Id.
179. 380 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
180. Id. at 1110-11. The court stated:
In our view, business or employment premises should enjoy the same sanctity as a home for
self defense purposes as in each instance the person attacked has a proprietary or near proprie-
tary interest in the place where he is assaulted which is cloaked with a certain privacy protec-
tion; a person ought not be required, when attacked, to flee from such hallowed ground. More-
over, our normal solicitude for the life of the attacker is somewhat dampened when he chooses
such historically protected premises on which to make his murderous assault.
Id.
181. Frazier v. State, 681 So. 2d 824, 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
182. Id. at 824.
183. Id. at 825.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Frazier, 681 So. 2d at 825.
187. See Baker v. State, 506 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
188. Id. at 1056.
189. Id. at 1059.
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gation. '" ° Unwilling to eliminate the duty to retreat, Florida continued to
wade through its convoluted "castle doctrine" until the Supreme Court of
Florida heard the case of Weiand v. State.'9'
Kathleen Weiand shot and killed her husband during a violent argument
in their apartment.'92 At trial, Weiand claimed self-defense and presented
evidence of battered spouse syndrome. 93 A jury found Weiand guilty of
second-degree murder.'94 The Supreme Court of Florida accepted the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal's certified question as to whether the court
should recede from the Bobbitt decision. 195 In overruling Bobbitt, the court
acknowledged it was joining a majority of jurisdictions that do not impose a
duty to retreat from the home when a defendant uses deadly force in self-
defense, so long as such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily
harm from a co-occupant.'96 The court reasoned that it would no longer rely
on property law and possessory rights in determining when a duty to retreat
exists, and that the decision represented sound public policy based upon
known information about the victims of domestic violence. 197 In an attempt
to curtail concerns that eliminating a duty to retreat might result in increased
violence, the court chose Justice Overton's "middle ground" approach from
Bobbitt.198 Thus, there would no longer be a "duty to retreat from the resi-
dence before resorting to deadly force against a co-occupant or invitee if
necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm, although there is a limited
duty to retreat within the residence to the extent reasonably possible."' 9
And so, it appeared that Weiand had resolved Florida's confused and
unsettled law regarding the duty to retreat and the "castle doctrine."'" More
recently, however, the issue of whether to extend the "castle doctrine" privi-
190. Id. In another automobile case, the defendant was in his car, with the motor running
and no obstacle preventing him from exiting the parking lot. Reimel v. State, 532 So. 2d 16,
17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The court held that lethal self-defense was not established
as a matter of law, since both a real necessity for taking a life and imminent danger, such that
a reasonably prudent person would fear, are both required to establish justified self-defense.
Id. at 18. Further, the defendant had a duty to retreat to the wall in order to avoid the necessity
of taking another person's life. Id.
191. 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999).
192. Id. at 1048.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1049.
195. Id. at 1046-47.
196. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1051.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1056 (citing State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. 1982) (Overton, J.,
dissenting)).
199. Id. at 1058.
200. Orr, supra note 87, at 125.
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lege to include temporary visitors or guests came before the Third District
Court of Appeal. 2°' The court declined to extend the castle doctrine privilege
that far, afraid that granting such an extension would provide visitors with
"innumerable castles" wherever the visitors were permitted to visit, which
would in turn "encourage the use of deadly force. 20° Such a scenario, the
court believed, was not what the Supreme Court of Florida had in mind when
it decided Weiand and thereby protected the value of human life.203
B. The New Law: Stand Your Ground
Although it appeared the judiciary had finally settled Florida's duty to
retreat and "castle doctrine" laws, on October 1, 2005, its decisions became
obsolete, because on that day, Florida's new "Stand Your Ground" law went
into effect.204 Premised upon the concept that law-abiding people should be
able to "protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders and
attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of
themselves and others," the common-law "castle doctrine" that "declares that
a person's home is his or her castle," the "State Constitution [that] guarantees
the right of the people to bear arms in defense of themselves," the ideal that
"persons residing in or visiting this state have a right to expect to remain
unmolested within their homes or vehicles," and that "no person or victim of
crime should be required to surrender his or her personal safety to a criminal,
nor should a person or victim be required to needlessly retreat in the face of
intrusion or attack," the new legislative material creates two new sections of
the Florida Statutes and amends two other sections.2 5
First, section 776.013 entitled "Home Protection; Use of Deadly Force;
Presumption of Fear of Death or Great Bodily Harm" is newly created.206 It
establishes that:
(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of immi-
nent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or an-
other when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause
death or great bodily harm to another if:
201. State v. James, 867 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
202. Id. at 417.
203. Id. (citing Bobbin, 415 So. 2d at 728 (Overton, J., dissenting)).
204. See Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/laws/051aws/ch 2005-027.pdf.
205. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, pmbl., 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 1.
206. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 1, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 1-2 (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. § 776.013).
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(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in
the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlaw-
fully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehi-
cle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove an-
other against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or
occupied vehicle; and
(b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to be-
lieve that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible
act was occurring or had occurred.2 °7
There are certain situations in which the presumption will not apply.
One such situation occurs if "[t]he person against whom the defensive force
is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence,
or vehicle" and there is no "injunction for protection from domestic violence
or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person. 2 °8
Another situation where the presumption will not apply is where the "per-
son[] sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the
lawful custody . . . of the person against whom the defensive force is
used. ' 2°  A third situation where the presumption will not apply is where
"[tihe person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity." 210
Finally, the presumption does not apply if "[tihe person against whom the
defensive force is used is a law enforcement officer ... who enters a dwell-
ing, residence, or vehicle in the performance of his . . . official duties. 22 '
However, the officer must have identified himself in the manner prescribed
by law, or the person using force must have known or reasonably should
have known that the person entering was a law enforcement officer. 2
Additionally, the new section establishes:
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in
any other place where he has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the
right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly
force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent
death or great bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the commis-
213





211. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 1, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 1-2 (to be codified at
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In addition, a person attempting to unlawfully enter another "person's dwell-
ing, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent
to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. ' t 4
Sections 776.012 and 776.031 of the Florida Statutes were amended.15
The former, which establishes when the use of force is justified when used in
defense of a person, now includes the phrase "and does not have a duty to
retreat, ''216 while the latter, which establishes when the use of force is justi-
fied in defense of others, now includes the sentence: "A person does not
have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to
be."'1 7 Additionally, a person may use deadly force in defense of self under
the circumstances described in the newly amended section 776.012.218 Thus,
the duty to retreat has been abrogated in Florida.
V. THE EFFECT
A. The Reaction
Even before the Florida House of Representatives passed the Florida
Senate-approved bill, opinions on the new legislation emerged.2'9 According
to the bill's sponsor, Representative Dennis Baxley, R-Ocala, the bill's pur-
pose is to give law-abiding citizens more rights, specifically the right to
"meet force with force," since having a duty to retreat is "a good way to get
shot in the back., 2 0 The bill's introduction followed an incident in North
214. Id. Interestingly, the definition of "dwelling" includes attached porches and essen-
tially anything with a roof over it, including tents. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, §
1, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 1-2 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 776.013). The definition of "resi-
dence" is "a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visit-
ing as an invited guest." Id.
215. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 2, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 3 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 776.012 (2004)); Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 3, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 3
(amending FLA. STAT. § 776.031 (2004)).
216. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 2, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 3 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 776.012 (2004)).
217. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 3, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 3 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 776.031 (2004)).
218. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 2, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 3 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 776.012 (2004)). Additionally, a person who justifiably uses force "is immune from
criminal prosecution and civil action." Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 4, 2005 Fla.
Laws 1, 3-4 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 776.032).
219. See, e.g., Fred Grimm, Legislature Goes Gangsta with "Kill Bill," MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 5, 2005, at BI; Royse, supra note 15.
220. Royse, supra note 15; Grimm, supra note 219.
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Florida, where a seventy-seven-year-old man and his wife had been living in
a mobile home beside their house, which Hurricane Ivan had damaged."'
The man fired at a burglar, killing him. 222 Once the bill passed the Senate
unanimously, 223 the uproar continued as "conservatives cheer[ed] and liberals
recoil[ed]." 2 4
Those who oppose the new law point out that Florida's law never re-
quired retreat if retreat would increase a person's chance of facing great bod-
ily harm or death.2 25 They voice concerns that the law is not age-specific or
intent-specific, so many questions arise, such as whether a sixth-grader may
justifiably retaliate against a bully or whether society can rely upon the
judgment of a person who had been drinking in a bar and says he acted be-
cause he felt threatened. 226 They say it is a "virtual license for vigilante jus-
tice," and that it would make it difficult to prosecute homicides resulting
from gang activity. 2 7
Although the law does not mention guns, legislators appeared to believe
that the underlying issue was people's feelings on gun control.228 The fact
that Marion Hammer, a National Rifle Association (NRA) lobbyist, pushed
the bill through the legislature helps support this assumption.2 Because the
law passed in Florida so emphatically, the NRA plans to ride their "big tail-
wind" and get similar laws passed across the nation. 3°
221. Rosica, supra note 11.
222. Id. Prosecutors did not file criminal charges against the North Florida man. Id.
223. Id.
224. Hinkle, supra note 11.
225. Stephen Majors, Opinions Mixed on Gun Law, BRADENTON HERALD, June 5, 2005, at
1C.
226. Shannon Colavecchio-Van Sickler, Will Deadly Force Law Open Door to Abuses?,
ST. PETE. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at IA.
227. Armed and Dangerous: NRA-Backed Gun Bill Deadly for Florida, DAYTONA NEWS-
J., Mar. 14, 2005, at 04A.
228. Stephen Majors, House Divided Over Defense Bill, BRADENTON HERALD, Apr. 5,
2005, at 2C.
229. Alan Gomez, House Passes NRA-Backed Gun Proposal; Bush to Sign, PALM BcH.
POST, Apr. 6, 2005, at I A; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Fla. Gun Law to Expand Leeway for Self-
Defense; NRA to Promote Idea in Other States, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2005, at A01 (noting
that Marion Hammer is a former NRA president).
230. Roig-Franzia, supra note 229.
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B. Concealed Carry Redux?
In 1987, Florida became the first state to streamline the process of ob-
taining a permit to carry a concealed weapon.231 The same arguments arose
then that have arisen now; namely, that the state will become a modem Wild
West.232 Interestingly, in the subsequent years, the state's violent crime rate
decreased even as the number of weapons permits increased. 3  The reason
for the decline remains unclear, although some experts claim the explanation
lies in tougher laws like the 10-20-life and three strikes laws, as well as
tougher sentencing guidelines for violent felons.234 Others credit the coun-
try's economic upswing and demographics for the nationwide decline in vio-
lent crime, which paralleled Florida's decreased rate.235 Gun advocates say
that the increased number of guns in private hands is the reason for the na-
tional decline in violent crime.236 However, gun control advocates dis-
agree.237 They point out that Massachusetts has one of the lowest rates of
violent crime in the nation and also has strict gun control laws.238 Also, even
though Florida's violent crime rate is decreasing, Florida remains one of the
most violent states in the nation.2 39 Thus, with this new law, the same lines
appear to be drawn. 240 The question then becomes whether these positions
are realistic.
While the question of whether statutes can deprive criminals of firearms
has long been debated, "the relationship between the number of guns and the
number of armed crimes" has received much recent attention.24 One argu-
ment proclaims an inverse relationship between the number of people armed
and the violent crime rate; that is, as the former increases, the latter de-
creases.242 This argument relies on criminals being inherently logical.243
231. Mark Schwed, Who's Packing Heat in Florida?, PALM BCH. POST, June 4, 2005, at
6D.
232. Jacqui Goddard, Florida Boosts Gun Rights, Igniting a Debate, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, May 10, 2005, at 2.





238. Schwed, supra note 231.
239. Id. In 2000, Florida was second only to Arizona in the rankings for the most violent
state in the country. Id. In 2003, Florida remained second, this time behind only South Caro-
lina. Roig-Franzia, supra note 229.
240. Goddard, supra note 232.
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Presumably, criminals "weigh the cost of committing a crime" and will hesi-
tate before attempting to victimize an armed individual.244 Following this
theory, thirty-three states are now "permitting law-abiding citizens to carry
concealed weapons. 245 Supporters of Florida's new law propound the same
argument.2 6
One study supported responsible ownership of guns after examining
Canadian self-defense and comparing it to American self-defense.247 An-
other study refuted the commonly invoked image of people nobly defending
their families at home when it found that defensive gun use more typically
occurred outside of the home.248 That study's results also suggested that hos-
tile gun displays designed to frighten others inside the home may be more
common than gun use in self-defense, with most hostile gun displays charac-
terized as domestic violence directed against women.2' 9 Responding to fears
that allowing defensive gun use may lead to vigilantism, another study de-
termined that defensive gun use is more often used for self-protection rather
than to punish criminals.25° While homeowners may purchase guns for self-
protection, the greater threat to those living in the home may come from
other family members inside.25'
Thus, the studies do not clearly link gun ownership and increased vio-
lent crime, and, similarly, they cannot definitively advocate for or against the
concept of defensive gun use.
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida's new law specifically abrogates a duty to retreat.252 Addition-
ally, it provides immunity from civil and criminal prosecution, and creates a
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Colavecchio-Van Sickler, supra note 226.
247. Gary A. Mauser, Armed Self-Defense: The Canadian Case, 24 J. CRIM. JUST. 393,
404 (1996) (examining the frequency with which Canadians and Americans used firearms to
protect against criminal violence and concluding that private ownership of firearms, coupled
with moderate firearms regulations, is beneficial to society and may contribute significantly to
public safety).
248. Deborah Azrael & David Hemenway, 'In the Safety of Your Own Home': Results
from a National Survey on Gun Use at Home, 50 Soc. Sci. & MED. 285, 289 (2000).
249. Id. at 290.
250. Tomislav Kovandzic et al., Defensive Gun Use: Vengeful Vigilante Imagery Versus
Reality: Results from the National Self-Defense Survey, 26 J. CRtM. JUST. 251, 258 (1998).
251. Azrael & Hemenway, supra note 248, at 289.




: Nova Law Review 30, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
FLORIDA'S NEW "STAND YOUR GROUND" LA W
presumption of fear of death or great bodily injury.253 Advocates of the new
law laud it as a measure that provides the public with a means to better pro-
tect itself, as well as sends a message to criminals that the public will, with
the full backing of this law, support anyone who chooses to stand his or her
ground.254 Opponents declare the new law "will return Florida to the days of
the Wild West-all but giving [six] million registered gun owners a license
to kill in what is already one of the most violent states in America. 2 5
The battle over this new law resurrects past arguments regarding con-
cealed carry laws,2 56 and the continuing conflict over whether that law bene-
fited or harmed Florida may foreshadow another chronic debate. The two
laws appear irrevocably linked, since some claim the "Stand Your Ground"
law will encourage more people to get concealed-carry permits, while others
declare it will lead to a reduction in violent crime. 7 While it may be too
soon to tell what effect the new law will have on the legal system, 258 it seems
it is not too early for controversy and debate.
253. See Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 4, 2005 Fla. Laws 1, 3-4 (to be codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 776.032); Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 1, 2005 Fla. Laws 1,
1-3 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 776.013).
254. Colavecchio-Van Sickler, supra note 226.
255. Suzanne Goldenberg, Florida Backs Right to Shoot, GuARDIAN, Apr. 8, 2005, at 16.
256. See Goddard, supra note 232, at 3.
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criminal act.' An individual may also be convicted of conspiracy if that per-
son "agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with another person.., to
commit any offense.",2  The issue that will be examined in this article is
whether, according to Florida law, the solicitor can be convicted of both so-
licitation and conspiracy to commit a single criminal offense, or whether
double jeopardy prohibits conviction for these two crimes.
For purposes of this article, a simple hypothetical fact pattern will help
illustrate the issue. Zack hires Hunt to murder Ken.3 On that same day at
that same time, Hunt agrees to commit the murder.4 This article will address
the specific question of whether Zack can be convicted of both solicitation
and conspiracy. Moreover, if Hunt commits the murder of Ken, can Zack be
convicted of solicitation, conspiracy, and the murder? Under previous Flor-
ida cases, individuals have been convicted of both solicitation and conspiracy
to commit one substantive offense such as murder or theft.5 The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person
shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."6 The Florida Constitution also contains a double jeopardy clause stat-
ing, "[n]o person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 7
The double jeopardy clause provides "protect[ion] against a second prosecu-
tion for the same offense after acquittal, and against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction,"8 and "protection against 'multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense' imposed in a single proceeding." 9 Accord-
ingly, both the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution pro-
hibit multiple convictions for the same act committed during a single episode
when those offenses contain identical elements.' ° The Florida Statutes re-
garding double jeopardy also contain exceptions which expand double jeop-
1. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004).
2. § 777.04(3).
3. This fact pattern is loosely based upon the case of Zacke v. State, 418 So. 2d 1118,
1120 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
4. Id.
5. See Corona v. State, 814 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Burnside
v. State, 656 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Atkinson v. State, 457 So. 2d
1063, 1063 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Zacke, 418 So. 2d at 1119.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
8. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (citing Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493,
498 (1984)).
9. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
10. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); State v. Florida, 894 So.
2d 941,945-46 (Fla. 2005).
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ardy prohibitions to grant further protections not provided by the United
States Constitution. 1
Part II of this article will take a look at the Florida Statutes and case
law regarding the crimes of solicitation and conspiracy. Part 11 of this arti-
cle will examine the Florida Statute that codifies the "same-elements test"
and the exceptions used to determine whether double jeopardy is an issue so
as to prevent multiple convictions for the same offense. 2 Part IV will exam-
ine Florida's double jeopardy analysis and its effect on solicitation and con-
spiracy. Moreover, since this is a prima facie case under Florida jurispru-
dence, Part V of this article will explore how other jurisdictions have dealt
with the question of whether a charge of solicitation and conspiracy should
merge for purposes of protecting individuals from multiple convictions
against double jeopardy. Part VI will then discuss how the Model Penal
Code deals with convictions and sentencing in regards to the inchoate crimes
of solicitation and conspiracy. Lastly, Part VII will conclude with a proposal
for the Florida legislature to adopt the Model Penal Code's approach to
criminal convictions of solicitation and conspiracy.
II. SOLICITATION AND CONSPIRACY
A. Solicitation
The basic premise of a solicitation is the "enticement" of another person
to commit a criminal offense. 3 Even if the individual who is solicited to
commit the crime never agrees to the request, the solicitor has still commit-
ted the crime of solicitation. 4 Section 777.04(2) of the Florida Statutes pro-
vides:
A person who solicits another to commit an offense prohibited by
law and in the course of such solicitation commands, encourages,
hires, or requests another person to engage in specific conduct
which would constitute such offense or an attempt to commit such
offense commits the offense of criminal solicitation, ranked for
purposes of sentencing as provided in subsection (4). 15
11. See FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b) (2004).
12. See generally Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
13. Lopez v. State, 864 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Hut-
chinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
14. Id. (citing State v. Waskin, 481 So. 2d 492, 493-94 n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
15. FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004).
2005]
185
: Nova Law Review 30, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2005
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Florida courts have stated that "[tihe crime of solicitation is completed
when the actor with intent to do so has enticed or encouraged another to
commit a crime; the crime need not be completed."'16 Furthermore, the crime
of solicitation itself need not be violent or even involve a violent crime.
17
Since the solicitation is completed by one party simply asking another to
commit a crime, no agreement is necessary by the person solicited. 18 The
question that Florida courts have seemed to evade is what happens to the
solicitation when the solicitee agrees with the solicitor and a conspiracy has
been formed?
B. Conspiracy
Florida courts explain that "'[t]he crime of conspiracy is comprised of
the mere express or implied agreement of two or more persons to commit a
criminal offense; both the agreement and an intention to commit an offense
are essential elements."' 19 Florida statutes codifying the crime of conspiracy
state that "[a] person who agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with
another person or persons to commit any offense commits the offense of
criminal conspiracy, ranked for purposes of sentencing as provided in sub-
section (4). ' '20 An individual who combines with a police officer to commit a
crime cannot be convicted of conspiracy because the officer lacks the re-
quired intent to ultimately commit the substantive offense.2 ' However, an
individual who requests a police officer to commit a crime may be convicted
of solicitation.2 E Furthermore, the object of the conspiracy for purposes of
sentencing is already factored into the guidelines providing the appropriate
punishment.23
Interestingly, a defendant in Florida has argued that a conviction for so-
licitation should merge with a conviction for conspiracy. 4 The Florida court
16. State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that
an individual can be convicted of solicitation even when the person he solicits is a police
officer); see also Waskin, 481 So. 2d at 498.
17. Lopez, 864 So. 2dat 1153.
18. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1323.
19. Corona v. State, 814 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Jim-
enez v. State, 715 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
20. § 777.04(3).
21. Johnson, 561 So. 2d at 1322-23.
22. Id. (rejecting defendant's argument that an individual cannot be convicted of solicita-
tion when the person he solicits is a police officer).
23. Crofton v. State, 491 So. 2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see also §
777.04(4).
24. See Tarawneh v. State, 562 So. 2d 770, 772 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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dismissed this argument under circumstances where merger would not apply
because the conspiracy by the defendant was between himself and his co-
defendant, and the solicitation occurred with another individual.25 However,
by the court's acknowledgment of the appellant's merger theory, it is logical
to infer that they have recognized the possibility of merger under other cir-
cumstances.6 The inchoate crimes of solicitation and conspiracy, although
appearing simple at first glance, can raise complex issues.
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall.., be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb., 27 The Florida Constitution also contains a double jeop-
ardy clause stating, "[n]o person shall .. .be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense. 2 ' The Double Jeopardy Clause provides three separate types
of protection for criminal defendants. 29  These safeguards include "pro-
tect[ion] against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,
and against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction."3 °
The third "protection against 'multiple punishments for the same offense'
imposed in a single proceeding" is the most important protection for pur-
poses of this analysis.3' Both the United States Supreme Court and the Su-
preme Court of Florida prohibit multiple convictions for the same act com-
mitted during a single episode when those offenses contain identical ele-
ments.32
25. Id. In Tarawneh, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the argument that
conviction for solicitation should merge with the conviction for conspiracy. Id. However, in
Tarawneh the husband's conviction for conspiracy was based on an agreement between the
husband and his wife to have a third party murdered. Id. The solicitation charge was based
upon the husband's attempted procurement of one Petrillo to commit the murder of the third
party. Id. The court's rejection of the merger theory was premised on the fact that the crimes
were committed at a different time with different actors. Tarawneh, 562 So. 2d at 772.
Therefore, there was no issue as to double jeopardy. Id.
26. See id.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
29. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 380-81 (1989).
30. Id. at 381.
31. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
32. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); State v. Florida, 894 So.
2d 941,945 (Fla. 2005).
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A. Blockburger and the "Same-Elements" Test
The United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States ex-
plored the issue of double jeopardy and whether an individual may be pun-
ished more than once for the same offense.33 In Blockburger the defendant
was convicted of Count II for sale of morphine, Count III for sale of mor-
phine not in the original stamped package, and Count V for selling morphine
without a written order.34 Counts m and V occurred on the same day with
the same person purchasing the morphine.35 The defendant appealed and
argued that his conviction violated his protection against double jeopardy
because the morphine was only sold to one person and this constituted a sin-
gle offense. 36 The Court rejected the petitioner's first argument because his
charges for the second and third counts "although made to the same person,
were distinct and separate sales made at different times. 37 The Court also
reasoned that the legislature had intended to punish "[e]ach of several suc-
cessive sales [as] a distinct offense. 38
The Court went on to discuss Counts III and V which included sale of
narcotics not in the original stamped package and selling any of such drugs
not pursuant to a written order.39 The question was then raised whether, dur-
ing the one sale of narcotics, the individual had "committed two offenses or
only one." 4 The Court stated that the test to determine whether two offenses
had been committed "is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not."41 The Court held that a single act may be a viola-
tion of two statutes, and the petitioner's consecutive sentences were upheld.42
The test created by Blockburger has been commonly referred to in Florida as
the "same-elements" test43 and has been codified under section 775.021(4) of
the Florida Statutes."
33. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301-02.




38. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302.
39. Id. at 303-04.
40. Id. at 304.
41. Id. (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)).
42. Id. (citing Gavieres, 220 U.S. at 342).
43. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 2001).
44. See FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4) (2004).
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B. Section 775.021(4) of the Florida Statutes
Under Florida law, the courts will examine the legislative intent to de-
termine whether multiple convictions for different crimes occurring during a
single criminal transaction can be upheld.45 When the legislative intent is not
clear, the courts will apply the "same-elements" test as set forth in Block-
burger.46 Florida has codified the Blockburger test in section 775.021(4) of
the Florida Statutes.4 7 This statute also provides several exceptions to the
"same-elements" test that enhance double jeopardy protections for individu-
als facing criminal conviction.41 Section 775.021(4)(a) of the Florida Stat-
utes provides:
Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, com-
mits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal of-
fenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced
separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may or-
der the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the
purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense re-
quires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to
the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.49
Florida cases apparently have yet to apply this test to the inchoate offenses of
solicitation and conspiracy when both occur during one criminal episode.50
However, section 775.021(4) is consistently applied in cases dealing with
double jeopardy issues.51
1. Overview of Section 775.021(4) and Exceptions: State v. Florida
In a recent case, the Supreme Court of Florida provided a helpful over-
view of how to apply the provisions of section 775.021(4) of the Florida
45. State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945 (Fla. 2005).
46. Id.
47. See § 775.021(4).
48. See § 775.021(4)(b)(1)-(3).
49. § 775.021(4)(a) (emphasis added).
50. See Corona v. State, 814 So. 2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Burnside
v. State, 656 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Atkinson v. State, 457 So. 2d
1063, 1063 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Zacke v.State, 418 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
51. See State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 944 (Fla. 2005) (finding that the conviction of
both aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer and attempted second degree murder
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Statutes." The Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Florida was faced with
the question of whether an individual can be convicted of aggravated battery
on a police officer and attempted second-degree murder with a firearm aris-
ing from a single criminal act by the defendant of firing a bullet and hitting a
police officer.53 On its face, the case appeared to be a clear cut violation of
the defendant's constitutional rights protected under the double jeopardy
clause.54 However, the court held that the defendant's conviction of at-
tempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery on a law enforcement
officer did not violate double jeopardy, and consecutive sentences under sec-
tion 775.021(4) were proper.5
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. The defendant, dur-
ing a single criminal episode, shot a police officer in the head with a hand-
gun.56 The jury came back with a verdict under Count VI as guilty of aggra-
vated battery on a law enforcement officer and guilty on Count VII for at-
tempted second-degree murder with a firearm.57 During sentencing, "defense
counsel moved to vacate the conviction on" double jeopardy grounds alleg-
ing that the convictions were for "the same exact conduct."5 8 The trial court
then withheld sentencing on Count VI but sentenced the defendant to life
imprisonment on Count VII. 59 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
per curiam and without an opinion.60 However, when the defendant asserted
post-conviction relief on double jeopardy grounds, the Fourth District re-
versed and vacated the conviction on Count VI. 6' The Supreme Court of
Florida granted de novo review of the case on a motion for post-conviction
relief.
62
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the State's contention that
attempted second-degree murder and aggravated battery on a law enforce-
ment officer contained elements distinct from one another.63 The court nar-
rowly applied the "same-elements" test and found that "[v]ictim contact is
52. Id. at 944-49.
53. Id. at 944.
54. See Lovell v. State, 882 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that
dual convictions satisfying the "same-elements" test may still violate double jeopardy protec-
tions when the offenses are "degree variants of the same core offense").
55. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 949.




60. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 944 (citing Florida v. State, 701 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)).
61. Id. (citing Florida v. State, 855 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
62. Id. at 944-45.
63. Id. at 946.
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unnecessary for attempted second-degree murder but essential to aggravated
battery, and unlike attempted second-degree murder, an act need not have
had the potential to cause death to constitute aggravated battery." 64 The
court then examined the exceptions under section 775.021(4)(b) which pro-
vides:
The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each
criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode
or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in
subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this
rule of construction are:
1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.
2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided
by statute.
3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of
which are subsumed by the greater offense.
65
Applying the exceptions provided under this statute is a complex task.66 The
Supreme Court of Florida quickly dismissed the "identical elements" excep-
tion under section 775.021(4)(b)(1), explaining that proof of attempted sec-
ond-degree murder requires the state to prove the defendant's act could have
caused death where as aggravated battery does not require this proof.
67
The court also went on to analyze the application of section
775.021(4)(b)(2) which bars a dual conviction for "[o]ffenses which are de-
grees of the same offense as provided by statute. 68 The test under this ex-
ception looks to see whether the crimes committed during the single criminal
episode are done toward the same "core offense. 69 In determining if both
crimes have the same "core offense," the court will look to see what the pri-
mary evil is of the crime that has been committed.70 If the two offenses con-
64. Id.
65. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b) (2004).
66. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 2001).
67. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 947-48.
68. § 775.021(4)(b)(2).
69. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 948. In Johnson v. State, the defendant had stolen a purse that
contained a firearm and a certain amount of cash. 597 So. 2d 798, 799 (Fla. 1992). He was
separately convicted of grand theft of cash and grand theft of a firearm. Id. The court of
appeals reversed on double jeopardy grounds because both takings occurred during one crimi-
nal taking. Id.
70. See Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J. dissenting) ("The
primary evil of aggravated battery is that it inflicts physical injury on the victim; [and that] the
primary evil of attempted homicide is that it may inflict death .... "); Lovell v. State, 882 So.
2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a conviction for first degree felony
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tain the same "primary evil," no dual conviction will withstand double jeop-
ardy protection.7' Because the "primary evil" of aggravated battery is the
infliction of bodily harm, and the "primary evil" of attempted murder is the
possibility of killing the victim, both crimes are not derived from the same
"core offense. 72 In Florida, the court followed precedent 73 and held that
aggravated battery and attempted murder were "not merely degree variants
of the same core offense, and therefore [did] not come within the [statutory]
exception."74
Next, the court analyzed the last exception to the Blockburger test as
codified under the Florida Statutes. Section 775.021(4)(b)(3) of the Florida
Statutes bars dual convictions for two separate crimes when one of the of-
fenses is the lesser offense, "the statutory elements of which are subsumed
by the greater offense. 75 However, the court in Florida made clear that this
subsection only applies "to necessarily lesser included offenses listed in
Category 1 of the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses. 76 In other words,
"necessarily lesser included offenses are those in which the elements of the
lesser offense are always subsumed within the greater, without regard to the
charging document or evidence at trial. '77 The court also discussed the dif-
ference between necessarily lesser included offenses and permissive included
offenses.78 The permissive lesser included offense is fact specific where both
crimes appear different on the face of the statute; but in this particular case,
one crime cannot be committed unless the other has been perpetrated. 79 The
court, in applying the necessarily lesser included offense exception, found
that dual convictions for aggravated battery on a police officer and attempted
second-degree murder did not violate double jeopardy protections since ag-
gravated battery is not a necessarily lesser included offense under Category 1
of the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses.8° Judging from the court's
opinion in this case, the double jeopardy protections under Florida law are
murder and aggravated manslaughter of one person violated double jeopardy because the
statutes are designed to punish the same evil of a criminal act leading to death).
71. See Johnson, 597 So. 2d at 799.
72. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 23-24 (Fla. 2001).
73. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 949 (Fla. 2005) (citing Gordon, 780 So. 2d at 23).
74. Id.
75. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(3) (2004).
76. Florida, 894 So. 2d at 947.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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narrow, and the application of section 775.021(4) of the Florida Statutes can
be cumbersome."
2. The Single Criminal Episode
Another issue important to double jeopardy analysis under Florida law
is the length of one criminal episode. When does a single criminal transac-
tion end and another begin? The court appears to have taken a very narrow
view of timing for a single criminal episode, almost insuring multiple pun-
ishments.82 The Supreme Court of Florida in Hayes v. State 3 settled con-
flicting law among the First, Third, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal.84
The question presented in Hayes was "whether a defendant may be sepa-
rately convicted of both armed robbery and grand theft of a motor vehicle
where the defendant steals various items from inside a victim's residence,
including the victim's car keys, and then proceeds outside the victim's resi-
dence to steal the victim's motor vehicle utilizing those keys. '85 After being
"convicted of armed robbery, armed burglary of a structure, and grand theft
of a motor vehicle, ' 86 Hayes appealed, arguing that because the acts stemmed
from one criminal episode, "double jeopardy prohibited [multiple] convic-
tions for both of these offenses because they are degree variants of the core
offense of theft." 87
The court in Hayes then discussed the conflict between the First District
and the Fifth District.88 In Henderson v. State,89 the First District upheld
multiple convictions for robbery and grand theft of an automobile on sub-
stantially similar facts to that of Hayes, which states that the "the robbery...
was sufficiently separated... by both time and geography." 90 The Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, in another case with facts indistinguishable from
Hayes, concluded that because the robbery and theft of the automobile oc-
curred during one continuous sequence of events and was the "product of the
same force and fear," dual convictions had to be reversed. 9' The Supreme
Court of Florida rejected the Fifth District's analysis and went on to rule that
81. See generally Florida, 894 So. 2d at 941 (Fla. 2005).
82. See Hayes v. State, 803 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2001).
83. Id. at 695.
84. Id. at 705.
85. Id. at 697.
86. Id.
87. Hayes, 803 So.2d at 698.
88. Id.
89. 778 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
90. Id. at 1047.
91. Castlebury v. State, 402 So. 2d 1231, 1231-32 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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the defendant may be convicted and consecutively sentenced to robbery and
grand theft of an automobile.92 The court established that in determining
double jeopardy issues resulting from stealing one victim's personal belong-
ings,
courts should look to whether there was a separation of time,
place, or circumstances between the initial armed robbery and the
subsequent grand theft, as those factors are objective criteria util-
ized to determine whether there are distinct and independent
criminal acts or whether there is one continuous criminal act with a
single criminal intent.9
3
The court reasoned that the defendant, Hayes, first entered the home of
the victim and robbed him of many personal items.94 This ended the rob-
bery. 95 Second, the defendant then went on to separately steal the victim's
automobile. 96 The court in Hayes recognized the criminal acts of the defen-
dant as "sufficiently separated as to time and place so as to constitute distinct
and independent criminal acts." 97 Applying the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Florida in both Florida and Hayes, a valid argument can be made
that a conviction for solicitation and conspiracy occurring at the same time,
with the same criminal object should be barred under double jeopardy analy-
sis.98
IV. APPLYING FLORIDA'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS TO SOLICITATION
AND CONSPIRACY
A. "Same-Elements" Test
To determine whether multiple convictions for solicitation and conspir-
acy arising out of one criminal episode violate a defendant's protection
against double jeopardy, the courts will first explore whether the legislature
intended separate punishments. 9 Absent clear legislative intent to allow for
multiple punishments for two separate crimes, courts will apply the Block-
92. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 704-05.




97. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 704.
98. See State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 949 (Fla. 2005); Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 704-05.
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burger test, which the Florida Legislature later codified in section
775.021(4)(a).'O° According to the Florida Statutes codification of the
Blockburger "same-elements" test, an individual may be convicted of multi-
ple crimes when "in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, [he or
she] commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal
offenses."'0 ' To determine whether an offense is separate for double jeop-
ardy purposes, each offense must contain "an element that the other does
not."'1 2 It is relatively clear that the crimes of solicitation and conspiracy
will not pass the "same-elements test" under section 775.021(4)(a) of the
Florida Statutes.'03 The crime of solicitation under the Florida Statutes pun-
ishes the individual who "commands, encourages, hires, or requests another
person" to commit a crime."°4 The crime of conspiracy punishes "[a] person
who agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with another person ... to
commit [an] offense" prohibited by law.'0 5 Clearly, the crime of solicitation
does not require the element of an "agreement" to commit the crime.' °6 Fur-
thermore, the crime of conspiracy does not require the element of one indi-
vidual encouraging or requesting the other to commit the offense.0 7 Since
solicitation and conspiracy are two separate crimes under the "same-
elements" test, which therefore does not prohibit separate convictions of
each, it is necessary to review the exceptions listed under section
775.021(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes.10 8 Multiple convictions are barred "if
the offenses meet the criteria in [any] one of the exceptions."'09
100. Id. at 19-20; see FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(a) (2004).
101. § 775.021(4)(a).
102. Id.
103. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2)-(3) (2004).
104. § 777.04(2).
105. § 777.04(3).
106. § 777.04(2); Lopez v. State, 864 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding that the crime of solicitation is complete when the solicitor asks another person to
commit a crime); see also State v. Waskin, 481 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that a solicitation is complete when one person encourages another person to commit
a crime).
107. § 777.04(3); see also Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (explaining that "the crime of solicitation need not be included in a conspiracy, which
may be brought about by the cooperative planning of participants where no one co-conspirator
requested the other to become involved").
108. § 775.021(4)(b).
109. State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945 n.2 (Fla. 2005).
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B. Identical Elements of Proof
The next issue under the analysis requires a review of the illustration
provided in the introduction of this article. Zack hires Hunt to kill Ken and
at that same time and location, Hunt agrees to commit the murder. The first
exception under section 775.021(4)(b)(1) of the Florida Statutes bars multi-
ple convictions for offenses occurring during one criminal episode that "re-
quire identical elements of proof."' 1 ° Here, the only proof needed to sustain
the charge against Zack for conspiracy would be the fact that Hunt agreed."'
Moreover, the proof needed to find Zack guilty of solicitation would be the
fact that he requested or hired Hunt to commit the murder. 12 The identical
elements of proof exception is not easy to overcome and is very similar to
the "same-elements" test; however, even if the two crimes fail to meet this
test, the other exceptions must still be analyzed." 3
C. Primary Evil and Degree Variant
The second provision under section 775.021(4)(b)(2) of the Florida
Statutes provides an exception for "[o]ffenses which are degrees of the same
offense as provided by statute."'" 4 To fulfill this exception, the defendant
must prove that the crimes committed were "'aggravated forms of the same
underlying offense distinguished only by degree factors.""' 5 The Supreme
Court of Florida in Gordon v. State used a two-step analysis to see whether
two criminal acts committed during a single criminal episode would fall
within exception two of section 775.021(4)(a) of Florida Statutes."6 The
first question is whether the two crimes constitute separate offenses under the
Blockburger "same-elements" test."7 The next inquiry is "whether the
crimes are 'degree variants' or aggravated forms of the same core of-
110. § 775.021(4)(b)(1).
111. See § 777.04(3).
112. See § 777.04(2).
113. See Lovell v. State, 882 So. 2d 1107, 1108-09 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The
court applied the identical elements of proof test to conclude that to convict for felony murder
the state need only prove that the victim died during the commission of a felony, while aggra-
vated manslaughter needs proof that the death resulted from negligently failing to get the
victim medical attention. Id. at 1109. The court ultimately found that the two crimes fell
within another exception and reversed part of the conviction. Id.
114. § 775.021(4)(b)(2).
115. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d
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fense.""' 8  As previously discussed, there is no doubt that solicitation to
commit murder and conspiracy to commit murder, are two separate crimes
under the "same-elements" test."9 For purposes of double jeopardy, the ar-
gument must now be made that solicitation to commit murder and conspiracy
to commit murder occurred during one criminal episode, and "are merely
degree variants of the [same] core offense." 120
According to Hayes, and referring to the illustration of Zack's hiring
Hunt to kill Ken, it is clear that the offenses of solicitation and conspiracy
committed by Zack both occurred during one criminal episode.' 2' As previ-
ously mentioned, Hayes examined "whether there was a separation of time,
place, or circumstances" between the two crimes to determine "whether there
are distinct and independent criminal acts or whether there is one continuous
criminal act with a single criminal intent."' 22 In the case of Zack's hiring
Hunt to commit murder, there is no separation of "time, place, or circum-
stances" between the request by Zack and the subsequent agreement by Hunt
to commit the offense.123 Furthermore, both of these acts occurred during
"one continuous criminal act with a single criminal intent." ' 24 Zack needs
only to command, encourage, hire, or request Hunt to commit a crime to
have committed solicitation. 125 At that same time, and without any further
act or intent on behalf of Zack, Hunt simply needs to agree to the scheme for
Zack to have committed not only solicitation, but conspiracy as well. 26 Hav-
ing established in this illustration that the crimes were committed during one
118. Id.
119. See id. at 20; see also FLA. STAT § 777.04(2)-(3) (2004) (stating solicitation includes
a request, or encouragement, where criminal conspiracy only requires an agreement to commit
an offense proscribed by the law).
120. Sirmons, 634 So. 2d at 154 (reversing conviction of grand theft of an automobile and
armed robbery with a weapon because both crimes are merely degree variants of the core
offense of theft and both occurred during one criminal transaction); see also State v. Florida,
894 So. 2d 941, 948-49 (Fla. 2005) (rejecting argument that aggravated battery is a degree
variant of attempted murder); Hayes v. State, 803 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 2001); Mixson v.
State, 857 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that two counts of grand
theft must be struck down because they are part of the same core offense of theft and occurred
during one criminal episode).





125. See FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004).
126. See § 777.04(2)-(3).
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criminal episode, the issue remaining to be resolved is whether solicitation
and conspiracy are "degree variants" of part of the same core offense.'27
Florida courts have used the "primary evil test" to determine whether
separate crimes are "degree variants" of the same "core offense."'128 Accord-
ing to State v. Florida, the court looks at the potential harm that the criminal
act will or may cause as a result. 129 Under this test, the "primary evil" of a
solicitation is that an individual will request, encourage, or hire another to
commit an offense with the potential that the other individual will agree,
although it is not necessary for there to be an agreement. 3 ° Furthermore, the
"primary evil" of conspiracy is the agreement between two or more people to
commit a criminal offense.13' Under this analysis, it would appear that the
solicitation would be a lesser "degree variant" of the "core offense" of con-
spiracy to commit murder because both are punishing the potential for an
agreement or actual agreement that may result in the solicitation becoming a
conspiracy.'32 The argument for double jeopardy protection of an individual
convicted of solicitation and conspiracy to commit a crime, arising during
one criminal episode, may find its chances under the "degree variant" excep-
tion in section 775.021(4)(b)(2) of the Florida Statutes.'33
D. Lesser Offense Subsumed by the Greater Offense
The most persuasive double jeopardy argument which would ultimately
bar dual convictions for a solicitation to commit murder and conspiracy to
commit murder, arising during one criminal transaction, will likely be found
in the exception listed under section 775.021(4)(b)(3) of the Florida Stat-
utes. 34 The third provision under section 775.021(4)(b) of the Florida Stat-
utes grants exception to "[o]ffenses which are lesser offenses the statutory
elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.' 35  The court in
127. See FLA. STAT § 775.021(4)(b)(2) (2004); State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 948 (Fla.
2005).
128. See, e.g., Florida, 894 So. 2d at 948-49.
129. Id. at 948-49 (finding that the primary evil of battery is intentional, nonconsensual
touching, and the primary evil of attempted second-degree murder is the potential of the de-
fendant's act to cause death).
130. See § 777.04(2); State v. Johnson, 561 So. 2d 1321, 1322-23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (stating that "solicitation is completed by one party asking another" with no agreement
or action required by the second party).
131. See § 777.04(3).
132. See § 777.04(2)-(3); Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 1994).





Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss1/1
SOLICITATION AND CONSPIRACY
Florida explained that this exception only applies "to necessarily lesser in-
cluded offenses listed in Category 1 of the Schedule of Lesser Included Of-
fenses."'136 Accordingly, a review of the Florida Standard Jury Instructions
in Criminal Cases provides that neither solicitation nor conspiracy have any
necessarily lesser included offenses listed within their jury instruction.'37
Moreover, Category 1 of the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses lo-
cated in the appendix of the jury instructions also fails to mention either so-
licitation or conspiracy.'38 An argument to include solicitation as a necessar-
ily lesser included offense of conspiracy is not an easy obstacle to overcome.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Ray v. State3 9 has confirmed that the Cate-
gory 1 "schedule is presumptively correct and complete, and the Court ex-
pects that using the schedule will lessen the confusion surrounding lesser
included offenses."' 4 To succeed under this exception, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that Category One of the Schedule of Lesser In-
cluded Offenses is complete and argue that solicitation is a necessarily lesser
included offense to conspiracy.
An argument to include solicitation as a lesser included offense to con-
spiracy is not without merit. Arguments have been made that a solicitation
can also be referred to as an attempted conspiracy.14' In Hutchinson v. State,
the appellant requested a man by the name of Pledger to kill one Dutch
Thomas. 42 Pledger then "reported the incident to the State Attorney's of-
fice."'143 The appellant was convicted of attempted conspiracy, and on appeal
the question was raised whether attempted conspiracy was recognized as a
crime under Florida law.' 44 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed
the conviction, holding that attempted conspiracy was not a crime and a
136. State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 947 (Fla. 2005) (finding that aggravated battery is
not a necessarily lesser included offense of attempted murder recorded under Category One of
the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses).
137. See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 5.2, 5.3 (4th ed.
2002).
138. Id. at609.
139. 403 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1981).
140. Id. at 961 n.7.
141. Hutchinson v. State, 315 So. 2d 546, 547-49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.02 cmt. 1 (Official Draft & Revised Comments
1985) (explaining that "[s]olicitation may... be thought of as an attempt to conspire").
142. Hutchinson, 315 So. 2d at 547.
143. Id.
144. Id. It should be noted that at the time the appellant was convicted, the crime of solici-
tation was not codified but would have to be charged under the crime of common law solicita-
tion under section 775.01 of the 1973 Florida Statutes. Id. This statute made "common law
[crimes] of England in relation to crimes applicable in Florida." Id.
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charge of solicitation would be proper.'45 However, the court did concede to
the proposition that, theoretically, a solicitation is the equivalent to attempted
conspiracy." The law is well-established that an individual who succeeds in
the commission of a crime may not be convicted of both the criminal attempt
and the substantive offense.'4 7 Theoretically, because a solicitation is tanta-
mount to the non-existent crime of attempted conspiracy, an argument could
be made that once the solicitee agrees with the solicitor's proposition then
the object of the solicitation has been completed and would therefore merge
into the conspiracy.'48 In this case, if a jury were to convict the solicitor of
conspiracy, then the lesser offense of solicitation, or theoretically an at-
tempted conspiracy, would be "absorbed by the greater offense."'49
Furthermore, one Florida court has recognized that punishment for so-
licitation is already factored into the sentencing for a conviction of conspir-
acy. 50 In Crofton v. State,'51 the Second District Court of Appeal held that
the trial court departed from the recommended sentencing guidelines and the
case was reversed and remanded.'52 Geraldine Crofton, the defendant, ar-
ranged for her husband to be murdered by seeking out the help of one Vance
Ellison.153 Crofton actively provided information to plan the murder while
Ellison subsequently hired two other individuals to commit the murder.'54
Crofton was later convicted of conspiracy to commit the murder of her hus-
band and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.115  On appeal, Crofton
argued that her conviction had exceeded the recommended sentencing pro-
vided in Florida guidelines. 56 The court reversed the sentence because "the
trial judge improperly considered factors inherent in the underlying crime to
justify departure."'' 57 The Second District Court of Appeal further noted that
"[t]he [lower] court also saw aggravation in the fact that Geraldine solicited
Ellison to commit the murder."' 58 The court then explained that solicitation
145. Hutchinson, 315 So. 2d at 549.
146. Id.
147. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 375 (3d ed. 2001).
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Crofton v. State, 491 So. 2d 317, 319-20 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
151. Id. at317.
152. Id. at 320.
153. Id. at 318.
154. Id.
155. Crofton, 491 So. 2d at 318.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 319. The trial judge improperly considered the fact that the object of the con-
spiracy was murder and that this was already factored into the sentencing guidelines. Id. at
320.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
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to commit murder "is in the very nature of the charge of conspiracy to com-
mit murder and is already factored into the sentencing guidelines."' 9 The
case was sent back to the lower court for resentencing.' 6 According to Crof-
ton, it would appear that punishment for solicitation to commit murder is
already factored into the punishment for conspiracy. 16' Accordingly, solicita-
tion should be a necessarily lesser included offense to conspiracy, thus bar-
ring multiple convictions. 62 Other jurisdictions have dealt with the complex
case of double jeopardy analysis for solicitation and conspiracy and may be




A. Michigan Rejects Double Jeopardy Argument
In Michigan, the issue of whether double jeopardy prohibits multiple
convictions for the crimes of solicitation and conspiracy arising during one
criminal transaction has been raised."6 The case of People v. Jones was de-
cided in an unpublished opinion on March 22, 2005.165 In Jones, the defen-
dant was convicted and sentenced to nineteen to thirty years imprisonment
for solicitation and second-degree murder, and he also received life impris-
onment on a conspiracy count."6 On appeal, the defendant argued that his
convictions violated both federal and state protections against double jeop-
ardy. 67 Similar to the Florida double jeopardy analysis, the Court of Ap-
peals first determined the legislative intent in permitting multiple punish-
ments. 68 However, unlike Florida, the Michigan courts believe "[s]tatutes
prohibiting conduct violative of distinct social norms are generally viewed as
separate and amenable to permitting multiple punishments.' ' 69 The Court of
Appeals then explained that "the purpose of the conspiracy statute is to pro-
159. Corfton, 491 So. 2d at 320.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 319-20.
163. See, e.g., People v. Jones, No. 250326, 2005 WL 657578 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22,
2005); State v. Vallejos, 9 P.3d 668 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d
814 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
164. See Jones, 2005 WL 657578, at *4-5; Burgess, 396 N.W.2d at 825.
165. Jones, 2005 WL 657578, at *1.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id. at *5.
169. Id. (citing People v. Pena, 569 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)).
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tect society from the increased danger presented by group activity as opposed
to individual activity."' 7 ° The court then found that the purpose of the solici-
tation statute was to punish those people who try to induce others into com-
mitting a criminal act. 7' The court held that since the statutes were aimed at
two separate and distinct social norms, conviction for each crime "[did] not
offend double jeopardy principles."' 72 Lastly, the court rejected the defen-
dant's argument that convictions of both solicitation and conspiracy should
be barred because each required proof of the same evidence. 73 This test is
similar to Florida's double jeopardy statute, which exempts those crimes
which require identical elements of proof, thus barring multiple convic-
tions.'74 However, the Supreme Court of Michigan has rejected the adoption
of this test, so the Court of Appeals would not apply an analysis.'75
In Jones, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in coming to their conclusion,
cited the case of People v. Burgess. 76 It should be noted that the court in
Burgess recognized that under double jeopardy there is "a close question...
where ... [a] defendant is convicted of inciting, inducing or exhorting an-
other to commit murder in addition to conspiracy and first-degree murder."'
' 77
This analysis appears misplaced. The Burgess court came to the conclusion
that the intent of the legislature was to punish the solicitation and conspiracy
separately. 78 However, the statute which proscribes solicitation was earlier
found to be "a special kind of accomplice statute," 179 which stated "[a]ny
person who incites, induces or exhorts any other person to unlawfully ...
murder ... shall be punished in the same manner as if he had committed the
offense."' 80 Nonetheless, the court found that the statute was meant to codify
common law crime of solicitation and ultimately upheld the defendant's mul-
tiple convictions. 8' The conclusion in this analysis relied on the legislature's
intent in establishing statutes that were meant to punish individuals for sepa-
rate crimes. 82 Another jurisdiction analyzed a similar "inciting" statute to
170. Jones, 2005 WL 657578, at *4 (citing People v. Sammons, 478 N.W.2d 901, 913
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d 814, 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing Pena, 569 N.W.2d at 875).
173. Id.
174. See FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(1) (2004).
175. Jones, 2005 WL 657578, at *5.
176. Id. (citing People v. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d 814, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).
177. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d at 823.
178. Id. at 824.
179. Id. at 823 (citing People v. Rehkopf, 370 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Mich. 1985)).
180. Id. (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 824.
182. Burgess, 396 N.W.2d at 824.
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the one analyzed in Burgess and came to a different conclusion as to whether
an individual can be convicted of solicitation, conspiracy, and the substantive
offense of murder.'83
B. New Mexico: One Last Defense
In the case of State v. Vallejos, the New Mexico Court of Appeals re-
versed the defendant's convictions for solicitation and conspiracy." 4 In
Vallejos, the defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit
first-degree murder and solicitation to commit murder, arguing that the mul-
tiple punishments violated his protection against double jeopardy. 85 The
state secured a conviction on the fact that the defendant had solicited and
conspired with his nephew, Chris Sedillo, to shoot and kill Sybil Saiz. 86 The
criminal plan was executed; however, the victim, Ms. Saiz, survived. 87 The
defendant was formally adjudicated as guilty of both solicitation and con-
spiracy, but the court imposed concurrent sentences for the dual convic-
tions. 88 The defendant then argued that the merger of the two offenses for
sentencing purposes was in contradiction to his right against double jeop-
ardy.' 89 As a result, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the legislature
intended multiple convictions for crimes relating to a solicitation.'9"
The court first explained that in a prior case, it determined that the
crimes of solicitation and conspiracy merge for purposes of sentencing and
the defendant may only receive a concurrent sentence for the two crimes.' 9'
The court of appeals then stated that "imposition of concurrent sentences did
not render multiple convictions for the same offense harmless," and that "be-
sides habitual liability, other potential adverse collateral consequences flow
from allowing a separate conviction to stand, including delay in the defen-
dant's eligibility for parole, the use of the second conviction for impeach-
ment purposes, and general social stigma."'' 92 The court then concluded that
the crimes of solicitation and conspiracy to commit murder may be prose-
cuted and submitted to a jury which can render a verdict on both counts. 193
183. See State v. Vallejos, 9 P.3d 668 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).




188. Vallejos, 9 P.3d at 674.
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing Swafford v. State, 810 P.2d 1223, 1234 (N.M. 1991)).
191. Id. at 675 (citing State v. Shade, 726 P.2d 864, 878 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)).
192. Id. (citing State v. Pierce, 792 P.2d 408, 419 (N.M. 1990)).
193. Vallejos, 9 P.3d at 675-76.
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However, the court held that the "[d]efendant will not be held 'liable' or
'guilty' of criminal solicitation upon formal adjudication or entry of judg-
ment and sentence by the trial court."'94 Thus, the court vacated the convic-
tion for criminal solicitation.' 95 Analyzing the Florida Statutes codifying
solicitation and conspiracy in light of Florida's accomplice liability statute
may prove to be one last defense in barring multiple convictions for the two
inchoate offenses. 1
96
C. Applying the New Mexico Approach
The New Mexico statute construed in Vallejos was substantially differ-
ent from the Florida statute that punishes criminal solicitation.1 97 The prob-
lems that arose in Vallejos were the statutes "incongruous provisions" cou-
pled with the fact that the statute also combined accomplice liability with the
inchoate crime of solicitation. 98 The New Mexico Court of Appeals was
forced to interpret these provisions strictly and with the principle of lenity
due to the nature of the crimes.' 99 The principle of lenity "requires [the
court] to interpret the statute in favor of the defendant."' ° According to sec-
tion 775.021(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, "[t]he intent of the Legislature is
to convict and sentence for each criminal offense" and "not to allow the prin-
ciple of lenity. ''20' Furthermore, it appears that the legislature intended pun-
ishment for accomplice liability and solicitation separately. Section 777.011
of the Florida Statutes which describes the "[p]rincipal in first degree," or
aider and abettor, is only related to the solicitation statute in that they both
are contained under chapter 777 of the Florida Statutes. °2 However, an ar-
gument can be made regarding the construction of the solicitation statute and
accomplice statute which may require prohibition of multiple punishments.
A "[p]rincipal in the first degree" can be convicted and punished for a
substantive offense if he or she "aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise
procures such offense to be committed. ''20 3 The use of the word "hires" in
both the accomplice liability statute and the solicitation statute may provide
194. Id. at 676 (citing State v. Mondragon, 759 P.2d 1003, 1006 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 775.021 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 777.011 (2004).
197. Compare FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004), with N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-28-3(D) (Lex-
isNexis 1978).
198. Vallejos, 9 P.3d at 675.
199. Id.
200. Id. (citing State v. Odgen, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (N.M. 1994)).
201. FLA. STAT § 775.021(4)(b) (2004).
202. See FLA. STAT §§ 777.011, 777.04(2) (2004).
203. § 777.011 (emphasis added).
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double jeopardy protection when the substantive crime is committed.2 4 An
argument can be made that Zack can only be convicted of murder in this
instance because Zack's guilt of solicitation and the substantive offense of
murder would rely on the same proof of him "hiring" Hunt, and, therefore,
would fall within the statutory exception barring dual convictions.2 °5
It is clear that some bright-line rule regarding these offenses and the
convictions thereof should be established and adopted by Florida. Professors
and legal scholars of the American Law Institute may have created a solution
to double jeopardy issues arising out of multiple convictions for solicitation
and conspiracy.20 6
VI. THE MODEL PENAL CODE: SOLICITATION, CONSPIRACY, AND
COMPLICITY
The Model Penal Code (MPC) and states that have adopted similar pe-
nal statutes have taken a different approach to the inchoate offenses of solici-
tation and conspiracy. 27 According to section 5.02 of the MPC:
A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the pur-
pose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands,
encourages or requests another person to engage in specific con-
duct that would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such
crime or would establish his complicity in its commission or at-
208tempted commission.
The basic language of this statute is very similar to that of section
777.04(2) of the Florida Statutes.2°9 The MPC also provides that a defendant
is still guilty of criminal solicitation even if the actor failed to communicate
the solicitation to another person, so long as his behavior was indicative of a
command, encouragement or request.
21°
204. See State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945 (Fla. 2005) (stating that legislative intent is
determinative in double jeopardy cases); § 775.021(4)(b)(1) (barring dual convictions for
crimes requiring the same elements of proof).
205. See § 775.021(4)(b)(1).
206. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES §§ 5.02(2)-(3), 5.05(3) cmt. I (Official
Draft & Revised Comments 1985).
207. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES §§ 5.02(1), 5.03(1); see also Commonwealth
v. Graves, 508 A.2d 1198, 1198 (Pa. 1986) (finding that an individual may not be convicted of
solicitation and conspiracy if both inchoate offenses are designed towards the commission of
one substantive offense).
208. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.02(1).
209. See FLA. STAT. § 777.04(2) (2004).
210. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.02(1).
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The MPC's statute regarding conspiracy is also very similar to Florida's
statute. According to section 5.03(1) of the MPC:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to
commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its
commission he:
(a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or
more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime or
an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or
commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to com-
mit such crime. t '
Under both the MPC and Florida law, an agreement to commit some criminal
act is a necessary element of conspiracy.212 In addition, unlike Florida law,
the MPC requires that at least one of the co-conspirators commit some overt
act to prove the alleged conspiracy exists.21 3
However, a difference between Florida law and the MPC that is impor-
tant for purposes of this article regards multiple convictions. Accordingly, in
defining the law of solicitation and conspiracy, the MPC provides that "[a]
person may not be convicted of more than one offense defined by this Article
for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the
same crime., 214 Indeed, the MPC reasons that the danger of inchoate crimes
is that they may result in the crime being committed, and, therefore, "there is
no warrant for cumulating convictions of ... solicitation and conspiracy to
commit the same offense. 21 5 Applying the provisions of the MPC to the
illustration of Zack hiring Hunt to kill Ken, Zack will only be guilty of one
inchoate crime, either conspiracy or solicitation, since the inchoate offense is
of "conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the
same crime. 2t 6 Furthermore, the MPC provides that a person may not be
convicted of both an inchoate crime and the substantive offense which was
its object.2 17 Thus, under the MPC, if Hunt murders Ken, Zack will be guilty
211. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.03(1).
212. See id.; § 777.04(3).
213. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.03(5).
214. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.05(3).
215. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.05 cmt. 4.
216. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.05(3).
217. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(l)(b) (Official Draft & Explanatory Notes 1985).
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of murder and punished accordingly, but will not be guilty of either solicita-
tion or conspiracy.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
Florida criminal law providing punishment for the crimes of solicitation
and conspiracy not only raises double jeopardy issues, but also poses a dan-
ger to the efficiency of the Florida criminal justice system. Currently, a jury
can convict an individual of both solicitation and conspiracy that is designed
to culminate into one substantive criminal offense.21 8 An argument that so-
licitation is a lesser included offense or a "degree variant" of conspiracy may
ultimately bar dual convictions under Florida law. However, it appears that
the MPC takes the appropriate view that punishment "should certainly suf-
fice to meet whatever danger is presented by the actor," and the "heaviest
and most afflictive sanctions" should be reserved for the substantive
219
crimes.
It is questionable whether imposing numerous punishments on an indi-
vidual for inchoate crimes which were meant to culminate in the commission
of one substantive offense will act as a deterrent. 20 Furthermore, the Florida
Legislature must enact law that will efficiently "determine under what cir-
cumstances consecutive punishment is to be authorized for the various com-
binations of offenses that arise from unitary conduct. 22 ' To clear up any
confusion raising double jeopardy issues, over-sentencing problems, and
overall efficiency of the Florida criminal law system regarding punishment
for inchoate crimes such as solicitation and conspiracy, the Florida Legisla-
ture should adopt similar provisions to those provided under the Model Penal
Code. However, without such legislation the double jeopardy argument to
bar dual convictions for solicitation and conspiracy designed to achieve one
criminal offense will await its day in court.
218. See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 5.2, 5.3 (2002).
219. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 5.05 cmt. 2 (Official Draft & Revised
Comments 1985).
220. See id.
221. Kevin A. Hicks, Note, A Proposal for Legislative Effectuation of Double Jeopardy
Protection, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 669, 693 (1990).
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